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 Cooperation presents evolutionary theory with an interesting puzzle: why should an 2 
actor help a recipient? Evolutionary explanations of cooperation rely on finding ways through 3 
which cooperative behaviour benefits the actor, by considering the selection on a gene for 4 
cooperation. A critical variable is the relatedness between the actor and the recipient, which 5 
determines the probability that they share the gene for cooperation. Consequently, a classic 6 
expectation is that an actor should only cooperate on the condition that the relatedness between 7 
the actor and the recipient ensures a net gain for the gene for cooperation. However, such 8 
conditional cooperation has been dismissed as an unimportant part of the evolutionary theory 9 
of cooperation because the simpler explanation of unconditional cooperation is usually 10 
sufficient. The scepticism of the relevance of conditional cooperation is often based on two 11 
premises: first there is very little evidence of its importance, and second conditional 12 
cooperation lacks a plausible mechanism for its operation and persistence. In this thesis by 13 
publication, I provide a rebuttal using experimental evidence of conditional cooperation in the 14 
social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, developing theoretical models to examine the 15 
possible mechanisms for conditional cooperation and comparatively situating these arguments 16 
within the broader context of other study systems. Using five papers (and a comment on each), 17 
I present the case that conditional cooperation should not be so easily dismissed, as it seems 18 
likely to be a more important part of the evolutionary explanation of cooperation in nature 19 
than current evidence might suggest.  20 
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Cooperative behaviour is widespread throughout the natural world, and yet it presents 2 
evolutionary theory with a special difficulty (Hamilton, 1964a; b; Williams, 1966; Leigh, 3 
1977; Alexander & Borgia, 1978; Bull & Rice, 1991; Frank, 2003; Sachs et al., 2004; West et 4 
al., 2007a; Bourke, 2011). In cooperation, an actor provides a benefit to a recipient, so why 5 
does the actor do it? Evolutionary explanations of cooperation rely upon finding a way in 6 
which the actor gains from cooperation (West et al., 2007a). These explanations can be 7 
broadly divided into two, which can be understood from a genetic perspective using 8 
Hamilton’s rule, by considering the balance of selection on a gene for cooperation (Hamilton, 9 
1963; Charnov, 1977; Grafen, 1985). First, the actor may indirectly gain when the cooperative 10 
behaviour is altruistic (Hamilton, 1964a), such that the actor pays a direct fitness cost (𝑐 < 0) 11 
to provide a fitness benefit to the recipient (𝑏 > 0). The gene for cooperation may be favoured 12 
by selection despite paying a direct fitness cost in the actor because the same gene is also 13 
carried by the recipient due to relatedness between the actor and recipient (𝑟). The most 14 
prevalent source of relatedness in nature is common ancestry, and so relatedness can be 15 
described with a kinship coefficient (Haldane, 1955; Williams & Williams, 1957; Hamilton, 16 
1963). However, in genetic terms, relatedness can be thought of more generally as the 17 
probability that the actor and recipient share the gene over and above the population average 18 
(and so relatedness can be positive or negative, which the kinship definition can overlook) 19 
(Grafen, 1985). Consequently, the gene for cooperation reaps an indirect fitness benefit from 20 
the recipient is accordance with the benefit-weighted probability of sharing the gene (𝑟𝑏). In 21 
this way, the gene for cooperation is favoured when it has positive inclusive fitness, which is 22 
calculated as the addition of direct and indirect fitness: 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0. When relatedness is 23 
negative, the gene for cooperation is never favoured (because 𝑟𝑏 < 0 making inclusive fitness 24 
always less than zero). Second, the actor may directly gain when the cooperative behaviour is 25 
mutually beneficial to both the actor and the recipient (Hamilton, 1964a). In this case, the actor 26 
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reaps a direct fitness benefit (or negative cost; 𝑐 < 0) and so always has positive inclusive 1 
fitness when relatedness is positive (or zero; because both 𝑟𝑏 > 0 and 𝑐 > 0). However, when 2 
relatedness is negative, the direct fitness negative costs (𝑐 < 0) must outweigh the indirect 3 
fitness positive benefits (𝑏 > 0, given 𝑟 < 0) for cooperation to be favoured (i.e. for inclusive 4 
fitness to be positive). Therefore, for both altruistic and mutually beneficial behaviour, 5 
relatedness always has the potential to reverse the direction of selection on a gene for 6 
cooperation, making Hamilton’s rule a useful approach.  7 
Evolutionary explanations of cooperative behaviour have given particular focus to 8 
altruism (Williams, 1966; Hamilton, 1972; Wilson, 1975b; Frank, 2003; West et al., 2007a; 9 
Bourke, 2011). Many of the most eye-catching forms of cooperation in nature are interpreted 10 
as altruism, including sterile castes in social insects (Hamilton, 1964b), helping at the nest in 11 
birds (Skutch, 1935) and communal care in mammals (Riedman, 1982). Further, altruism 12 
appears more difficult for evolutionary theory to explain because of the problem of cheaters 13 
(Foster, 2004; Sachs et al., 2004; Travisano & Velicer, 2004; West et al., 2006, 2007a; Bourke, 14 
2011; Ghoul et al., 2014). Altruistic behaviour involves an actor paying a cost to give a 15 
recipient a benefit, and so altruistic behaviour is vulnerable to a cheater that is the recipient of 16 
the benefit without ever paying its costs (Hamilton, 1963). This focus may in part be because 17 
the threat of cheaters can be easily studied both theoretically and experimentally. 18 
Theoretically, cheaters can be studied using simple models like a prisoner’s dilemma 19 
(Hamilton, 1971; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1979; Axelrod & Hamilton, 20 
1981), which show that selection does not tend to favour cheaters when relatedness is 21 
sufficiently high (Travisano & Velicer, 2004; West et al., 2006; Bourke, 2011). 22 
Experimentally, cheaters can be studied through competition experiments between a wildtype 23 
and mutant individual/strain (which can easily be generated, e.g. by knock-out out a 24 
cooperative phenotype through random mutagenesis; e.g. Velicer et al., 2000; Foster et al., 25 
2004; Griffin et al., 2004). These studies show that a gene for altruism can be vulnerable to 26 
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invasion by a gene for cheating, which can prevent individuals from reaping the potential 1 
benefits of altruistic behaviour.  2 
 In recent years, there has been some confusion surrounding the focus of evolutionary 3 
explanations of cooperation on the problem of altruistic behaviour due to the conceptual 4 
conflation of cooperation and altruism. Part of this confusion stems from the forms of 5 
cooperation that appear altruistic at first inspection, but have been revealed to be mutually 6 
beneficial after detailed study, like sentinel behaviour in meerkats (Clutton-Brock et al., 7 
1999), cooperative breeding in wasps (Queller et al., 2000) and worker policing in some social 8 
insects (Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2006). Symptomatic of this confusion is the continuing 9 
description of these systems as if they were vulnerable to cheating, which is not the case for 10 
mutually beneficial behaviour. A gene for cheating would be unable to invade a gene for 11 
mutual benefit because, whilst it would gain the indirect fitness benefit of being a recipient, it 12 
would not gain the direct fitness benefit (or negative cost) of being the actor, and so have 13 
lower inclusive fitness. But another part of this confusion also stems from the over-application 14 
of the concept of altruism to biological systems because of the fashionable way that it can 15 
construe cooperation as paradoxically vulnerable to cheaters, leading to confusing 16 
terminology like reciprocal altruism, weak altruism and altruistic punishment, which are all 17 
forms of mutual benefit (West et al., 2007b). 18 
When considering the evolution of a particular cooperative behaviour, the confusion 19 
surrounding its vulnerability to cheating is exacerbated when considering ‘conditional 20 
cooperation’ (sensu Marshall, 2015) where the behaviour is varied in different situations 21 
(Maynard Smith, 1976; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod et al., 2004; 22 
Doebeli et al., 2004; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005). The most-studied form of conditional 23 
cooperation is facultative cooperation, where a gene can switch behaviour between 24 
cooperating or cheating with social partners (Velicer et al., 2000; Abbot et al., 2001; Griffin 25 
et al., 2004; Santorelli et al., 2008; Khare & Shaulsky, 2010; Ferrari et al., 2015; Pollak et al., 26 
2016; Nair et al., 2018). But conditional cooperation need not be all-or-none, as a gene could 27 
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also quantitatively adjust the level of cooperation from anywhere between what appears to be 1 
altruism or cheating dependent upon the social situation (Madgwick et al., 2018). The 2 
vulnerability of conditional cooperation to cheating is, arguably, reduced because 3 
conditionality permits the cooperation to persist in specific situations where cheating may 4 
generally be favoured in the average social situation. But the focus on cheating is really 5 
missing the key question about balance of selection on a gene, where it is anticipated that a 6 
gene for cheating would be outcompeted by a gene for conditional cooperation (which acts as 7 
a cheater in some situations and as a cooperator in others). In this way, conditional cooperation 8 
does not avoid cheating, but instead permits an individual to better exploit their social situation 9 
come what may.  10 
 Conditional cooperation has received some theoretical and experimental study, but 11 
the empirical tests of theory have focused on simple qualitative predictions (Reeve & 12 
Dugatkin, 1998; McNamara, 2013). Consequently, the only forms of conditional cooperation 13 
where theory has been used to derive specific predictions about the patterns of conditional 14 
cooperation involve facultative cooperation comparing two social situations (which are 15 
usually high and low relatedness between social partners; see above) (Velicer et al., 2000; 16 
Abbot et al., 2001; Griffin et al., 2004; Santorelli et al., 2008; Khare & Shaulsky, 2010; Ferrari 17 
et al., 2015; Pollak et al., 2016; Nair et al., 2018) rather than testing quantitative predictions. 18 
In general, there has been a scepticism that conditional cooperation is really important for the 19 
evolutionary explanation of cooperation in biological systems because ‘recognition’ of social 20 
partners (or other features of the social situation) is an unnecessarily complicated hypothesis 21 
for many systems where there is high relatedness (e.g. instead relying on limited dispersal) 22 
(Grafen, 1990; Rousset & Roze, 2007; West et al., 2007a, 2011; Cornwallis et al., 2009; West 23 
& Gardner, 2013). There are several factors that are often used to support this scepticism. 24 
First, there is little evidence that conditional cooperation is important. In counter, I would 25 
argue that this is a premature assessment because many empirical studies simply assume that 26 
cooperation is unconditional at some fixed level (West et al., 2007a; Foster, 2009; Bourke, 27 
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2011). Further, there is likely to be a publication bias; the patterns of conditional cooperation 1 
are, arguably, harder to study than the threat of obligate cheating because conditional 2 
cooperation must be studied within natural (or naturalised laboratory) settings to avoid biasing 3 
the social signals/cues that individuals are using to adjust their level of cooperation, and cannot 4 
simply rely on a simple competition experiment between a wildtype and mutant (knock-out) 5 
strain. Second, it is unclear how conditional cooperation would work mechanistically – both 6 
in the functional and evolutionary senses. Whilst this scepticism is reasonable for some classic 7 
study systems in animals, molecular biology has revealed how signal-receptor proteins can 8 
permit interacting individuals to characterise their social situation (Haig, 1996; Springer et al., 9 
2011). However, the genes that we know about that encode for signal-receptor proteins that 10 
modulates a cooperative behaviour are typically suggested to be greenbeards (Gardner & 11 
West, 2010; Madgwick et al., 2019), which are often thought to only permit simplistic social 12 
traits rather than the complicated traits that we observe (West & Gardner, 2013). Further, any 13 
recognition genes (i.e. greenbeard or kin-selected) are anticipated to be subject to Crozier’s 14 
paradox, whereby more common types are favoured, leading one signal-receptor variant to go 15 
to fixation, which prevents conditional cooperation from persisting (Crozier, 1986; Rousset & 16 
Roze, 2007).  17 
 This thesis by publication contributes to the evolutionary explanation of cooperation 18 
by addressing the puzzle of conditional cooperation. I start from the observation that different 19 
strains of Dictyostelium discoideum appear to exhibit conditional cooperation across 20 
frequencies (Buttery et al., 2009). Paper 1 presents a game theoretic model that describes the 21 
patterns of conditional cooperation that are expected to evolve under natural selection, and 22 
tests these patterns as predictions to demonstrate a close fit of theory and data within chimeric 23 
mixes of two strains. Comment 1 explores how these results tie into the logic of simple 24 
bimatrix games of the prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift and stag hunt. Paper 2 tests predictions 25 
of the patterns of conditional cooperation in chimeric mixes of D. discoideum when there are 26 
more than two strains, showing how nonadaptive constraints on the flexibility of conditional 27 
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cooperation can be beneficial. Comment 2 uses these findings to suggest the likely mechanism 1 
by which strains are adjusting their level of cooperation. Paper 3 generalises the game theoretic 2 
model for D. discoideum to explain the logic of conditional cooperation across different 3 
systems, suggesting how conditional cooperation can lead to negative frequency-dependent 4 
fitness which can overcome Crozier’s paradox. Comment 3 explores how the patterns and 5 
explanation of conditional cooperation are robust to real-world considerations. Paper 4 6 
examines the experimental evidence of greenbeard genes across study systems, which can be 7 
critical in the mechanism of conditional cooperation. Comment 4 makes further mathematical 8 
remarks on greenbeard theory, showing how different conceptions of a greenbeard gene 9 
suggest different properties. Paper 5 takes inspiration from greenbeards to consider how to 10 
improve the design of gene drives, as an application of the logic of conditional cooperation to 11 
a practically useful end. Starting from the greenbeard concept, Comment 5 develops the 12 
concept of an unbeatable gene as a design objective for gene drives. In an overarching 13 
discussion, I bring together my findings. Therefore, starting from a puzzling observation, this 14 
thesis presents the case that conditional cooperation is likely to be a more important part of 15 
the evolutionary explanation of cooperation in nature than current evidence might suggest.  16 
     17 
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Strategic investment explains patterns of cooperation and cheating in a microbe 1 
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 12 
Abstract 13 
Contributing to cooperation is typically costly, while its rewards are often available to all 14 
members of a social group. So why should individuals be willing to pay these costs, especially 15 
if they could cheat by exploiting the investments of others? Kin selection theory broadly 16 
predicts that individuals should invest more into cooperation if their relatedness to group 17 
members is high (assuming they can discriminate kin from non-kin). To better understand how 18 
relatedness affects cooperation, we derived the ‘Collective Investment’ game, which provides 19 
quantitative predictions for patterns of strategic investment depending on the level of 20 
relatedness. We then tested these predictions by experimentally manipulating relatedness 21 
(genotype frequencies) in mixed cooperative aggregations of the social amoeba Dictyostelium 22 
discoideum, which builds a stalk to facilitate spore dispersal. Measurements of stalk 23 
investment by natural strains correspond to the predicted patterns of relatedness-dependent 24 
strategic investment, wherein investment by a strain increases with its relatedness to the group. 25 
10 
 
Furthermore, if overall group relatedness is relatively low (i.e., no strain is at high frequency 1 
in a group) strains face a scenario akin to the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and suffer from insufficient 2 
collective investment. We find that strains employ relatedness-dependent segregation to avoid 3 
these pernicious conditions. These findings demonstrate that simple organisms like D. 4 
discoideum are not restricted to being ‘cheaters’ or ‘cooperators’, but instead measure their 5 
relatedness to their group and strategically modulate their investment into cooperation 6 
accordingly. Consequently, all individuals will sometimes appear to cooperate and sometimes 7 
cheat due to the dynamics of strategic investing.  8 
 9 
Keywords: cooperation; conflict; game theory; cheating; kin selection 10 
 11 
Significance statement  12 
Contributing to cooperation is costly, while its rewards are often available to all members of 13 
a social group. Therefore, cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation by individuals that do not 14 
contribute, but nevertheless share the benefits. So why contribute to cooperation? This 15 
dilemma can be resolved if individuals modulate their ‘investment’ into cooperation 16 
dependent on whether benefits go to relatives or nonrelatives, which maximizes the return on 17 
investment to their genes. To evaluate this idea, we derived a model for cooperative 18 
investment and tested its predictions using a social microbe that cooperatively builds a stalk 19 
to facilitate spore dispersal. We find that cooperative investment into stalk closely matches 20 
predictions, with strains strategically adjusting investment according to their relatedness to 21 





Cooperation is widespread in nature (Hamilton, 1964b; West et al., 2007a; Bourke, 2 
2011), often being manifested as individuals investing in the production of public goods that 3 
benefit all members of a group (Hardin, 1968; Rankin et al., 2007; Frank, 2010). However, 4 
these goods are vulnerable to exploitation by ‘cheaters’ (or ‘free riders’) that reap the benefits 5 
of cooperation without commensurate investment (Hamilton, 1963; Olson, 1965). Because 6 
such behavior has the potential to undermine the evolutionary stability of cooperation through 7 
public good production, successful cooperation is typically thought to require mechanisms of 8 
cheater avoidance or control (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Frank, 2003; Travisano & 9 
Velicer, 2004; West et al., 2007a). This logic implies a simple evolutionary scenario where 10 
there is competition between alternative ‘cooperator’ and ‘cheater’ strategies. However, it is 11 
logical to assume that such discrete strategies would lose out to individuals that can 12 
strategically modify their contribution to public goods. This is because strategic investment 13 
could allow individuals to balance the costs and benefits of ‘investing’, whilst realizing 14 
potential opportunities to exploit the investments made by others (Ostrom, 1990; Doebeli et 15 
al., 2004). Because these costs and benefits can vary across social settings, individuals face a 16 
strategic dilemma over how much to invest, with the realized success of a strategy depending 17 
not only on the level of cooperative investments made by the individual, but also that made 18 
by others in the group.  19 
Kin selection theory provides an appealing framework for understanding how 20 
evolution shapes investment in cooperation. In this framework, the competing ‘individuals’ 21 
are different genetic variants (Williams, 1966; Cosmides & Tooby, 1981; Taylor et al., 2007), 22 
with strategies evolving to maximize ‘inclusive fitness’ (Grafen, 2006a; West & Gardner, 23 
2013). The inclusive fitness accounting considers the total impact of a behavior on the success 24 
of the causal genes in terms of the direct costs to the actor and indirect benefits to relatives 25 
(i.e., others carrying that same genetic variant). For cooperation through production of public 26 
goods, where all benefits go to the entire group, relatedness to the group should be a critical 27 
12 
 
determinant of inclusive fitness because it governs the share of rewards that go to the 1 
individual, and hence determines the expected net return on investment. Consequently, we 2 
would logically expect that individuals should optimize their inclusive fitness by facultatively 3 
modulating their willingness to invest into public goods as a function of their relatedness to 4 
the members of the group (Hamilton, 1964a; Taylor & Frank, 1996; Pepper, 2000; Frank, 5 
2010).  6 
A number of theoretical studies have analyzed facultative cooperative strategies, 7 
where individuals modulate their behavior in response to social context (such as the behaviors 8 
shown by rivals) (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005). While most of these 9 
studies have focused on discrete alternative strategies (‘cooperate’ or ‘cheat’) (Axelrod & 10 
Hamilton, 1981; Doebeli et al., 2004), there is also a growing literature that considers 11 
continuously variable strategic cooperative behavior in response to social contexts, including 12 
relatedness (Doebeli & Hauert, 2005; Frank, 2010). However, experimental tests of theoretical 13 
predictions often either rely on the simpler models that do not include such potential 14 
complexity (Sinervo & Lively, 1996; Dugatkin & Reeve, 1998; Turner & Chao, 1999; Bshary 15 
et al., 2008; Gore et al., 2009) or do not evaluate whether the observed facultative patterns are 16 
strategic (i.e., match adaptive quantitative predictions from evolutionary models) (Buttery et 17 
al., 2009; Manhes & Velicer, 2011; Parkinson et al., 2011; Xavier et al., 2011; Pollak et al., 18 
2016; Bruce et al., 2017). For example, the opportunistic pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa 19 
facultatively produces iron-scavenging siderophores, which represent a cooperative public 20 
good (West & Buckling, 2003; Griffin et al., 2004; Diggle et al., 2007). Cells produce quorum-21 
sensing molecules that that allow them to modulate their production of siderophores. There is 22 
evidence that investment into siderophore production is flexible (West & Buckling, 2003; 23 
Diggle et al., 2007) and varies between broad-scale differences of ‘high’ versus ‘low’ 24 
relatedness (Griffin et al., 2004). However, it is unclear as to whether the level of production 25 
can be varied quantitatively as a strategic response to fine-grained variation in relatedness.  26 
13 
 
To understand how selection shapes patterns of investment into public goods in 1 
response to variation in relatedness, we therefore first developed a dynamic game-theoretical 2 
framework that views competing genetic variants as players who can modulate their 3 
contributions to public goods based on their relatedness to their group. The resulting 4 
‘Collective Investment’ game offers an intuitive economic logic for why and how organisms 5 
should modulate their contributions to public goods and provides a set of simple and 6 
unambiguous predictions that can be tested empirically. To directly test these predictions, we 7 
next examined the consequences of experimentally manipulating social group composition in 8 
the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum on patterns of individual and collective 9 
investment in cooperation. These studies revealed a remarkable agreement between patterns 10 
of individual and collective investment with fine-scale model predictions, where patterns of 11 
cooperation are explained by savvy investment strategies that maximize the fitness return on 12 
investment.  13 
 14 
Results and Discussion 15 
The Collective Investment game 16 
When individuals engage in social interactions, their success typically depends on 17 
both their own behavior and the behavior of their social partner(s). Under these conditions, 18 
game theory provides a powerful framework for identifying how individuals should behave to 19 
maximize their expected social success across encounters (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; 20 
Maynard Smith, 1974; Queller et al., 1985; Taylor et al., 2007). Game theoretical models 21 
predict that individuals will display the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), which cannot be 22 
invaded by any competing strategy (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Taylor et al., 2007). In 23 
most economic and biological scenarios that involve cooperation, we might logically expect 24 
that individuals could do better by playing dynamic strategies in which they change their 25 
behavior quantitatively across different social contexts (Hamilton, 1964b; Ostrom, 1990). 26 
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While games with fixed alternative strategies (e.g., the Prisoner’s Dilemma) have been widely 1 
used as the basis for analyses of strategic modulation of cooperative behavior (Doebeli & 2 
Hauert, 2005; Frank, 2010), they do not yield any quantitative predictions about continuously 3 
variable behavior. Instead, models that consider cooperation via public goods (Frank, 1995, 4 
2010; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005; Dionisio & Gordo, 2006), typically based on the inclusive 5 
fitness framework (Taylor, 1992; Taylor & Frank, 1996; Frank, 1998), have proven more 6 
informative. We extend this work by developing a model based on an equivalent ‘direct 7 
fitness’ accounting, where different genetic variants are the players in a dynamic game, to 8 
provide an intuitive logic for the costs and benefits of investing in pubic goods.  The game is 9 
described with two players, but logically extends to include more.  10 
The Collective Investment game is based on a scenario in which the payoff to a player 11 
is determined by two opposing factors: the costs suffered from investing in the public good 12 
and the resulting benefits from public good availability (Figure 1A). From the perspective of 13 
the group, this antagonistic relationship between costs and benefits results in a scenario where 14 
group success is maximized at some intermediate level of collective investment whenever 15 
public good production is favored by natural selection (Figure 1B). Examples of this sort of 16 
scenario, where overall success is maximized at an intermediate level of investment, are well 17 
documented, ranging from economics to biology (Gordon, 1954; Parker & Maynard Smith, 18 
1990; Foster, 2004; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005). However, the level of collective investment that 19 
maximizes group success (denoted ΘG in the model) will typically differ from the level of 20 
personal investment that maximizes individual fitness (Frank, 2003). This is because 21 
individuals suffer the cost of investment, yet their payoffs are divided among the collective. 22 
Therefore, we expect individuals to implement selfish strategies that maximize their return on 23 
investment in terms of fitness, which must balance their personal costs with the return they 24 
receive through their influence on collective success (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). The 25 
relative magnitude of the costs and benefits together define the strength of selection (denoted 26 
15 
 
 in the model), which reflects the rate at which group success declines as investment deviates 1 
from the level that maximizes group success (i.e., deviates from 𝛩𝐺). 2 




Figure 1. The costs and benefits of cooperation through production of public goods. A) The 2 
benefit (relative payoff) from public good production is an increasing function of the resources 3 
invested into the public good (blue line). Because investment is costly it results in a decreasing 4 
payoff through other components (red line). In the case of the D. discoideum system, the 5 
benefits of stalk investment come through spore dispersal and come at a cost in terms of 6 
reduced spore production. B) The costs and benefits of investment in the public good result in 7 
a quadratic relationship between total investment (𝐼𝐺) and overall group success (𝜔𝐺). Groups 8 
have their highest success at some intermediate level of investment (𝛩𝐺) that balances costs 9 
and benefits. In both A and B, investment in public good is given as the proportion of the total 10 
budget available, with zero being no investment and 1 corresponding to investment of all 11 
available budget into the public good. In the case of the D. discoideum system, this represents 12 
the proportion of cells that a strain invests into stalk production. For illustration, the optimal 13 
level of investment (𝛩𝐺) resulting from the relative costs and benefits is 0.3. To capture 14 
different strengths of selection on investment (, see equation 5), the bold lines were plotted 15 
for a strength of selection where  = 2, with the shaded region indicating the range from  = 16 
1 to 4.  17 
  18 
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To implement our direct fitness accounting, we consider a player to represent some 1 
proportion of the group, which is equivalent to the frequency of that genetic variant within the 2 
group (and therefore can vary between 0 and 1) and represents their ‘whole-group relatedness’ 3 
(Taylor & Frank, 1996; Pepper, 2000) (in economic terms, this might be described as a 4 
player’s ‘stake’ in the group). This measure of relatedness is relevant because, as the benefits 5 
of public goods are accessible to all group members, the whole-group is the beneficiary of 6 
investment made by an individual, and hence whole-group relatedness accounts for direct 7 
fitness return from investing in public goods. Despite differing from the more typical ‘kinship’ 8 
coefficient of inclusive fitness models, the two approaches produce exactly equivalent results 9 
(Taylor & Frank, 1996; Frank, 1998; Pepper, 2000). To identify the strategy that maximizes 10 
expected individual fitness, which represents the ESS for the game, we solved the Collective 11 
Investment game across the full range of relatedness over a broad array of relative costs and 12 
benefits of investment in public goods. These analyses revealed a general qualitative 13 
prediction for patterns of investment under the ESS: individuals should modulate their 14 
investment into public goods as a continuous function of their relatedness to the group. By 15 
evaluating the patterns predicted by the model across an enormous range of values for the 16 
optimal level of collective investment (i.e., the value that maximizes group success, 𝛩𝐺) and 17 
the strength of selection on investment (), it is clear that the qualitative results are robust 18 
across a wide array of conditions (Figure 2A and 2D; see also SI Appendix, Figure S1A, S1D, 19 
S1G and S1J). When there is a relatively large asymmetry in the degree to which players are 20 
related to the group, each player should behave differently. The player with higher relatedness 21 
to the group has the incentive to invest because their interests are more closely aligned with 22 
those of the group (and hence investing maximizes their fitness, see SI Appendix, Figure S2), 23 
while the player(s) that is less related to the group does best by withholding investment (or 24 
under-investing) and exploiting the investment of their partner (SI Appendix, Figure S2). 25 
Consequently, under these conditions, the player with the lower relatedness will have higher 26 
relative fitness than the player with higher relatedness because of this exploitative behavior 27 
(Figure 2B and 2E, see also SI Appendix, Figure S1B, S1E, S1H and S1K). In contrast, when 28 
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the players have similar levels of relatedness to the group, neither is expected to be willing to 1 
invest heavily, leading to a pattern of under-investment in the public good (Figure 2C and 2F; 2 
see also SI Appendix, Figure S1C, S1F, S1I and S1L). 3 
Because organisms in nature presumably rely on some cue(s) to measure their level 4 
of relatedness to the group (which would represent a mechanism of kin discrimination), we 5 
also evaluated how the patterns would be affected if individuals make errors when measuring 6 
relatedness (with the patterns in Figure 2 and S1 illustrating the scenario of no measurement 7 
error). We included measurement error in the model by integrating over a Gaussian 8 
distribution centered on the true relatedness (allowing us to vary the degree of error by 9 
modulating the standard deviation of the error distribution, SI Appendix, Figure S3). We 10 
further assumed that measurement error depends on group complexity, and so is high at 11 
intermediate levels of relatedness (where group composition is the most complex), and low 12 
when one player has very high relatedness to the group. This extension of the model provides 13 
us with a robust and clear set of predictions for what to expect in nature (see Figure 3 for an 14 
example and SI Appendix, Figure S4 for illustrations across parameter space). Together, the 15 
Collective Investment game reveals that although the exact patterns will depend on the relative 16 
costs and benefits of public good production (which will determine the optimal level of 17 
investment and the relative strength of selection on investment patterns) and the degree of 18 
error in measurement of relatedness, the qualitative patterns of individual investment, relative 19 
fitness, and collective investment are consistent across parameter space (see also SI Appendix, 20 
Figure S2B for an illustration of absolute fitness).  21 






Figure 2. Examples of the predictions of the Collective Investment game (and specific 1 
application to the D. discoideum system). Predictions are plotted as a function of a focal 2 
player’s relatedness to the group (i.e. a strain’s frequency in the group). For parts A-C the 3 
optimal investment (𝛩𝐺) was fixed at 0.3 and the strength of selection () was varied, while 4 
for D-F the strength of selection was fixed at 2 and the optimum was varied. A & D) Predicted 5 
Investment (𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) in the public good (stalk investment) as a function of relatedness 6 
(frequency). B & E) Predicted relative payoff (fitness) (𝜌𝑖) as a function of relatedness 7 
(frequency). C & F) Predicted collective investment (𝐼𝐺) for a pair of players as a function of 8 
the relatedness (frequency) of the focal player to the group. (See SI Appendix, Figure S1 for 9 
illustrations across other parameter values).  10 






Figure 3. Illustration of the predictions of the Collective Investment game for the case where 1 
players make errors when measuring their relatedness. This corresponds to the scenario where 2 
players have imperfect information about their relatedness and are estimating their relatedness 3 
from some cues. The structure of the figure matches that of Figure 2. In all figures the optimal 4 
level of investment (𝛩𝐺) is 0.3 and the strength of selection () is 2. Lines within each figure 5 
correspond to different values of error () in measurement of relatedness (frequency in the 6 
group) (see SI Appendix, Figure S4 for illustrations across other parameter values). 7 
  8 
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Individual and collective investment in D. discoideum 1 
 To test whether organisms are able to deploy the relatedness-dependent (and hence 2 
frequency-dependent) strategies predicted by the Collective Investment game, we measured 3 
patterns of investment into a public good in the social amoeba D. discoideum. Free-living D. 4 
discoideum amoebae initiate a social cycle in response to starvation (Strassmann et al., 2000; 5 
Kessin, 2001). Thousands of amoebae aggregate to form a multicellular fruiting body with a 6 
supporting stalk composed of dead cells that holds aloft a sporehead. The stalk structure is 7 
thought to have evolved to aid spore dispersal, and it has been shown experimentally that an 8 
intact fruiting body does indeed increase dispersal (although dispersal is not eliminated by 9 
stalk removal) (Smith et al., 2014). Stalk cell differentiation has typically been viewed as 10 
altruistic self-sacrifice for the benefit of the cells in the sporehead (Strassmann et al., 2000, 11 
2011; Foster et al., 2004; Shaulsky & Kessin, 2007). However, this perspective ignores the 12 
implications of collective investment on the group’s success: if a genotype only produced 13 
altruists then there would be no spores to reap the benefits of stalk investment and likewise, if 14 
a genotype only produced spores then they would be unable to reap group benefits of 15 
producing a stalk (Figure 1A). Consequently, there must be some intermediate level of stalk 16 
investment that is favored by natural selection that balances these costs and benefits (Figure 17 
1B). Indeed, laboratory measurements reveal that typically 25-35% of cells are allocated to 18 
the stalk cell fate (Forman & Garrod, 1977; Chattwood et al., 2013).  19 
Multicellular aggregations can also be composed of multiple strains (i.e. can be 20 
chimeric), providing the opportunity for conflict over stalk investment (Strassmann et al., 21 
2000; Foster et al., 2002). Conflict arises because the different strains within an aggregation 22 
each contribute to the costs for building the stalk, while all members of the aggregation benefit 23 
equally. Thus, stalk investment in D. discoideum fits the scenario modelled by the Collective 24 
Investment game. In our direct fitness accounting, different strains are the relevant fitness-25 
maximizing strategists, with the proportion of cells sacrificed by the strain to build the stalk 26 
representing their investment into the public good, and their relative frequency within the 27 
24 
 
aggregation determining their relatedness to the group (Figure 1). Furthermore, D. discoideum 1 
provides an ideal model social system to experimentally test the predictions made by the 2 
Collective Investment game because group composition can be manipulated and 3 
corresponding patterns of investment can be measured quantitatively (Strassmann et al., 4 
2000). Specifically, the ESS of the Collective Investment game predicts that D. discoideum 5 
strains should show relatedness-dependent patterns of investment, meaning that their 6 
investment should change as a function of their frequency in a group. When a strain is at low 7 
frequency in the aggregation they would be predicted to invest little or nothing into the stalk 8 
(hence produce mostly spores), while a strain that is at a high frequency in an aggregation 9 
should invest at a level that is close to their clonal investment (Figure 2A and 2D). This pattern 10 
of investment results in a return on investment, and hence relative fitness, that is highest when 11 
a strain is at low frequency in an aggregation and hence has low relatedness (because it 12 
exploits its partner as a free rider) and is lowest when it is at high frequency and hence has 13 
high relatedness (because it pays the cost of being exploited). Consequently, the expected 14 
relative fitness of the lower-frequency player is always higher than that of the higher-15 
frequency player (Figure 2B and 2E).  16 
To test these predictions, we measured the behavior of co-occurring natural D. 17 
discoideum strains in clonal and chimeric development. We examined the fit to theoretical 18 
predictions using data from ten naturally co-occurring strains, which represent the spectrum 19 
of genetic diversity within a natural population (Gruenheit et al., 2017), interacting in 34 20 
different chimeric pairings. To vary levels of relatedness we combined pairs of strains across 21 
a range of frequencies (at least five different frequencies per replicate, for a total of 944 22 
chimeric combinations). On average, strains show patterns of frequency-dependent 23 
investment in the stalk in pairwise mixes that match the qualitative predictions of the ESS in 24 
the Collective Investment game (compare Figure 4A with 4D, see also expected values in 25 
Figures 2A, 2D, and 3A). Strains invest little into the stalk when their relative frequency in a 26 
group is low and much more when their relative frequency is high (χ2(3) = 181.5, p < 10‒38, see 27 
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also Figures S5A and S5B for high resolution illustrations of patterns from two pairings). 1 
Overall, the pattern very closely corresponds to the quantitative predictions of the model 2 
(Figure 4A and 4D). Strains approach zero investment when they are at a very low frequency 3 
in a group, whereas their investment is close to the optimal level of investment (assumed to 4 
be about 30% of their cells into stalk) when their frequency in a group approaches 100%. This 5 
pattern of investment leads to the pattern of frequency dependent relative fitness predicted by 6 
the Collective Investment game (Figure 2B, 2E, and 3B) in which strains have a high relative 7 
fitness when they are at a low frequency in a group and low relative fitness when they are at 8 
high frequency (χ2(3) = 348, p < 10‒75; compare the illustration of expected values in Figure 4B 9 
with the experimental results in Figure 4E, see also Figures S5C and S5D). Importantly, these 10 
results imply that all strains will appear to behave as ‘cheaters’ when at low frequency in 11 
groups and as ‘cooperators’ when at high frequency.  12 
 The predictions of the Collective Investment game can also be viewed from the 13 
perspective of the aggregate behavior of the strains in terms of total collective investment. 14 
Experimental measurements of total collective investment as a function of the relative 15 
frequencies of strains shows the predicted pattern of relative investment in stalk across 16 
frequencies in a group (Figure 2C, 2F and 3C), where investment is lowest when strains are 17 
at the same frequency, and increases exponentially as the difference in their frequencies 18 
increases (i.e. as frequency of the focal strain approaches zero or one) (χ2(2) = 144.3, p < 10‒19 
32; compare the illustration of expected patterns in Figure 4C with empirical results in Figure 20 
4F, see also S5E and S5F).  21 






Figure 4. Patterns of stalk investment, relative fitness, and collective investment as a function 1 
of strain frequencies in chimeric aggregations. Parts A-C illustrate expected patterns (see 2 
Figure 3) under parameter values that resemble the empirical results (using the same equations 3 
[eqns. 8-10]1 to calculate model expectations as those used for empirical estimation), with the 4 
bold line corresponding to the case where 𝛩𝐺=0.3,  = 2, and  =  with the shading 5 
spanning a range of error in measurement of frequency (relatedness) ( = 0.25 to  = 0.75). 6 
Parts D-F show empirical results from the set of 34 chimeric pairs (N=944 total chimeric 7 
mixes), with the points representing the means and the bars their standard errors, estimated 8 
from a mixed model (following the model structure in the Methods, but with frequency as a 9 
categorical factor). D) Individual stalk investment by a focal strain as a function of its 10 
frequency in a chimeric aggregation., E) Relative fitness for a focal strain as a function of its 11 
frequency in a chimeric aggregation, F) Collective investment by chimeras as a function of 12 
the frequency of a randomly assigned focal strain to the chimeric aggregation. In parts D and 13 
E the bold curve represents the best-fit estimate from the cubic regression model (here fitted 14 
to the estimated means). For part F, the curve represents the best-fit estimated from a quadratic 15 
regression model (fitted to the estimated means). For all three figures (parts D to F) the shaded 16 
region indicates a one standard error interval on either side of the best-fit line. For individual 17 
(parts A and D) and collective (parts C and F) investment values were re-scaled by subtracting 18 
1 − 𝛩𝐺 from the raw measures, under the assumption that 𝛩𝐺 = 0.3 (therefore, the value 19 
labelled as 𝛩𝐺 corresponds to a value of 0.3 in the figure).  20 
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1 These equations were given incorrectly in the published manuscript as “[eqns. 11-13]”. I have 
corrected the text to the correct equation numbers.  
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The Prisoner’s Dilemma and how to avoid it  1 
Although the ESS is characterized by continuously variable relatedness-dependent (or 2 
frequency-dependent) behavior (Figure 2), to achieve a more intuitive understanding we can 3 
link the payoff structure at any particular group composition to canonical games. To do so, at 4 
a given group composition we can compare the relative payoffs to a player that defects by 5 
making no contribution and the relative payoffs to a player that cooperates by making a 6 
contribution (see Methods). We consider a scenario to be akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma when 7 
defection is the best strategy for both players, regardless of the opponent’s strategy. In the 8 
Snowdrift game, we expect players to adopt opposite roles, with one cooperating and the other 9 
defecting. Therefore, we consider two different scenarios to be akin to the Snowdrift game. 10 
The first scenario follows the structure of the classic symmetrical game, where players are 11 
better off defecting against a cooperator and cooperating against a defector. The second 12 
scenario occurs when there is an asymmetry between players that dictates their roles in the 13 
Snowdrift game, with one player doing best by cooperating while the other does best by 14 
defecting.  15 
The exact nature of payoffs depend on the model parameters, but in general, when the 16 
players’ differ widely in their relatedness to the group, we find that the pattern of joint payoffs 17 
are akin to the Snowdrift game and when they have similar levels of relatedness to the group 18 
it is akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Doebeli et al., 2004; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005) (Figure 19 
5). Under the Snowdrift game, one player adopts the role as the cooperator and the other as 20 
the defector, which results in relatively high fitness for the group. By adopting different roles, 21 
the defector receives a higher payoff than the cooperator, but the cooperator is willing to adopt 22 
that role because it is better off cooperating than defecting when its opponent defects (Doebeli 23 
& Hauert, 2005). In the context of the Collective Investment game, it is the asymmetry in 24 
relatedness to the group that drives the players to adopt the two roles (Figure 5), with the 25 
player that is more related to the group acting as the cooperator while its opponent is able to 26 
defect (Figure 2A, 2D and 3A), leading to a higher relative payoff to the defector (Figure 2B, 27 
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2E and 3B). In contrast, under the Prisoner’s Dilemma conditions (Figure 5), both players do 1 
best by defecting, which leads to low collective investment (Figure 2C, 2F and 3C). These 2 
game scenarios help explain the pattern of collective investment in stalk that we observe in 3 
the D. discoideum system (Figure 4F): under the Snowdrift game conditions we see collective 4 
investment approach the level seen in clonal development (which presumably evolved to 5 
maximize group fitness), whereas under the Prisoner’s Dilemma conditions we see 6 
underinvestment. 7 




Figure 5. Payoff structure of the Collective Investment game and relationship to classic 2 
games. Payoffs are characterized in terms of whether defection or investment is favored, or 3 
whether the best strategy depends on the investment by the opponent (labeled as ‘Conflict’). 4 
The best strategy for the focal player is shown in red and that of their opponent in blue. When 5 
both players do best by defecting the overall payoff structure is akin to the Prisoner’s 6 
Dilemma, and we see low levels of total investment (see Figure 2). When one player does best 7 
by investing while its opponent does best by defecting the overall payoff structure is akin to 8 
an asymmetric Snowdrift game, where the difference in relatedness determines which player 9 
takes the role as the cooperator (with the player with higher relatedness making the investment 10 
in cooperation). Bridging these two regions is a zone of conflict. The bold lines correspond to 11 
a level of investment of 
1
2







The shaded region illustrates that the zones corresponding to the different games will depend 13 
on how much an individual invests when cooperating.   14 
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 We expect the predicted collective underinvestment under the Prisoner’s Dilemma 1 
conditions to be detrimental compared to the higher investment under Snowdrift conditions. 2 
We tested this by measuring the proportion of fruiting bodies that collapsed due to inadequate 3 
investment in the stalk. Fruiting bodies made by chimeric mixtures (using all pair-wise 50:50 4 
mixes of ten natural strains) were found to have spontaneously collapsed more often than those 5 
made by clonal groups (12% versus 1.1%, F(1,52.3) = 10.4, p = 0.002). Furthermore, we expect 6 
the stability of fruiting bodies to reflect the overall level of collective investment in stalk, 7 
which should be manifested as an inverse relationship between the level of collective 8 
investment (Figure 4F) and the probability of fruiting body collapse. We tested this prediction 9 
using data from four pairs of strains measured at seven frequencies and find the expected 10 
negative correlation between collective investment for a given pair and probability of their 11 
fruiting bodies collapsing (r = −0.94, p = 0.0009). This relationship between investment and 12 
fruiting body stability underlies a strongly frequency (and hence relatedness) dependent risk 13 
of fruiting body collapse, with risk of collapse peaking when is there is no asymmetry in the 14 
frequency of the strains (i.e. both strains at a frequency of 0.5) and declining exponentially as 15 
the difference in frequencies increases (i.e. on either size of a frequency of 0.5) (χ2(4) = 403, p 16 
< 10‒86; Figure 6A, Figures S6 and S7). If we use fruiting body stability (which is simply 1 17 
minus the probability of fruiting body collapse) as a proxy for the dispersal success of a group 18 
(𝜙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙(𝐺)) and the estimates for individual stalk investment (see Figure 4D) to estimate 19 
fitness through spores (as simply 1 minus the proportion of cells invested in stalk; see eqn. 1), 20 
we can generate an approximate pattern of individual fitness (see eqn. 3). Despite the fact that 21 
our lab-based measure of fruiting body stability provides only a rough approximation for 22 
group fitness through dispersal, we find that the pattern of individual fitness closely matches 23 
the pattern expected under the Collective Investment game (SI Appendix, Figure S2C and 24 
S2D). The resulting fitness pattern illustrates that individuals will have the lowest possible 25 
fitness when at intermediate frequencies and, while individuals always do best at very low 26 
frequency in a group, individual fitness increases towards both frequency extremes.  27 




Figure 6. Empirical measures of fruiting body stability and segregation behavior. A) The 2 
proportion of fruiting bodies that spontaneously collapsed as a function of the frequency of 3 
the focal strain in each mix (estimated from six chimeric pairings; N=324). B) The relative 4 
degree of segregation as a function of the frequency of the designated focal strain. 5 
Measurements are from three different chimeric pairings across the nine frequencies (N=692 6 
total sporeheads, with an average of 25.6 sporeheads measured for each pair at each 7 
frequency). In both figures, the points represent the means and the bars their standard errors, 8 
estimated from a mixed model (following the model structure in the Methods, but with 9 
frequency as a categorical factor). For part A, the curve gives the best fit cubic relationship 10 
while for part B the curve gives the best fit quadratic relationship (with the shaded region 11 
indicating a one standard error range on either side of the curve).  12 
  13 
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The finding that individuals suffer a much larger cost from conflict when trapped in 1 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma-like conditions at intermediate levels of relatedness (Figure 5 and 6A) 2 
raises the question of why strains would engage in cooperative fruiting body formation under 3 
these conditions. Indeed, widespread (imperfect) strain segregation is a known mechanism in 4 
D. discoideum for avoiding chimerism when strains are mixed at equal frequencies and 5 
developed on a natural soil substrate (Benabentos et al., 2009; Gilbert et al., 2012), with two 6 
rapidly evolving genes being thought to be principally responsible (Benabentos et al., 2009; 7 
Gruenheit et al., 2017). Although the mechanism by which these genes regulate segregation 8 
remains to be fully elucidated, there is evidence to suggest that a critical mass of self-self-9 
interactions are required for the coordinated directional motility that is necessary to form 10 
independent cooperating groups (Ho & Shaulsky, 2015). We might, therefore, expect strains 11 
to only show segregation when faced with Prisoner’s Dilemma-like conditions (i.e. low 12 
asymmetry in relatedness), while remaining in aggregations when in Snowdrift-like conditions 13 
of high asymmetry in levels of relatedness. Indeed, as predicted, we find that segregation is 14 
highest when there is little asymmetry in frequencies (relatedness) and declines exponentially 15 
as the difference in frequencies increases (χ2(2) = 19, p < 10‒4; Figure 6B). The frequency-16 
dependent nature of segregation suggests that it may not have evolved as a mechanism of 17 
‘cheater avoidance’, as has previously been suggested (Benabentos et al., 2009; Gilbert et al., 18 
2012; Gruenheit et al., 2017), but rather, as a mechanism for reshaping group composition to 19 
generate asymmetry in relative frequencies (resulting in a scenario where there will typically 20 
be a strain with high relatedness to the group), thereby avoiding the pernicious Prisoner’s 21 
Dilemma-like conditions and entering into the more favorable Snowdrift-like conditions.  22 
 23 
The logic of collective investment 24 
The Collective Investment game and the supporting empirical data from the D. 25 
discoideum system have broad implications for our understanding of cooperative behavior. 26 
From the perspective of kin selection theory, an individual’s relatedness to the group governs 27 
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whether the personal cost of contributing to public goods are outweighed by the benefit. 1 
Consequently, if individuals can measure their relatedness to group-mates, we would expect 2 
to see them invest in a way that maximizes inclusive fitness in terms of the balance between 3 
the benefit to kin in relation to the costs to self (following Hamilton’s rule in the context of 4 
the ESS, which means that the optimal strategy depends on the behavior of opponents). 5 
Applying this logic to the D. discoideum system, an individual cell should modulate its 6 
‘willingness’ to differentiate into a stalk cell based on its measurement of relatedness to other 7 
members of its aggregation, with the actual level of investment being determined by the 8 
benefits of producing a stalk relative to the cost of diminished spore production. From an 9 
economics perspective, we can view players as investors in some collective venture who are 10 
out to maximize return on investment, with relatedness representing their level of ‘stake’ or 11 
‘ownership’ in the venture. When a player has a low relatedness to the group, their personal 12 
investment can have little effect on the overall performance of the venture (regardless of how 13 
much they invest), so they are better off withholding their investment. In contrast, when a 14 
player has high relatedness to the group their investment can have a large impact on the 15 
performance of the venture. Therefore, they should be willing to invest more heavily. In the 16 
context of the D. discoideum system, this perspective logically implies that a strain at a low 17 
frequency in an aggregation cannot impact the performance of the fruiting body regardless of 18 
how much it invests into stalk, and hence that strain should withhold their investment. Finally, 19 
we can view the scenario from the perspective of a dynamic game, with individuals as players 20 
out to maximize their payoff. From this perspective, a player contributes to the public good 21 
because they directly benefit from their own contribution and the optimal strategy is 22 
determined by the benefit they receive in relation to the cost paid (see Figure 1A). Players 23 
with low representation in the group do not contribute much to the public good because their 24 
contribution is diluted by the group, so they receive back only a small fraction of what they 25 
invest. In contrast, a player with high representation in the group should invest more because 26 
they receive back most of the benefit, and consequently they are mostly helping themselves 27 
through production of the public good. In the context of the D. discoideum system, this 28 
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perspective implies that a strain with a high frequency in an aggregation should contribute 1 
heavily to stalk production because most of the benefit goes to their own spores, and lower 2 
investment would only hurt them. The result is that a strain with a lower frequency, who would 3 
see little return on their contribution, can be exploitative since it is in the best interests of a 4 
common strain to build a stalk to their own benefit.  5 
 Although these different perspectives suggest different logical explanations for why 6 
and how individuals should invest in public goods, they are ultimately interchangeable since 7 
all are based on the same underlying framework. All suggest that organisms should adopt 8 
dynamic strategies in which they modulate their contribution to cooperation through public 9 
goods in relation to their relatedness to the group. Furthermore, it suggests that approaches 10 
where organisms are simply classified as ‘cooperators’ and ‘cheaters’ (Maynard Smith, 1976; 11 
Doebeli et al., 2004; Travisano & Velicer, 2004) will often fail to capture the true nature of 12 
cooperative behavior in many systems. Indeed, the same individual or genotype could be 13 
expected to be cooperative or exploitative depending on their relatedness to the group. This 14 
scenario is clearly realized in the D. discoideum system. Although strains have typically been 15 
viewed as cooperators and cheaters (Strassmann et al., 2000; Gilbert et al., 2007; Strassmann 16 
& Queller, 2012; Santorelli et al., 2013), the striking fit of the observed investment behavior 17 
by natural strains to the predictions of the Collective Investment game (Figure 4) provides 18 
strong evidence they cooperative through the implementation of a dynamic frequency-19 
dependent strategy. As a result, all strains can appear as cheaters when they are at a relatively 20 
low frequency in a group and as cooperators when they are at a relatively high frequency. Our 21 
finding that even simple organisms like a social amoeba can implement the sorts of savvy 22 
relatedness-dependent investment suggests that these dynamic adaptive strategies may be 23 




Materials and Methods 1 
The Collective Investment game  2 
The Collective Investment game is a two-player game in which each individual makes 3 
an investment into a public good and receives a payoff as a function of their own investment 4 
and the collective investment of the pair. The structure of the game is related to economic 5 
games of public goods (Olson, 1965; Frank, 2010), but differs in that the return on investment 6 
is a function of a player’s relatedness to the group. The game is described with reference to 7 
the Dictyostelium discoideum system but the basic structure is easily adapted for other 8 
systems. The players are different genotypes (strains), but in principle can represent any 9 
evolutionarily-relevant fitness-maximizing agent. Within an aggregation (which represents 10 
the group or collective) strains may have varying relative frequencies or proportions (𝑝𝑖). The 11 
frequency of a strain in a group is equivalent to whole-group relatedness since it represents 12 
the average relatedness of a randomly selected cell to the entire group (self-included) (Taylor 13 
& Frank, 1996; Pepper, 2000). We present the model results and insights with regard to 14 
relatedness in keeping with theory but discuss the results in the context of frequencies of 15 
strains within a group to provide a clear link to the experimental methods.  16 
Strains invest a proportion of their cells into stalk (𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) and the rest (1 − 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) into 17 
spores (with the level of investment potentially depending on their proportion, 𝑝𝑖). Therefore, 18 
their level of investment represents the proportion of their entire ‘budget’ of cells that are 19 
allocated towards stalk production (hence 0 ≤ 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1). Investment into stalk is costly because 20 
it reduces the total number of spores a strain can produce and hence the ‘payoff’ (component 21 
of fitness) to a strain through spores declines (at a rate of 𝛾𝑠) as a function of their investment 22 
in stalk (see Figure 1A): 23 
 24 




The payoff is scaled to a value of 1 when no cells are invested into stalk.  1 
Strains presumably invest in building a stalk to facilitate dispersal of spores 2 
(Strassmann et al., 2000; Foster et al., 2002; Smith et al., 2014). While the cost of investing 3 
into the stalk is paid by the individual strain from their total budget of cells, the benefit (payoff) 4 
gained from dispersal depends on the architecture of the fruiting body, and hence on collective 5 
investment into the stalk (which is simply the weighted average of the stalk allocation of the 6 
two players, 𝐼𝐺 = ∑ 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑖). We model the performance of the fruiting body for spore dispersal 7 
as an increasing function of collective investment: 8 
 9 
𝜙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙(𝐺) = 1 + 𝛾𝑑𝐼𝐺 (2) 
 10 
where 𝛾𝑑 gives the rate at which the payoff through dispersal increases as a function of 11 
investment into stalk (Figure 1A). As with the payoff through spores (eqn. 1), the payoff 12 
through dispersal is scaled to a value of 1 when no investment is made. For both payoff 13 
functions (eqns. 1 and 2) the qualitative results do not depend on this scaling, so the baseline 14 
value of 1 is used in both cases for simplicity. Similar cost/benefit relationships underlie a 15 
wide array of models that consider tradeoffs, such as models for the evolution of life-histories 16 
(e.g., models of clutch size and parental investment). For example, models for the evolution 17 
of parental investment assume increasing investment per offspring is costly because it reduces 18 
fecundity, but beneficial because it increases offspring survival. Although, like many of these 19 
models, we assume a linear relationship between investment and costs/benefits, the qualitative 20 
results are robust across an array of relationships (so long as costs and benefits both increase 21 
with investment).  22 
The overall success of a strain is determined by its payoff through spores weighted by 23 
the overall performance of the fruiting body. This is consistent with evolutionary theory, such 24 
as models that consider trade-offs between components of fitness or episodes of selection, and 25 
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is necessary to properly account for the influence of multiple factors affecting fitness. For 1 
example, to calculate total parental fitness in models for the evolution of parental investment, 2 
it is necessary to multiply an individual’s fecundity (number of offspring produced) by the 3 
expected survival of the progeny they produce (since the product represents the number of 4 
surviving offspring). In terms of the D. discoideum system, the expected success of each spore 5 
depends on its expected dispersal, and hence fitness of a strain is the product of spore number 6 
and spore dispersal: 7 
 8 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝜙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑖)𝜙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙(𝐺) (3) 
 9 
The overall success of a group is simply the average fitness of its members (eqn. 3), 𝜔𝐺 =10 
∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑝𝑖 which is equivalent to the expected payoff for the group through spores weighted by 11 
the payoff through dispersal, 𝜔𝐺 = 𝜙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝐺)𝜙𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙(𝐺) (where the group payoff through 12 
spores is the weighted average of the spore production by group members, 𝜙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝐺) =13 
∑ 𝜙𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑖)𝑝𝑖). The trade-off between spore production and spore dispersal reflected in the 14 
payoffs (eqns. 1 and 2, see Figure 1A) results in a quadratic relationship between collective 15 
investment and group success (Figure 1B). From this relationship, we can derive the level of 16 
collective investment (𝐼𝐺) that maximizes group success (𝐼𝐺 = 𝛩𝐺), which represents the most 17 
efficient (welfare optimal) allocation of cells to stalk and spores that is possible given the costs 18 























where the condition insures that investment is non-negative. Therefore, the optimal level of 1 
investment into stalk (in terms of group success) is determined by the relative importance of 2 
payoffs through spores versus through dispersal. Consequently, under any conditions where 3 
the benefits of dispersal outweigh the cost to spore production, the collective will have highest 4 
overall success at some intermediate level of investment into stalk. Because aggregations of 5 
D. discoideum invest into stalk while also producing spores, the pattern of payoffs in nature 6 
must result in such an intermediate optimum. The strength of selection on fruiting body 7 
architecture (Γ) is given by the rate at which group success declines as the level of investment 8 
deviates from the group optimum: 9 
 10 
Γ = −𝛾𝑠𝛾𝑑 (5) 
 11 
The value of Γ represents the curvature of the relationship between collective investment and 12 
group success (i.e., it is the quadratic coefficient for the parabolic relationship between 13 
collective investment and group success; see Figure 1B). 14 
While equation (4) represents the optimal investment into stalk for a group, individual 15 
players (strains) within a group should invest in a way that maximizes their expected 16 
individual fitness (eqn. 3). The optimal level of investment for a given player (a strain) is a 17 



























Logically, the optimal level of individual investment corresponds to the value that maximizes 21 
group success (eqn. 4) when a strain is clonal (𝑝𝑖 = 1). At all other frequencies, the optimal 22 
level of investment will be lower than the value that maximizes group success (since 0 ≥𝐼𝑗∣𝑝𝑗 23 
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≤ 1 and 0 > 𝑝𝑖 < 1). The level of investment given by equation (6) represent the ESS for a 1 
strain, but because the optimal level of investment by each strain depends on the level of 2 
investment by other strains, the actual level of investment will depend on the joint resolution 3 
of that interdependence. As a result of this interdependence, the constraints on the range of 4 
investment values (0 ≤ 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1), and the constraints on the range of frequencies (0 ≤ 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1), 5 
we use numerical solutions from equation (6) to illustrate the patterns of the ESS under 6 
different conditions (see below).  7 
To understand the properties of the ESS consider the case where other strains make 8 
no investment, such that the ESS is simply 
1
2
(1 𝛾𝑠⁄ − 1 𝛾𝑑𝑝𝑖⁄ ) (or zero when the term is 9 
negative). This level of investment represents the most economically ‘efficient’ strategy for a 10 
strain. Under these conditions, when the optimal strategy is to make a non-zero stalk 11 
investment, the two terms in parentheses must be greater than zero, with the first term (1 𝛾𝑠⁄ ) 12 
representing the reciprocal of the cost of investing and the second term (1 𝛾𝑑𝑝𝑖⁄ ) the reciprocal 13 
of the benefit of investing. Thus, at the optimal payoff 𝑝𝑖𝛾𝑑 > 𝛾𝑠, which is a form of 14 
Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964a; Charnov, 1977), the kin selection benefits (𝑝𝑖𝛾𝑑) must 15 
outweigh the costs (𝛾𝑠). The third term in parentheses (𝐼𝑗∣𝑝𝑗𝑝𝑗 𝑝𝑖⁄ ) reflects the dispersal benefit 16 
to the focal strain arising from investment into stalk made by other strains, with the numerator 17 
(𝐼𝑗∣𝑝𝑗𝑝𝑗) representing the total investment made by others. The ESS deviates from the most 18 
efficient strategy because any investment made by other strains increases the value of the focal 19 
strain’s spores, and hence increases the cost of making their own investment. This term can 20 
be viewed from an economic perspective as an ‘opportunity cost’, where a strain has the 21 
opportunity to gain from the dispersal benefit provided by the investment made by others and 22 
loses that opportunity when those spores are sacrificed to invest into stalk. The kin selection 23 
consequences of this opportunity cost can be seen by examining the conditions where the ESS 24 
level of investment is non-zero, which correspond to 𝑝𝑖𝛾𝑑 > 𝛾𝑠 (1 + 𝛾𝑑𝐼𝑗∣𝑝𝑗𝑝𝑗). 25 
Consequently, if we view these conditions as a form of Hamilton’s rule, we can see that the 26 
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dispersal benefit to kin from investing has to overcome both the direct cost from making an 1 
investment and the additional cost arising from the missed opportunity to exploit investments 2 
made by others.  3 
We can also view the cost of investment into stalk in terms of its effect on the 4 
representation of a strain in the sporehead of their group (𝑝𝑖
′), which defines their within-group 5 
fitness. Their representation is determined by their investment in stalk relative to the overall 6 
investment made by the group: 𝑝𝑖
′ = 𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖 1 − 𝐼𝐺⁄ ). The within-group fitness can be 7 
calculated as a strain’s representation in the sporehead relative to its frequency in the group: 8 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖







Therefore, relative fitness within a group is a direct function of the relative investment made 12 
by strains. The pattern of relative fitness within a group is similar to the pattern of relative 13 
absolute fitness (𝜔𝑖 𝜔𝑗⁄ ), which is simply ([1 − 𝛾𝑠𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖] [1 − 𝛾𝑠𝐼𝑗∣𝑝𝑗⁄ ]). 14 
 15 
The nature of the game 16 
To understand the properties of the ESS we can characterize the payoffs to players in 17 
relation to the payoff structures of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games (Doebeli & 18 
Hauert, 2005). This analysis allows us to relate the game’s properties to the intuitive 19 
framework of existing well-understood models. However, to achieve this goal we need to first 20 
address the fact that the Investment Game differs from the canonical games in three key 21 
aspects. Firstly, the Investment Game differs in that expected payoffs vary as a function of 22 
relatedness, so there is no single payoff matrix, but rather, a relatedness-dependent payoff 23 
function. Therefore, we need to evaluate the properties of the game across levels of 24 
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relatedness, which allows us to understand how the properties of the game change as a player’s 1 
relatedness to the group changes. Secondly, when the opposing players differ in their 2 
relatedness to the group, they will also differ in their expected payoffs. Therefore, we need to 3 
consider a separate payoff matrix for each player at each level of relatedness. Finally, because 4 
investment into public goods can vary quantitatively, the game does not have discrete 5 
strategies that correspond to fixed alternative strategies like ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’. There are 6 
several logical alternative ways to consider cooperation versus defection and the type of game 7 
that a scenario corresponds to necessarily depends on the level of investment being made by 8 
a ‘cooperator’. The higher the investment made by a cooperator the higher the rewards for 9 
defection, which changes the optimal response (see eqn. 6). Therefore, we use a simple 10 
framework where we consider defection as the case where individuals make no contribution 11 
to the public goods and cooperation as the case where individuals make some non-zero 12 
contribution (the size of which we vary in our analysis of the game).  13 
The game scenario depends on payoffs to a player in terms of their expected fitness 14 
(𝜔𝑖, eqn. 3) under four scenarios (stating the focal player’s strategy first): cooperate against a 15 
cooperator (CiCj), cooperate against a defector (CiDj), defect against a cooperator (DiCj), or 16 
defect against a defector (DiDj). Because we are primarily interested in how payoffs lead to 17 
‘motivation’ for a player to invest or defect, we consider ‘weak’ forms of the games rather 18 
than the overall structure of the payoff matrices. That is, we consider whether a player’s fitness 19 
is increased or decreased by making a contribution to public goods when their opponent either 20 
cooperates (makes a contribution) or defects (withholds their contribution). Payoffs are 21 
classified as being Prisoner’s Dilemma-like when a player is better off defecting regardless of 22 
the strategy of their opponent (DiCj > CiCj and DiDj > CiDj) and Snowdrift like when they are 23 
better off defecting against a cooperator and cooperating against a defector (DiCj > CiCj and 24 
CiDj > DiDj). If a player is better off cooperating regardless of the strategy of their opponent 25 
(CiCj > DiCj and CiDj > DiDj) we consider their strategy as selfish investment, meaning they 26 
43 
 
are favored to cooperate because it is in their own selfish interests regardless of what their 1 
opponent does.  2 
Both players can ‘agree’ on the game being played or, because of the asymmetry in 3 
payoffs, they can disagree. When both agree that the game is Prisoner’s Dilemma or Snowdrift 4 
we classify the scenario as the agreed game. Disagreement over the game being played 5 
generally arises when one player views the scenario as favoring selfish investment, while the 6 
other sees the scenario as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. This scenario is analogous to the ESS for an 7 
asymmetrical Snowdrift game, with one player getting a payoff for cooperating with a defector 8 
and the other getting the payoff for defecting against a cooperator. In this case, the asymmetry 9 
in relatedness determines which player will take the role as cooperator and which as defector 10 
(with the higher relatedness player being the cooperator). Hence, we describe this scenario as 11 
being like an asymmetrical Snowdrift game.  12 
 13 
Imperfect information 14 
The derivation of the Investment Game implicitly assumes that players (strains) have 15 
perfect information about their relatedness to the group and can therefore adjust their 16 
investment accordingly. In the context of D. discoideum, ‘information’ is the output of any 17 
mechanism that provide feedback to cells that reflects their frequency in a group, and hence 18 
can potentially arise from many molecular mechanisms. Of course, if the players have no 19 
information about their relatedness we would not expect to see any relatedness-dependent 20 
changes in stalk investment, so any frequency dependent change in behavior must correspond 21 
to some information (regardless of whether it is actively or passively acquired). Presumably 22 
any molecular mechanism or responses to information should have some degree of noise, 23 
resulting in random error in the measurement of relatedness. In the D. discoideum system, 24 
random noise could simply represent the variation from cell to cell in their measurement of 25 
their frequency, so the entire group of cells from a strain measures their frequency with some 26 
noise. The mean of their measurement could be accurate, but the individual cells would 27 
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respond as if they were at a different frequency, making the response deviate from the perfect 1 
information case. 2 
 We modelled error using a Gaussian probability density function (PDF), where the 3 
mean of the PDF represents the true frequency (relatedness) of the strain and the standard 4 
deviation the level of noisiness (see SI Appendix, Figure S2). We assume that measurement 5 
error depends on the complexity of group composition, so the magnitude of the error (i.e., the 6 
standard deviation of the PDF) was weighted by 4𝑝1𝑝2 (which has a maximum value of 1 7 
when 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 and declines to zero as either strain nears a frequency of 1). Logically, this 8 
implies that strains are much more able to measure their frequency (relatedness) when they 9 
are at extreme frequencies than when they are at intermediate frequencies in a group. For 10 
example, a strain would be better able to distinguish between a true frequency of 0.01 and 11 
0.21 than it would be able to distinguish between 0.4 and 0.6. Analyses were integrated over 12 
all possible frequencies (from zero to one), with the probability that a strain behaves as if it 13 
has a particular frequency being given by the PDF weighted by the group complexity term. 14 
Because each player assesses their own frequency, analyses at a given frequency require 15 
integration over all possible pairwise frequencies.  16 
 17 
Model predictions 18 
To generate predictions for collective investment in D. discoideum, we varied the 19 
relative cost to spore production (𝛾𝑠) and benefit from dispersal (𝛾𝑑) from stalk investment to 20 
alter the strength of selection on fruiting body architecture (eqn. 5). For most illustrations in 21 
the main text we restricted the parameters to values that result in an optimal level of clonal 22 
investment of 30% of cells to the stalk, which corresponds to the approximate pattern observed 23 
in naturally derived strains (Forman & Garrod, 1977; Chattwood et al., 2013). However, in 24 
Figures 2D, 2E and 2F, we hold the strength of selection constant (at Γ = 2) and vary the 25 
optimal level of clonal investment to illustrate the impact of different optima. We illustrate a 26 
much wider range of parameter space in SI Appendix, Figure S1, varying both the strength of 27 
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selection and the clonal investment optimum systematically across panels. Within the range 1 
of values that keep fitness non-negative, the strength of selection on allocation of cells and the 2 
clonal investment optimum (which are both determined by the values of 𝛾𝑠 and 𝛾𝑑, see eqns. 3 
4 and 5) do not change the qualitative predictions of the model.  4 
 At each frequency (relatedness) we solved the ESS level of investment (eqn. 6) for 5 
the two players. Exact solutions were generated using the Solve function in Mathematica 10.0 6 
(Wolfram Research, Inc.). Given the ESS level of investment, we calculated absolute and 7 
relative (within-group) fitness of each player and the level of collective investment. We also 8 
analyzed the game scenarios under each scenario to link these patterns to the logic of the 9 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games. To link the model results to the experimental data 10 
we also calculated individual and collective investment following the methods used in the 11 
experimental work (where all measures are based on spore counts and representation in 12 
chimeric sporeheads, see below).  13 
 14 
Measurement of spore allocation  15 
We followed well-established D. discoideum protocols (Forman & Garrod, 1977; 16 
Kessin, 2001; Buttery et al., 2009), which are therefore only briefly outlined here. We used a 17 
set of ten naturally co-occurring strains of D. discoideum from Little Butt’s Gap, North 18 
Carolina (NC28.1, NC34.2, NC52.3, NC60.1, NC63.2, NC69.1, NC71.1, NC80.1, NC99.1 19 
and NC105.1) that have previously been used in several studies of social interactions (Buttery 20 
et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2015; Gruenheit et al., 2017). All strains were grown on SM plates 21 
with Klebsiella aerogenes as a food source. Before aggregation, cells were harvested and 22 
washed of bacteria by repeated centrifugation in KK2 (16.1mM KH2PO4, 3.7mM K2HPO4). 23 
To construct experimental chimeras, we reciprocally mixed cells from a strain that was 24 
fluorescently labelled with 10 mM CellTracker™ Green CMFDA dye with an unlabelled 25 
partner treated with DMSO to control for any effect of labelling. Clonal sets of labelled and 26 
unlabelled cells were also created to provide a measure of any counting bias. Cell mixes were 27 
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plated for development on 1.5% KK2 purified agar plates (surface area ~21.3 cm2), at a 1 
density of 4.7x105 cell/cm2. Relative proportional representation of the focal strain in the 2 
sporehead was primarily determined by counting the percentage of fluorescent spores using 3 
flow cytometry. However, for some sets of replicates from two pairs (NC28.1+NC63.2 and 4 
NC34.2+NC105.1) measurements were done by microscopy (with spores washed into 5ml 5 
spore buffer and imaged using a fluorescence imaging system). Despite the fact that two 6 
different methodologies were used to measure relative spore number, the patterns of relative 7 
representation in the sporehead were indistinguishable. Because of technical limitations 8 
associated with the labelling process, an average of 0.3% (s.d. = 0. 09%) of unlabelled spores 9 
are counted as being labelled and an average of 1.4% (s.d. = 0. 9%) of labelled spores are 10 
counted as being unlabelled (based on data from clonal populations of labelled and 11 
unlabelled). Therefore, to correct for any potential counting bias, the raw proportion of 12 
labelled (𝑝𝑖
∗) cells of strain i in a chimeric mix with an unlabeled strain j was corrected using 13 
the proportion of labelled cells measured from clonal sets of labelled (𝑝𝑖(𝐶)
∗ ) and unlabelled 14 
cells (𝑝𝑗(𝐶)) (created using the same pools of cells as in the chimeric mixtures): 15 
?̂?𝑖
∗ = (𝑝𝑖
∗ − 𝑝𝑗(𝐶)) (𝑝𝑖(𝐶)
∗ − 𝑝𝑗(𝐶))⁄ . To count the total number of spores produced by a set of 16 
fruiting bodies from a given number of cells plated (107 cells/plate), we harvested the entire 17 
agar discs from the plates into 5mL of spore buffer (20mM EDTA, 0.05% NP40) and counted 18 
spores using a hemocytometer. 19 
The ten strains were used to construct 34 different types of chimeric mixtures, with 20 
each strain used in at least 4 different pairings. Within each pairing, chimeras were created in 21 
which strains were mixed in seven different input frequency combinations (0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 22 
0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95). For each pair of strains, the set of chimeric mixtures across different 23 
input frequencies were independently replicated at least twice (with an average of 4 replicates 24 
per pair) for a total of 944 chimeric mixtures composed from the 34 pairs across the various 25 
input frequencies. Two of these strain pairings (NC28.1+NC63.2 and NC34.2+NC105.1) were 26 
replicated a larger number of times (N=18 and N=15 replicates respectively) to provide higher 27 
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resolution examples. Each experimental replicate therefore provides measurements of the 1 
relative representation of each strain in the sporehead and the total number of spores produced 2 
by the pair across different input frequencies. Every experimental replicate for a given pair 3 
also produced an estimate of the clonal spore production for both strains in the pair.  4 
 5 
Estimation of investment and relative fitness 6 
To provide for direct comparison between the model and the experimental data we 7 
calculated each parameter from the model following the same methods used to process the 8 
data. Four types of measurements were used to generate an estimate of stalk investment of a 9 
strain within a chimera (𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖): the total number of spores produced by chimeric fruiting bodies 10 
composed from strains i and j (?̂?𝐺(𝑖𝑗)), the total number of spores produced by a strain when 11 
in clonal fruiting bodies (?̂?𝑖), the input proportion of a strain within a chimeric mix (?̂?𝑖), and 12 
the output proportion of a strain within chimeric sporeheads (?̂?𝑖
′). From these values we 13 
calculated the number of spores from a given strain within the chimeric sporeheads as ?̂?𝑖
′?̂?𝐺(𝑖𝑗). 14 
This measure of spore production was normalized against the clonal spore production of the 15 
strain to account for any inherent differences in numbers of spores produced by different 16 
strains (which reflect differences in spore size and fixed differences in allocation of cells to 17 
spores; Buttery et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2015) to produce a measure of relative spore 18 
production: ?̂?𝑖∣𝑝𝑖 = (?̂?𝑖
′?̂?𝐺(𝑖𝑗)) (?̂?𝑖?̂?𝑖)⁄ . The inverse of the relative allocation of cells to spores 19 










Therefore, an investment value (𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) of 1 indicates that a strain allocates the same proportion 23 
of cells to spores when in a chimera as when clonal. Since we expect the allocation pattern of 24 
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clones to correspond to the optimal pattern, a value of 1 indicates that cells in both clones and 1 
chimeras are allocating a proportion 𝛩𝐺 of their cells into stalk and 1 − 𝛩𝐺 into spores. In the 2 
case where strains allocate 100% of their cells to spores, the estimate of relative investment 3 
(𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) is expected to simply be the ratio of the clonal level of allocation of cells to spores (1 −4 
𝛩𝐺) to 1 (where 1 is the proportion allocated in a chimera). Thus, an investment value 5 
corresponding to 1 − 𝛩𝐺 is equivalent to a pattern of zero investment of cells into stalk. 6 
Therefore, when we present the patterns of investment we rescale the estimates that are based 7 
on relative spore production to a scale that reflects relative investment in stalk by simply 8 
subtracting a value of 1 − 𝛩𝐺. As a result, when strains invest at the clonal level we get the 9 
expected investment value of 𝛩𝐺, and when they allocate all cells to spores (i.e., show zero 10 
investment) we get a value of 0. When applying this method to the analysis of data from the 11 
natural strains we use an optimal investment value of 30% of cells into the stalk, which is 12 
supported by a variety of empirical measurements (Forman & Garrod, 1977; Chattwood et al., 13 
2013). The investment for both strains within each chimeric combination within each 14 
experimental replicate were calculated separately.  15 
 To calculate relative collective investment for a group (𝐼𝐺) we first calculated the 16 
number of spores we would expect in a chimera given the clonal spore production for the pair 17 
and their relative frequencies in the chimera: ?̂?𝐺∣clonal(𝑖𝑗) = (?̂?𝑖𝑇𝑖 + ?̂?𝑗𝑇𝑗). Collective 18 
investment was calculated following equation (4) by dividing this clonal expectation by the 19 










Collective investment for each chimeric combination was calculated for each experimental 23 
replicate using the measures of the component parameters for that replicate. As with the 24 
measure of individual investment (eqn. 8), the pattern of collective investment reflects the 25 
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relative allocation of cells to spores by strains in a chimera compared to the pattern they shown 1 
when clonal (but measured for the entire group, rather than for the individual strains 2 
separately). Hence, the values of collective investment calculated using equation (9) have the 3 
same scaling as the measure for individual investment (eqn. 8). Therefore, we also subtracted 4 
a value of 1 − 𝛩𝐺 from all collective investment values, such that optimal investment (i.e., the 5 
clonal pattern) corresponds to the expected value of 𝛩𝐺 and the scenario where the collective 6 
produces only spores corresponds to a collective investment value of zero. 7 
Relative fitness within a group follows the definition in the model and simply reflects 8 
the representation of a strain in the sporehead relative to its input frequency: 9 
 10 
?̂?𝑖∣𝑗 = ?̂?𝑖
′ ?̂?𝑖⁄  (10) 
 11 
For simplicity, we compare the fitness of strains using the ratio of their relative fitness values 12 
(e.g., ?̂?𝑖∣𝑗 ?̂?𝑗∣𝑖⁄  for strain i relative to j). Values of relative fitness were calculated for each 13 
individual replicate. To test for any potential bias caused by the experimental labeling and 14 
methods used to calculate relative fitness, we applied the calculation of relative fitness in 15 
equation (10) to clonal self-mixes of labeled and unlabeled cells across the same set of 16 
frequencies. We find no significant frequency-dependent pattern of relative fitness in these 17 
self-mixes (F1, 195 = 1.65, p = 0.2; see SI Appendix, Figure S8). 18 
Patterns of collective investment, individual investment, and relative fitness across 19 
frequencies were modelled using a mixed model implemented in SAS (SAS Institute, Cary, 20 
NC, USA) fitted by maximum likelihood. For collective investment, frequency was modelled 21 
as a quadratic fixed effect with experimental replicate as a random effect. For individual 22 
investment and relative fitness, frequency was modelled as a cubic fixed effect. For relative 23 
fitness, strain-by-block was included as a random grouping variable, while for investment, 24 
strain was included as a grouping variable (owing to a lack of convergence for a model 25 
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containing a block or replicate effect). Reduced versions of all models were also run without 1 
any fixed effects (i.e., with only the random effects). Significance was determined by 2 
calculating twice the difference in the negative log likelihoods of the two models (full model 3 
and reduced), which is approximately chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom 4 
determined by the difference in the number of parameters in the models.  5 
 6 
Measurement and analysis of the cost of chimerism  7 
To measure the risk of fruiting body collapse, we collected two sources of data. First, 8 
we created 50:50 chimeric and clonal mixes of ten strain pairs (NC28.1, NC34.2, NC52.3, 9 
NC60.1, NC63.2, NC69.1, NC71.1, NC80.1, NC99.1 and NC105.1), with an average of 10.4 10 
replicates per chimeric combination (total N = 469) and 13 replicates per clone (total N = 130) 11 
(which together represent data from 31,026 fruiting bodies). Differences between clonal and 12 
chimeric mixes were analyzed using a mixed model with aggregation type (clonal or chimeric) 13 
as a fixed effect and pair as a random effect. Model degrees of freedom were determined using 14 
the Kenward-Roger approximation, which corrects the denominator degrees of freedom for 15 
the fixed effect based on the structure of the random effect to avoid pseudoreplication. Second, 16 
we created chimeric mixes across a range of focal strain frequencies (0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.5, 17 
0.75, 0.90 and 0.95) for six strain pairs (NC28.1+NC105.1, NC99.1+NC105.1, 18 
NC99.1+NC60.1, NC34.2.1+NC105.1, NC63.2.1+NC60.1 and NC34.2+NC60.1). Mixes 19 
were plated as a 10μl droplet onto non-nutrient KK2 agar in a 24-well dish and allowed to 20 
develop into fruiting bodies. The number of fruiting bodies that had spontaneously collapsed 21 
was scored as a proportion of the total number of fruiting bodies in the well. Data were 22 
modelled using a mixed model implemented in SAS (SAS Institute, Cary, NC, USA) fitted by 23 
maximum likelihood with frequency modelled as a fixed quadratic effect and pair as a random 24 
grouping variable. Significance was determined by calculating twice the difference in the 25 




Measurement and analysis of segregation 1 
To measure the degree of segregation between pairs of strains across different 2 
asymmetry in relatedness, we followed established protocols for measuring segregation for 3 
pairs at equal frequency and applied these methods to measurements across a range of pair-4 
wise frequencies (Ostrowski et al., 2008; Benabentos et al., 2009). Briefly, cells were labelled 5 
with CellTracker Green CMFDA (with DMSO used as a control for unlabelled cells) and 6 
strains were reciprocally mixed at a range of relative frequencies of the labelled strain (0.05, 7 
0.10, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95). Mixes were plated as a 10μl droplet on ~1.25g of sharp 8 
horticultural sand (Keith Singleton) wetted with 250μl of KK2 in a 24-well dish and allowed 9 
to develop to form fruiting bodies. Individual fruiting bodies were then harvested into spore 10 
buffer (KK2 with 20mM EDTA and 0.05% NP40), and the proportion of fluorescent to non-11 
flourescent spores in each fruiting body measured by flow cytometery. We measured patterns 12 
of segregation using three different pairs of strains (NC28.1+NC63.2, NC105.1+NC34.2, and 13 
NC105.1+NC99.1), with at least 10 sporeheads measured for each pair at each frequency (for 14 
a total of 692 sporeheads overall).  15 
A metric of the degree of segregation was calculated following ref. (Gruenheit et al., 16 
2017). Briefly, this measure is based on the standard deviation of a strain’s proportional 17 
representation across sporeheads (𝑠𝑡𝑑(?̂?𝑖
′)) at a given input frequency. If there is no 18 
segregation, then we would expect all variation in the representation of a strain across fruiting 19 
bodies (composed from the same proportions of strains) to be due to random binomial 20 
sampling error, and hence 𝑠𝑡𝑑(?̂?𝑖
′) should be very small given the number of spores counted. 21 
However, when there is segregation, we expect to see much more variation in the 22 
representation of a strain across fruiting bodies as strains preferentially aggregate with 23 
themselves. Because the maximum value of this standard deviation depends on the relative 24 
frequencies of the strains, it is standardized to the maximum possible value, which is 25 
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determined by the geometric mean of the average representation of the two strains across all 1 
sporeheads (?̂?𝑖
′̅), which is √?̂?𝑖
′̅(1 − ?̂?𝑖
′̅ ). This yields a standardized measure of segregation: 2 
 3 









which goes from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (the maximum possible degree of segregation, which 5 
would necessarily correspond to all fruiting bodies being clonal, with the relative frequency 6 
of each type of clonal fruiting body depending on the relative frequencies of the strains). In 7 
the statistical analysis, segregation data were modelled using a quadratic model following the 8 
approach outlined above for fruiting body collapse.  9 
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Comment 1: Self-interest and the snowdrift  1 
The preceding paper made claims about the links between the observed behaviour and other 2 
general games that have been used to dissect the evolution of cooperation. Here I examine 3 
those links in greater detail.   4 
The Collective Investment game is a simple framework for analysing the strategic 5 
dilemma of cooperation within a group of players. The central idea that the Collective 6 
Investment game brings to the fore is how any social situation can provide opportunities for 7 
both cooperation and exploitation. Although the model was phrased with respect to the social 8 
amoeba (Dictyostelium discoideum), the model setup is generalisable to a wide diversity of 9 
different social systems (see Paper 3) because it is free from specific constraints. Further, as 10 
players can have quantitatively different frequencies within the group and continuously-11 
variable strategies, players have both the ability to possess different quantitative degrees of 12 
incentive to cooperate and the ability to express those preferences in their strategy. 13 
Consequently, the scenario is highly revealing: in sweeping terms, the model suggests that a 14 
player’s ESS involves both increasing levels of cooperation as a player has higher frequency 15 
(or increasing levels of defection as a player has lower frequency), and indeed individual 16 
strains of the social amoeba are shown to exhibit the ESS pattern of investment into stalk cells 17 
(which is a form of cooperation in producing a public good). Thus, players exhibit exploitation 18 
when rare and cooperation when common.  19 
What do cooperation and exploitation mean in terms of inclusive fitness? The 20 
Collective Investment game does not explicitly use inclusive fitness theory, although it can 21 
gel with it (see Paper 3). The stalk-producing behaviour of D. discoideum is widely considered 22 
to be a paradigmatic case of altruism (e.g. Strassmann et al., 2000), which requires considering 23 
the actor as the individual cell and the recipients as the spore cells. Whilst this may seem 24 
reasonable, this would imply that a cell that differentiates to form a spore cell is a cheater, 25 
which seems counterintuitive because, in these terms, only cheaters can possibly survive into 26 
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the next generation. This confusion could presumably be avoided by treating the differentiated 1 
cell type (of stalk or spore cell) as an incomplete expression of the probabilistic phenotype 2 
that is the cell’s stalk allocation strategy, wherein a particular strategy appears more like 3 
mutual benefit than altruism with reference to what other cells of the same strain do (i.e. with 4 
the same genotype). Consequently, in Paper 1, we opted for the language that describes strains 5 
of D. discoideum as the players of the Collective Investment game, which would imply that 6 
cooperatively allocating some cells to the stalk is mutually beneficial for the focal strain and 7 
their competing non-focal strain. Consequently, not allocating cells to the stalk is exploitative, 8 
which is analogous to cheating within a particular social situation, though we would consider 9 
a cheater strain as one that never produces any stalk cells. In this way, conditional cheating is 10 
possible against a mutually beneficial behaviour because frequency asymmetry which means 11 
that the costs and benefits (of inclusive fitness) are not the same for different strains, whilst 12 
obligate cheater strains would have lower overall fitness than a conditionally cooperative 13 
strain. Thus, the focus on strains not cells helps to focus attention on the differences between 14 
strains that we are most interested in (namely, their frequency and the arising conditional 15 
cooperation). In this way, Paper 1 would treat the strain as the actor (and the spores as the 16 
recipients). This phrasing seems reasonable when considering that all members of a strain 17 
share the same genotype. As a result, the language of Paper 1 is closer to a gene’s eye view 18 
rather than an inclusive fitness perspective, which we find more intuitive in this instance.  19 
 Across the different frequency scenarios, the Collective Investment game has 20 
similarity to classic bimatrix games, which have been the preoccupation of much of 21 
evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1982; Sigmund & 22 
Nowak, 1986; Skyrms, 1996, 2004; Binmore, 2005; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005; Nowak, 2006; 23 
Sigmund, 2010). Bimatrix games involve two players with two different possible strategies 24 
(cooperate/defect). In Paper 1, similarities are drawn to the prisoner’s dilemma when players 25 
are at nearly-equal frequency and to the snowdrift when players have more unequal 26 
frequencies. In the prisoner’s dilemma (Table 1B), the ESS is for players to defect such that 27 
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there is no cooperation between the players because there is a temptation to defect irrespective 1 
of whether the other player cooperates or not (B>A; D>C). When players are at nearly-equal 2 
frequencies in the Collective Investment game, the payoffs of cooperation conform to a 3 
prisoner’s dilemma – as scaled between maximum and minimum level of cooperation. When 4 
one player has high frequency in the Collective Investment game, cooperation can lead to 5 
higher fitness than defection even if the other player defects. In this way, the payoffs in the 6 
Collective Investment game can conform to another well-studied bimatrix game – the 7 
snowdrift. The snowdrift differs from the prisoner’s dilemma in the order of its payoffs (see 8 
Table 1B, 1C), suggesting that there is still a temptation to defect (B>A) but that it is better to 9 
cooperate against a defector than otherwise (C>D). The difference between the Collective 10 
Investment game and the snowdrift is that, for the snowdrift, an arbitrary asymmetry, such as 11 
flipping a fair coin, could decide which player cooperates and which defects. Whereas, in the 12 
Collective Investment game, frequency is not an arbitrary variable, but favours a more 13 
common player to take on the burden of cooperation. Further, in the Collective Investment 14 
game, there is a penalty for a group of players investing below the optimal level of collective 15 
investment so, unlike the snowdrift (but like the prisoner’s dilemma), there is a group-level 16 
cost from one player defecting.  17 
 A simple rule can be used to describe the conditions when a game is more snowdrift-18 
like or prisoner’s dilemma-like. A game is snowdrift-like when one player invests into public 19 
goods whilst the other player does not, and prisoner’s dilemma-like when both players invest 20 
at a low rate (see Figure 1). A ‘snowdrift rule’ can describe when (in a group of players 21 
pursuing the ESS) a focal player has an incentive to invest whilst the other player does not. 22 
The snowdrift rule can take two specific forms, using the simpler notation from Paper 2: a 23 
focal player’s frequency/relatedness (𝑟𝑖), the costs of public goods (𝑐) and the benefits of 24 
public goods (𝑏). When the other player does not have any incentive to invest (i.e. their ESS 25 
level of investment is below zero when the other player does not invest), the snowdrift rule 26 
simply requires the focal player to have an incentive to invest (i.e. the focal player’s ESS is 27 
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greater than zero): 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑐/𝑏. When the other player has an incentive to invest, the snowdrift 1 
rule requires the focal player to have more of an incentive (i.e. the non-focal player’s ESS is 2 
exactly zero): 𝑟𝑖 > (2𝑏 − 𝑐)/3𝑏. As these two limits capture the same snowdrift logic (where 3 
only the focal player invests), both rules can be placed into a general form using a new term 4 
for the opportunity cost of investment (𝑘 = 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑥𝑖 = (𝑟𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐) 2𝑏⁄ , given 𝑘 > 0), which is the 5 
reduction in the share of the benefits that a player suffers from investment: 6 
 7 
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑘 > 𝑟−𝑖  (1) 
 8 
The LHS represents the fraction of the benefits of public goods reaped by the focal player after 9 
contributing toward public goods (i.e. the number of spore cells in the social amoeba system), 10 
whilst the RHS represents the fraction of the benefits of public goods reaped by the other 11 
player given that they do not contribute toward public goods. Thus, the snowdrift rule makes 12 
explicit that a focal player only invests into public goods, in spite of the other player not 13 
investing, when that focal player reaps the majority (>50%) of the benefit from its investment. 14 
The two specific forms are reached by the focal player investing (𝑘 > 0) being more stringent 15 
or the player reaping the majority of the benefits (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑘 > 𝑟−𝑖) being more stringent. In this 16 
way, irrespective of whether or not the social behaviour is viewed as altruism or mutual benefit 17 
in an inclusive fitness framework, the snowdrift-like cooperation in the Collective Investment 18 
game is thoroughly self-interested, in balancing the cost to self against the benefit to self after 19 
dilution of benefits to some nonself (which is because the inclusive fitness framework does 20 
not explicitly focus on explaining the quantity of investment – but rather on explaining 21 
whether or not a gene for a social behaviour is qualitatively favoured; see Paper 3). The 22 
snowdrift rule is likely to be a general rule for mutual benefit in whole-group traits among 23 
competitors, with equivalence to mutual benefit under negative relatedness for other-group 24 
traits (as described by Hamilton’s rule when 𝑐 > 0 and 𝑟𝑏 < 0; see Pepper, 2000), simply 25 






Figure 1. The investment (𝑥𝑖 or 𝑥𝐺) across a focal player’s relatedness/frequency (𝑟𝑖) and 1 
across benefit-to-cost ratios (𝑏/𝑐; assuming 𝑏 > 𝑐 and 𝑐 > 1 so there is a positive and 2 
intermediate level of group-optimal investment 0 ≤ 𝜑 ≤ 1). The game-space where both 3 
players exhibit the ESS (𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥−𝑖 = 𝑥−𝑖; A, B) and one player plays the selfish 4 
investment strategy whilst the other does not invest (𝑥𝑖 = ?̃?𝑖 and 𝑥−𝑖 = 0; C, D) for investment 5 
strategy (𝑥𝑖; A, C) and collective investment (𝑥𝐺 = 𝑟𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖𝑥−𝑖; B, D). The limit for one 6 
player providing all the investment for both the focal and non-focal player is marked by a 7 
black-line (solid for player one and dotted for player two respectively), dividing the game-8 
space into regions of resource-holding where neither (DD = defect-defect), one (CD/DC = 9 
cooperate-defect or visa versa), and both players (CC = cooperate-cooperate) make a 10 
contribution to collective investment. Across all panels (A-D), to showcase the difference 11 
between the investment strategy for individuals and groups across variation in the benefit-to-12 
cost ratio of public goods (𝑏/𝑐), two scenarios for investment strategy at intermediate 13 
resource-holdings are presented (labelled #1 and #2 for 𝑏/𝑐 = 3/2 and 𝑏/𝑐 = 3 respectively, 14 
where # is any of A-D) by extracting a cross-section of the panels A-D. The cross-sections are 15 
plotted as investment strategy (𝑥𝑖) across a focal player’s resource-holdings (𝑟𝑖). In each case, 16 
the red line represents the focal player with red shading for resource-holdings where the focal 17 
player is the sole investor. Additionally, with two-players, the blue line represents the non-18 
focal player with blue shading for resource-holdings where the non-focal player is the sole 19 
investor. (NB: the non-focal player’s curve is plotted with respect to the resource-holding 20 
refers to the focal player’s resource-holding which is one minus the non-focal player’s 21 
resource-holding.) 22 
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 The nature of the ESS draws parallels with another simple bimatrix game (Table 1D). 1 
The stag hunt emphasises that cooperation can be nothing more than a convention, wherein 2 
some conventions are better than others. In the stag hunt, as along as both players play the 3 
same strategy they reap some benefit, but if players do not then they each receive no benefit. 4 
Thus, the evolutionary problem of cooperation in the stag hunt is one of coordination, 5 
suggesting that there are gains from both pursuing the same convention. However, as some 6 
conventions are better for everyone than others (A>D), there is a problem arising from being 7 
unable to obtain the best convention because of the starting point of an evolutionary process 8 
(as A,D>B,C) rather than there being some perennial temptation to defect (unlike the 9 
prisoner’s dilemma or snowdrift). The Collective Investment game has elements of a 10 
coordination problem because (especially when the snowdrift rule is not met for either player) 11 
the selected level of investment depends on the best strategy in response to the current level 12 
of investment by the other player. So, if the other player did not play the ESS, the best response 13 
of a player’s investment to maximize their fitness would be different. However, as strategies 14 
coevolve en route to the ESS, the convention that is arrived at in the ESS reflects the 15 
compromise between the different incentives for players to invest at their given frequencies – 16 
thereby resolving any ‘stalemate’ arising from being stuck with one convention or other. 17 
Further, even when players have the same frequency, the ESS comes to reflect this 18 
compromise because any investment has a two-fold cost: a cell can either differentiate to 19 
become a stalk or spore cell, and so an increase in investment involves both taking away one 20 
spore cell and adding one stalk cell (creating a difference of two between the numbers of spore 21 
and stalk cells). Therefore, although the ESS for the Collective Investment game has similar 22 
properties to a coordination problem, the evolutionary path to the ESS avoids the stalemate of 23 
the stag hunt because the biology ensures that strategy coevolution is convergent.  24 
 Paper 1 has established that strains of D. discoideum behave as conditional 25 
cooperators, and the additional discussion in Comment 1 has expanded on how the game 26 
changes its nature across different frequencies with appeal to other well-known games. Next, 27 
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I move to consider testing the predictions of the Collective Investment game when there are 1 
more than two strains of D. discoideum, which is revealing about the mechanism through 2 
which conditional cooperation is made possible.  3 
  4 
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Table 1. Three classic bimatrix games (of two players with two strategies) for understanding 1 
the evolution of cooperation. A) The general form of a bimatrix game for cooperation, 2 
showing symmetry between players’ payoffs. B) The prisoner’s dilemma: B>A>D>C (Flood, 3 
1952; Poundstone, 1993). C) The snowdrift: B>A>C>D (Rapoport & Chammah, 1966; 4 
Sugden, 1986). D) The stag hunt: A>D>B=C (Lewis, 1969). 5 
A) Bimatrix Game Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate  A, A B, C 
Defect C, B D, D 
 6 
B) Prisoner’s Dilemma Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate  2, 2 -1, 3 
Defect 3, -1 0, 0 
 7 
C) Snowdrift Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate  2, 2 1, 3 
Defect 3, 1 0, 0 
 8 
D) Stag Hunt Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate  2, 2 0, 0 
Defect 0, 0 1, 1 
 9 
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 11 
Abstract 12 
Individuals across the tree of life make costly contributions that benefit their group. Such 13 
cooperation through ‘public goods’ presents a dilemma as all individuals can benefit from 14 
being ‘selfish’ by withholding contributions whilst benefitting from the contributions of others 15 
– leading to the breakdown of cooperation known as the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’. Whilst 16 
the threat of the tragedy is well understood, studies are largely limited to qualitative 17 
descriptions of how ‘cooperators’ adaptively avoid exploitative ‘cheaters’, rather than on how 18 
all individuals face strategic trade-offs governing how much they should contribute to public 19 
goods. Here, we address these limitations with a combination of quantitative theoretical 20 
predictions and experimental tests in natural strains of Dictyostelium discoideum. Our model 21 
broadly predicts that strains invest more in the group when their relatedness to the group is 22 
high, as their fitness interests are closer aligned with that of the group, suggesting that groups 23 
with few strains likely avoid the tragedy due to enough strains having sufficient motivation to 24 
contribute to the group. However, the model also predicts that groups with low average 25 
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relatedness should show catastrophic failure due to insufficient contributions. Experimental 1 
measures support these predictions, with strains reducing contributions as a function of 2 
relatedness to the group. However, despite a close quantitative match between predicted and 3 
measured contributions, we surprisingly find that strains avoid the worst of the tragedy. This 4 
is mostly likely due to non-adaptive constraints in information and strategy preventing strains 5 
from fully withholding contributions and expressing their selfishness. By viewing the tragedy 6 
of the commons as the consequence of the rational behaviour of all individuals, rather than 7 
‘exploitation’ by rouge cheaters, we highlight how non-adaptive constraints on strategy and 8 
information can play important and underestimated roles in avoiding the worst of the tragedy. 9 
 10 
Keywords: cooperation; conflict; public goods; social behaviour; kin selection 11 
 12 
Introduction 13 
Individuals often act in ways that benefit their group (West et al., 2007a; Bourke, 14 
2011). These cooperative acts are typically costly to the actor, yet the benefits are often 15 
available to all, regardless of individual contributions. Such cooperation through ‘public 16 
goods’ is therefore vulnerable to selfish individuals who restrict their contributions to public 17 
goods, while reaping the benefits from contributions made by others (Olson, 1965; Rankin et 18 
al., 2007). This lack of motivation to contribute to public goods underlies the ‘Tragedy of the 19 
Commons’ (Hardin, 1968), where selfish behaviours that maximise personal interests lead to 20 
suboptimal group success (Olson, 1965). The potential risk from such tragedies is well-21 
documented in both economics (Gordon, 1954; Ostrom, 1990) and biology (Wenseleers & 22 
Ratnieks, 2004; Rankin et al., 2007; Strassmann & Queller, 2014). Furthermore, the persistent 23 
threat of the tragedy of the commons can play a critical role in shaping the evolution of 24 
cooperation and group organization in nature (Rankin et al., 2007; Frank, 2009); cooperation 25 
can be lost when the costs imposed by exploitation outweigh the potential rewards from 26 
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contributing, group membership can be restricted to avert the most tragic outcomes, or groups 1 
can collapse entirely. Understanding ‘why’ and ‘how much’ the tragedy occurs (and how it 2 
can be avoided) is therefore of great importance in understanding the evolution of the diversity 3 
of cooperative behaviour found in nature. 4 
Our current understanding of the properties of the tragedy in natural systems is largely 5 
limited to qualitative descriptions; whether the outcome is catastrophic where no individuals 6 
contribute to cooperation, or merely sub-optimal, where contributions to cooperation are 7 
simply lower that the level that maximises group success (Wenseleers & Ratnieks, 2004; 8 
Rankin et al., 2007; Frank, 2009). Consequently, whilst we have some understanding of the 9 
broad-scale, qualitative conditions that lead to ‘tragic’ outcomes for groups, we have limited 10 
understanding of the processes governing the finer-scale variation in public goods production 11 
that is important for the evolution of social traits. Whilst there has been discussion of how the 12 
tragedy can be avoided (Frank, 1995, 2009; West et al., 2002; Foster et al., 2004, 2006; Rankin 13 
et al., 2007), the focus is often on how groups avoid obligate ‘cheaters’ who impose a ‘cheater-14 
load’ (Velicer, 2003; Travisano & Velicer, 2004; Van Dyken et al., 2011) on group fitness. 15 
Such a perspective masks the fact that contributing to a public good is a strategic choice for 16 
all individuals, subject to trade-offs between costs and benefits. Furthermore, in many public 17 
goods strategies are not limited to discrete ‘cooperate’ or ‘cheat’ strategies. Instead, selection 18 
can favour continuous strategies that adaptively adjust contributions to public goods in 19 
different social contexts. Studies in microbes have indicated that even simple organisms can 20 
strategically adjust their contributions to public goods (Madgwick et al., 2018), suggesting 21 
that the manifestation of the tragedy of the commons in nature might be quantitative and 22 
depend on social context. Therefore, to understand to extent to which individuals in groups 23 
will suffer from the tragedy of the commons and what factors allow groups to collectively 24 
avoid the worst of these conditions, we need to consider the strategic selfish behaviour of all 25 
members, not just how the group resists those who cheat by not contributing their ‘fair share’. 26 
To achieve this goal, we need to connect empirical studies to a theoretical framework that 27 
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considers how and why individuals strategically vary their contributions to public goods in 1 
response to social setting.  2 
The most obvious feature of groups that will drive variation in the contributions 3 
individuals make to public goods is their relatedness to group members. Individuals should 4 
presumably be more willing to contribute to public goods when benefits go to relatives. In this 5 
way, relatedness aligns the fitness interests of an individual with those of the group, because 6 
genes in the individual ultimately benefit when the group as a whole prospers (Foster et al., 7 
2006; Taylor et al., 2007; West et al., 2007a; Frank, 2009; Gardner & West, 2014). Hence, 8 
individuals should contribute to public goods dependent upon their relatedness to their group 9 
– a logic captured by Hamilton’s rule (𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0, where 𝑏 and 𝑐 capture the benefits to 10 
recipients and costs to actors of some cooperative act and 𝑟 captures the relatedness of the 11 
actor to the recipients) (Hamilton, 1964b; Charnov, 1977). The importance of this economic 12 
balance for the evolution of cooperative strategies can be overlooked by a perspective that 13 
focuses on cheating.  14 
Here, we apply a model of quantitative variation in ‘investment’ (i.e. contribution) 15 
into public goods (Madgwick et al., 2018) to experimental analyses of cooperation in the 16 
social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum. In this system, individual cells aggregate to 17 
collectively form a fruiting body constructed of a stalk (the public good) that facilitates 18 
dispersal of spores (the benefit from public goods) (Strassmann et al., 2000; Kessin, 2001; 19 
Smith et al., 2014). Because different strains can co-aggregate to form a chimeric fruiting 20 
body, the relatedness of a strain to the group can vary (depending on their relative frequency 21 
within, or relatedness to, the group), which can shift the balance of costs and benefits 22 
determining whether to contribute to public goods. Indeed, previous work examining simple 23 
two-strain groups demonstrated that strains can strategically alter their contribution to the stalk 24 
in response to relatedness (Madgwick et al., 2018). However, it is unclear how collective 25 
contributions to stalk production vary across groups with more complex social compositions, 26 
and hence how the tragedy of the commons is manifested in this system – though theoretical 27 
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modelling has more generally shown that relatedness has an important role in averting the 1 
tragedy of the commons (Frank, 1995, 1996, 2009). Here, we show theoretically that groups 2 
containing few strains are likely to have sufficiently high relatedness to the group to maintain 3 
a level of stalk production that avoids the collapsing tragedy of the commons (where there are 4 
no public goods produced). However, the model also robustly predicts that groups in which 5 
relatedness drops below a critical threshold should show catastrophic failure due to a 6 
collapsing tragedy of the commons. Experimental measurements of stalk production across a 7 
broad range of levels of relatedness support the model predictions, with groups reducing 8 
collective contributions to stalk production as relatedness declines in groups, leading to the 9 
quantitative manifestation of the tragedy of the commons. Surprisingly, however, despite a 10 
close match to model predictions that indicate that groups should show zero contribution to 11 
public goods and experience a collapsing tragedy, they avoid the most catastrophic outcomes 12 
(where all fruiting bodies fail to support spores). We suggest that this is most likely due to 13 
biological constraints in strategies and information that prevents strains from showing zero 14 
contribution to the stalk. Therefore, while groups clearly suffer from the tragedy of the 15 
commons, the outcomes are not nearly as tragic as predicted by theory because biological 16 
constraints prevent the necessary catastrophic decline in contributions to public goods. 17 
 18 
Results 19 
Theory predicts groups avoid tragic collapse across a range of relatedness 20 
To make predictions about how the contributions by members of a group contribute 21 
to public goods we model cooperation as an evolutionary game, where the players are 22 
genotypes (strains) that can make costly quantitative ‘investments’ (i.e. contributions) to 23 
public goods, and receive returns on those investments though the benefits to the group as a 24 
whole (see Methods). We build on a simple form of the game that was developed to model 25 
pairwise interactions between players (Madgwick et al., 2018), and hence cannot be used to 26 
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analyse of patterns in more complex groups composed of multiple strains (where the tragedy 1 
of the commons is most likely to play out). As expected, the model predicts that motivation to 2 
invest into public goods increases with relatedness. More importantly, the model provides 3 
clear predictions about specific patterns of investment that are qualitatively robust to a large 4 
range of benefits and costs of investment and non-linearity of benefits (see Methods). More 5 
specifically, the model predicts that groups with a small number of strains (where at least one 6 
strains will have high enough relatedness to the group to motivate investment) will typically 7 
make sufficient collective investment to avoid a collapsing tragedy of the commons (where 8 
collective investment is at or very close to zero). As such, groups with many strains that all 9 
have low relatedness to the group are predicted to show very low investment that reaches zero 10 
investment and a catastrophic ‘collapsing’ tragedy of the commons when relatedness drops 11 
below a critical lower threshold.  12 
To facilitate the application of the model to empirical patterns we allow for error in 13 
the measurement of relatedness (meaning individuals do not have access to perfect 14 
information about their relatedness, rather they estimate their relatedness to the group with 15 
some degree of stochastic error or ‘noise’) Furthermore, we allow error to be frequency-16 
dependant, such that strains make the largest errors in relatedness estimation when at 17 
intermediate relative frequency within the group. In this way, specific quantitative patterns of 18 
the tragedy of the commons depend on the exact costs (𝑐) and benefits (𝑏) of production of 19 
public goods (i.e. the stalk), as well as the magnitude of stochastic of error (𝑒), and how 20 
frequency-dependant (f) errors in the estimation of relatedness are. Hence, for any given level 21 





Data best fit a model with high benefits relative to costs and intermediate error 1 
 To understand patterns of collective investment and the threat of the tragedy of the 2 
commons, we first examine how investment changes across variation in relatedness in groups 3 
each composed of three different strains of D. discoideum (replicated across several different 4 
sets of strains). Relatedness to the group can easily be manipulated in D. discoideum because 5 
it is equivalent to the frequency of a strain in a group. Because relatedness of three strains can 6 
vary across a huge array of possible combinations, we assess patterns of investment by varying 7 
relatedness along several ‘transects’, where we hold the relatedness of one strain constant 8 
while varying the relatedness of the others (see Figure 1). We fit these data to the predictions 9 
from the model to identify the best fit estimates for the costs (𝑐), benefits (𝑏), and the total 10 
level of (𝑒) and degree of frequency-dependence (𝑓) of the error in the strains’ estimation of 11 
their relatedness to the group. We find that the best fit occurs when the benefits from stalk 12 
investment far exceed the costs 𝑐 = 1 and 𝑏 = 8) and strains make fairly large errors in 13 
measurement of relatedness (𝑒 = 0.4) that are moderately frequency-dependant (𝑓 = 0.175). 14 
Moreover, we find that experimental measures of collective investment in groups of three 15 
strains are not significantly different from the values predicted by the model (Paired t-test: 16 
𝑡(19) = −1.463, 𝑝 = 0.160) (Figure 1), indicating a close match between the predicted and 17 
observed values. The relatively high benefit to cost ratio suggests that individuals will be 18 
incentivised to invest into public goods across a large range of relatedness values, while the 19 
presence of a relatively large estimated error in measurement of relatedness means that we 20 
expect a slower decline in collective investment as relatedness declines than the perfect 21 
information model, with a lower threshold below which no strain should invest. 22 




Figure 1. Predicted (A) and measured (B) Collective Investment in the three-player game for 2 
transects through the available game-space of possible group compositions. Two transects are 3 
used, where a focal strain has a fixed relatedness to the group (=0.2 or 0.8), and the relative 4 
whole-group relatedness of the other two players varies. The colour represents Collective 5 
Investment (see scale), with red representing low collective Investment, and yellow high 6 
Collective Investment. Predictions are shown for the parameter set that provides the best fit to 7 
the data (C=1, B=8, E=0.4, F=0.175). 8 
  9 
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Theory predicts groups collapse with many strains at low relatedness 1 
 The close match between values of collective investment predicted by the model and 2 
the experimentally observed values indicates that our model can be utilised to make accurate 3 
quantitative predictions of public goods investment across social contexts. Therefore, to 4 
understand how and when the pattern of collective investment is expected to lead to the 5 
tragedy of the commons, including the potential for the collapsing tragedy, we created an array 6 
of groups with declining levels of relatedness. For this we mixed sets of N strains in equal 7 
proportions, such that relatedness equals 1/N for each group (and declines as more strains are 8 
added to the groups). The model predicts that these N-player groups should show a decline in 9 
collective investment down to a relatedness of about 0.1, below which relatedness will be too 10 
low to incentivise any level of investment, and hence collective investment should be zero 11 
(Figure 2A). In agreement with model predictions, we find that collective investment shows 12 
the expected deterioration as relatedness declines (mixed model: 𝜒1
2 = 69.1, N=228, 𝑝 <13 
10−15), eventually reaching a plateau at the level of relatedness where collective investment 14 
should go to zero (Figure 2A). The observed pattern shows a close fit to that predicted based 15 
on the parameter estimates from the three-strain experiments, where the observed values are 16 
not significantly different from those predicted by the collective investment game (paired t-17 
test: 𝑡(9) = 0.4034, 𝑝 = 0.403). To confirm the agreement between predictions from the 18 
three-strain experiments and the observations in the N-strain experiment we conducted an 19 
independent analysis where we fit the data from the N-strain experiments to predictions from 20 
the Collective Investment game. Remarkably, we find that that the best fit parameter estimates 21 
are identical to those yielded by the model fit to the three-strain data (𝑐 = 1, 𝑏 = 8, 𝑒 = 0.4, 22 
and 𝑓 = 0.175) which strongly supports the inference of the model.  23 






Figure 2. A) Measured Collective Investment (blue points) and predicted Collective 1 
Investment (black line) from the best-fit model for groups varying in size from 3-20 strains 2 
with all strains having the same relatedness to the group (=1/N). Grey shading represents 3 
confidence intervals around the estimate of the best-fit parameters to the data. B) Fruiting 4 
body collapse (blue points) for groups varying in size from 3-20 strains with all strains having 5 
the same relatedness to the group (=1/N). The grey line shows the fit from a mixed model of 6 
fruiting body collapse varying with average relatedness. C) Relationship between Collective 7 
Investment and fruiting body collapse (blue points). Error bars represent standard errors in 8 
Collective Investment (horizontal) and fruiting body collapse (vertical). The grey line shows 9 
the correlation between the variables. 10 
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Groups suffer when public goods decline, but not as badly as expected 1 
The close fit between model predictions of collective investment and empirical data 2 
suggests that groups with low relatedness should experience the catastrophic consequences of 3 
the collapsing tragedy of the commons, where there is no stalk produced and groups are unable 4 
to take advantage of stalk facilitated dispersal (Figure 2A). However, because our measure of 5 
investment is in relation to how strains shift allocation of cells away from stalk and towards 6 
production of spores (Madgwick et al., 2018), the pattern represents relative rather than 7 
absolute investment. We therefore directly measured the impact of collective investment on 8 
groups by evaluating the structural integrity of the stalk produced. To this end, we measured 9 
the proportion of fruiting bodies that spontaneously collapsed. We find that the proportion of 10 
failed fruiting bodies increases significantly as relatedness declines (mixed model: 𝜒1
2 = 68.0, 11 
N=175, 𝑝 < 10−15) (Figure 2B) and is significantly correlated with the level of collective 12 
investment (Pearson correlation: 𝑡(9) = −10.2, 𝑝 < 10
−5, 𝑟 = −0.97) (Figure 2C). However, 13 
despite the fact that patterns of collective investment closely match those predicted by the 14 
model, the groups in which we expect to see zero stalk investment remarkably still built 15 
complete fruiting bodies (with stalks), though they suffer from a relatively high rate of fruiting 16 
body collapse. This result suggests that, whilst investment is plateauing at low relatedness as 17 
predicted, the plateau occurs not at zero investment, but at some limit that potentially reflects 18 
a constraint on the available investment strategy that prevents zero investment. 19 
 20 
Discussion 21 
Our theoretical analysis of cooperation through production of public goods indicates 22 
that groups are expected to make relatively large collective contributions to stalk production 23 
across a large range of relatedness values, but these contributions should decline sharply when 24 
relatedness within groups falls below a critical threshold. This pattern occurs because strains 25 
with low relatedness to a group are necessarily at low frequency in the group and hence their 26 
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individual contribution can only have a small impact on the success of the group. For example, 1 
even if a strain at low frequency in a group were to make a very large relative contribution to 2 
stalk formation (e.g. sacrifice half of their cells to produce the stalk), their sacrifice would 3 
produce little if any group level benefit because it would represent an insignificant absolute 4 
contribution to the stalk. Thus, the potential rewards from contributing simply cannot 5 
compensate for the costs. We find a strong quantitative match between model predictions and 6 
empirical data for groups containing three strains, with total contribution (‘collective 7 
investment’) to the stalk declining with relatedness because strains lack sufficient motivation 8 
to invest (Figure 1). This leads to a robust prediction that contributions to stalk should 9 
eventually decline to zero when relatedness falls below a critical lower limit (which generally 10 
corresponds to groups containing an increasing number of strains). We find that measured 11 
contributions to stalk production matches this prediction (Figure 2A). However, we 12 
surprisingly show that even in these most tragic scenarios, groups still produce some stable 13 
fruiting bodies (Figure 2B). Whilst groups clearly suffer increasingly from the tragedy of the 14 
commons as contributions to stalk production decline, contributions are not falling to zero as 15 
predicted by theory. To understand these enigmatic findings, we focus on how groups might 16 
avoid the tragedy of the commons, and why the biology of the system may violate the 17 
assumptions of the theory in a way that essentially spares groups from the worst of the tragedy. 18 
There are many mechanisms that could lead groups to avoid the worst of the tragedy 19 
of the commons, including mechanisms that enforce contributing to public goods (Ågren et 20 
al., 2019), such as coercion (Frank, 1995; Wenseleers et al., 2004), rewards (Trivers, 1971; 21 
Sasaki & Uchida, 2014), punishment (Gardner & West, 2004a; Bshary & Grutter, 2005; Boyd 22 
et al., 2010), and sanctions (Pellmyr & Huth, 1994; Wang & Shaulsky, 2015). However, 23 
although such enforcement measures are well-studied across species (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 24 
1995; Frank, 1995, 1996; Rankin et al., 2007), including in microbes (Manhes & Velicer, 25 
2011; Wechsler et al., 2019) they arguably have more limited relevance in microbes due to 26 
the presence of clonal growth that structure microbial populations (Nadell et al., 2010; Ågren 27 
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et al., 2019) and limited ability for microbes to identify non-cooperators whose contributions 1 
must be ‘enforced’. Successful cooperation and the avoidance of the tragedy of the commons 2 
in microbes is therefore more likely to rely on high relatedness in groups, which restricts 3 
within-group competition and aligns the fitness interests of individuals with the group. Such 4 
outcomes can be achieved by excluding non-kin, or preferentially interacting with kin 5 
(Dionisio & Gordo, 2006, 2007). In D. discoideum, strains have been shown to be able to 6 
implement a mechanism that allows them to partially segregate away from other strains they 7 
encounter in aggregations (Ostrowski et al., 2008; Benabentos et al., 2009; Gruenheit et al., 8 
2017), resulting in preferential interactions with partners who match at a polymorphic 9 
recognition locus (Gruenheit et al., 2017). It appears likely that this mechanism evolved as a 10 
way to avoid the most tragic conditions (which occur at intermediate levels of relatedness) 11 
given that segregation is frequency dependent, with strains segregating most when they are at 12 
intermediate relatedness to the group (Madgwick et al., 2018). However, while segregation 13 
can help groups avoid the most tragic conditions, it is an imperfect mechanism that does not 14 
result in perfectly clonal fruiting bodies but rather, is quantitative and increases the variance 15 
in relatedness across fruiting bodies, which thereby inflates the average relatedness within 16 
fruiting bodies. Therefore, strains are still likely to experience the full range of relatedness in 17 
nature, which leaves groups vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons, even with a mechanism 18 
in place to reduce its impact (Gruenheit et al., 2017). 19 
Although much consideration has been given to adaptive mechanisms for avoiding 20 
the tragedy, there are many non-adaptive constraints that can preserve cooperation. One such 21 
constraint in D. discoideum could be an inability to down-regulate stalk cell fate to zero. 22 
Strains produce and respond to a various factors that regulate cell fate (Morris et al., 1987), 23 
which affect allocation of cells to stalk production (Parkinson et al., 2011). Such factors may 24 
present an opportunity for coercion of others to invest in the stalk, and may combine with 25 
pleiotropic constraints (e.g. Foster et al. 2004) in restricting how low a strain can invest. A 26 
further constraint is the inability of strains to perfectly assess their relatedness to the group 27 
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(Madgwick et al., 2018), leading a strain to contribute more to the stalk than may be optimal 1 
when at low relatedness to the group (SI Appendix, Figure S1A). Whilst a perfectly adapted 2 
individual would have information about its relatedness to all social partners, and choose its 3 
strategy accordingly (Hamilton, 2001), such information could generate substantial conflict 4 
between social partner (Ratnieks & Reeve, 1992). In this way, informational constraints can 5 
be an important non-adaptive mechanism for avoiding the tragedy of the commons, benefitting 6 
the group by restricting a strain’s ability to express its optimal selfishness. Imperfect 7 
information of this kind plays an important role in alleviating potential tragedies in many taxa, 8 
such as polyandrous social insect workers failing to favour their own patriline (Breed et al., 9 
1994; Keller, 1997; Nonacs, 2011), and cooperatively breeding birds failing to recognise 10 
extra-pair young (Dickinson, 2004; Komdeur et al., 2004) despite the obvious inclusive fitness 11 
advantage. A lack of information can change the optimal strategy in favour of cooperation, as 12 
occurs in meerkats where errors in relatedness estimation can select for indiscriminate altruism 13 
(Duncan et al., 2019), and mice where communally nesting mothers contribute milk according 14 
to total group size, rather than strategically investing according to their own relatedness (litter 15 
size) to the group (Konig, 1994; Ferrari et al., 2015; Ferrari & König, 2017). Overall, the types 16 
of constraints on selfishness we observe here, driven by imperfections and constraints in 17 
information, strategies, and enforcement measures may be important determinants of the 18 
degree to which groups avoid an expected tragedy of the commons throughout nature, 19 
particularly in microbes where avoiding such constraints may be more difficult. 20 
 21 
Methods 22 
A model of cooperation through public goods 23 
To understand individual and group contributions to public goods we generalise the 24 
‘Collective Investment game’ (Madgwick et al., 2018), which was originally developed to 25 
model pairwise interactions between strains of Dictyostylium discoideum. Using the model, 26 
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we evaluate how strains should quantitatively adjust their contributions to stalk production as 1 
a function of their relatedness to their group. Therefore, the model considers the stalk to be a 2 
public good that benefits the group by holding reproduce spores aloft for dispersal (Strassmann 3 
et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2014). Groups are composed of 𝑁 strains that each have a relative 4 
frequency of 𝑟𝑖 within a group. Here, frequency within a group is equivalent to a strain’s 5 
whole-group relatedness to the group (i.e. relatedness to the group, including self). This allows 6 
us to link theoretical predictions (of behaviour with respect to relatedness) directly with 7 
empirical results (from manipulations of frequency). To allow a broader discussion of the 8 
implications of the model, we use relatedness throughout, whilst noting the equivalence with 9 
frequency. Each strain makes an ‘investment’ by contributing a proportion 𝑥𝑖 of its cells into 10 
the stalk, with the residual proportion (1 − 𝑥𝑖) going into reproductive spores. Contributions 11 
to the stalk (𝑥𝑖) can therefore vary between 0 and 1 (see Figure 3 for a schematic representation 12 
of the model). The benefits of the stalk depend on the total contribute of all strains (i.e. the 13 
level of ‘collective investment’) in the group (𝑥𝐺), which is simply the sum of the proportional 14 
contributions of all strains weighted by their frequency in (and hence relatedness to) the group: 15 
 16 





The fitness benefit to the group (𝐵𝐺) from the stalk is modelled as a linear function in which 18 
fitness increases from a baseline value of 1 at a rate of b per unit of group contribution to stalk: 19 
 20 
𝐵𝐺 = 1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺 (2) 
 21 
Because all members of a group get the same benefit from the stalk regardless contribution, 22 
𝐵𝐺 can also be interpreted as the ‘between-group’ component of fitness. Contributing to the 23 
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stalk comes as a personal ‘opportunity cost’ (see Figure 3) to a strain because the cells it 1 
sacrifices to produce the stalk lose out on the opportunity to benefit from the stalk produced. 2 
This fitness cost to a strain arising from their contribution to the stalk (𝐶𝑖) is modelled as a 3 
linear function, where fitness declines from a baseline value of 1 by c units for each unit of 4 
cells contributed to the stalk (which is a proportion of all of the cells from that strain): 5 
 6 
𝐶𝑖 = 1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖 (3) 
 7 
Because a strain sacrifices a proportion of its cells (that could have been allocated to spores) 8 
to produce the stalk, the fitness cost component (𝐶𝑖) can also be considered as a strain’s 9 
‘within-group’ component of fitness. The total fitness of a strain (𝜔𝑖) is the product of the 10 
fitness cost from contributing to the stalk and the fitness benefit from the total stalk produced 11 
by the group: 12 
 13 
 𝜔𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖𝐵𝐺 = (1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖)(1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺) (4) 
 14 
Because a given strain does not have control over the total amount of stalk produced by their 15 
group (𝑥𝐺), the benefit they get from their own contribution to the stalk (𝐵𝑖) will depend on 16 
their frequency in (i.e. relatedness to) the group, which determines how much their 17 
contribution can impact the total stalk production, i.e. 𝐵𝑖 = 1 + 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑥𝑖. Therefore, we can 18 
evaluate the fitness of a strain in relation to the costs and benefits arising from their personal 19 
contribution to stalk production: 20 
 21 




which emphasises the fact that the relevant benefit from contributing to the stalk is that which 1 
arises from the strain’s own contribution (and hence, it is the benefit from their own 2 
contribution that incentivises them to contribute). 3 
The optimal proportion of its cells that a strain should contribute (𝑥𝑖) to the stalk (in 4 
terms of the marginal effect its contribution has on its own fitness) as a function of its 5 
relatedness to a group can be solved by finding the level of contribution that maximises fitness 6 













The relationship between equation (6) and Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964b) can be seen by 10 
examining the threshold between contributing and not-contributing to stalk formation (i.e. the 11 
threshold above which ?̃?𝑖 > 0), which occurs when 𝑟𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0. The patterns of investment 12 
predicted by equation (6) are illustrated in Figure 4, which indicates that strains are expected 13 
to show zero investment when their relatedness to the group drops below some critical 14 
threshold and is expected to approach the level shown by clonal groups (which is taken as the 15 
optimal level of investment) as their relatedness approaches 1.  16 




Figure 3. Schematic representation of the ‘Collective Investment game’ for two strains. Each 2 
strain has a total budget (e.g. number of cells) based on their relative frequency within the 3 
group. Strains invest a proportion of their budget into the public good, with the remainder 4 
representing the residual budget which is available to reap benefits.  The benefits of investment 5 
come through a multiplication b of the investments of both players to form the public good. 6 
The costs of investment come through a personal ‘opportunity cost’ of reducing the size of the 7 
residual budget of a strain (through which payoffs can be accrued) by investment multiplied 8 
by c. The payoff that each player receives is the product of the size of the group’s public good 9 
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and the relative representation of a player in the fitness accruing cells, which depends on both 1 
their relative frequency within the group to start with, and the amount of their residual budget 2 
spent on investment. 3 




Figure 4. Investment into public goods when the strength of selection on collective investment 2 
varies. A) Optimal investment for one strain as a function of relatedness to the group. B) 3 
Collective Investment of two strain as a function of a focal strain’s relatedness to the group. 4 
In both panels, the red line represents the weakest selection on public goods investment (S=3), 5 
and the blue line represents the strongest selection (S=53).  6 
  7 
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To understand how clonal groups should contribute to the stalk, we can evaluate 1 
equation (5) for the case where 𝑟𝑖 = 1 (or identify the value 𝑥𝐺 of that maximises equation 4), 2 








The sum of the contributions made by a group of strains contributing at the level given by 6 
equation (6) in a chimeric group will always be less than the value in equation (7) (i.e. 𝑥𝐺 < 𝜃 7 
for all chimeric groups). Therefore, we can evaluate the extent of the tragedy of the commons 8 
by considering how far groups are from the level of stalk production that maximises group 9 
success (eqn. 7). 10 
 11 
Imperfect information 12 
For strains to be able to make the optimal contribution to the stalk predicted in 13 
equation (6), they need perfect information of their relatedness to the group (𝑟𝑖). In real 14 
biological systems, individuals are likely to use cues that provide information about 15 
relatedness, and therefore we do not expect them to have access to perfect information (i.e. 16 
they make errors in estimation). There are two levels of error that we account for in our 17 
analysis; the overall level of error or ‘noise’ in estimating relatedness, and the shape of the 18 
frequency-dependant error, where strains make smaller errors in estimating their relatedness 19 
to the group when they are at either very low or very high relatedness to the group. 20 
To allow for error in estimating relatedness, we assume that cells within strains make 21 
unbiased normally distributed errors in their measurement of relatedness, with the mean of 22 
this distribution being their true relatedness to the group and the standard deviation 23 
corresponding to the degree of error in the measurement of relatedness (which reflects cells 24 
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over- or under-estimating their relatedness to the group). We model the standard error of this 1 
function by combining two processes, the inherent level of error in the measurement of 2 
relatedness (𝑒) and the degree to which error is frequency dependent (f). For this we assign a 3 
level of error or ‘noise’, which ranges from 0 to 1, and then weight this value by a frequency 4 
dependent parameter (f), to give the standard deviation of the error function. Therefore, for 5 
any given level of inherent measurement error or noise (𝑒), the realised level of error will 6 
depend on a strain’s frequency in a group and the degree of frequency dependence of the error 7 
(f). The degree of frequency-dependence accounts for the fact that within-group heterogeneity 8 
(i.e. the variance in the genetic identity of the cells encountered within a group) depends on a 9 
strain’s frequency, where the same level of inherent error (which reflects the biology of how 10 
relatedness is measured) is likely to realised errors of a larger magnitude in more 11 
heterogeneous groups. Therefore, we expect error to be highest when a strain is at a frequency 12 
of 0.5 and declines as they become either common or rare in groups. To allow for a range of 13 
shapes in this error function, we model it as a normal distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a 14 
standard deviation of f. In this way, the frequency dependent error parameter f captures the 15 
rate at which error drops as the frequency of a strain moves away from 0.5, with error dropping 16 
more rapidly with smaller values of f (see SI Appendix, Figure S2). To predict how a strain 17 
will behave given the level of error, we assume individual cells invest at a level given by the 18 
ESS strategy based on their measured relatedness to the group (rather than based on their true 19 
relatedness). As such, the level of investment by a strain at a given frequency reflects the 20 
averaging of the ESS strategy over the distribution of relatedness values measured by cells 21 
that are members of that strain.  22 
 23 
Robustness to model assumptions 24 
To provide a model that captures the most general scenario, we modelled benefits 25 
from the stalk as a linear function of investment. However, benefits could potentially be non-26 
linear. Therefore, we evaluate the robustness of the main model predictions to non-linearity 27 
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of benefits using two general shapes of non-linear benefit functions: diminishing and 1 
accelerating returns. For each, we derive a new function for 𝐵𝐺 (equation 2) and solve the 2 
ESS ?̃?𝑖 (equation 6). The non-linear equations for 𝐵𝐺 are as follows: diminishing returns 𝐵𝐺 =3 
1 + 𝑏(1 − (1 − 𝑥𝐺)
1.3 and accelerating returns 𝐵𝐺 = 1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺
1.3 (see Figure 5A). 4 
Importantly, these different functions do not alter the qualitative pattern of investment by 5 
strains, but rather, they shift the expected level of investment above or below that expected 6 
from the linear function (see Figure 5). However, because these patterns are nearly identical 7 
to those expected from the linear benefits function with a different value of benefits and costs 8 
(shown by comparing the patterns in Figures 4&5), the model based on the assumption of 9 
linearity is used for fitting empirical data.  10 




Figure 5. Linear and non-linear benefits of investment into public goods. A): Benefits of 2 
investment (black line) increase as investment increases. B) Optimal investment (black line) 3 
for one strain across the range of relatedness to the group. For both panels, the red and blue 4 
lines show data for diminishing and accelerating returns on investment respectively. 5 
  6 
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Empirical methods 1 
We tested model predictions using a set of 24 naturally occurring strains of D. 2 
discoideum from North Carolina (NC), which have previously been used in many studies 3 
(Buttery et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2015; Madgwick et al., 2018): NC28.1, NC34.1, NC34.2, 4 
NC39.1, NC43.1, NC52.3, NC54.2, NC58.1, NC60.1, NC60.2, NC63.2, NC67.2, NC69.1, 5 
NC71.1, NC73.1, NC76.1, NC78.2, NC80.1, NC85.2, NC87.1, NC88.2, NC96.1, NC99.1, 6 
NC105.1. 7 
Manipulation of group composition 8 
In the first set of experiments we created groups containing three different strains. 9 
Because there is a huge array of possible frequency combinations that can be constructed from 10 
sets of three strains, we explored frequency space by varying frequencies along ‘transects’ 11 
through this space, where each strain was held constant at a frequency 𝑟𝑖 of either 0.2 or 0.8 12 
while the frequencies of two other strains in the group were varied across a set of ten frequency 13 
combinations (see Table 1). This yielded a total of 60 unique frequency combinations for a set 14 
of three strains (which represent 20 different frequency combinations, with each of three 15 
strains in a ‘triplet’ being treated as the focal strain in turn). These frequency combinations 16 
are indicated by the positions of the data points in Figure 1 across the three-strain frequency 17 
space. A total of three distinct triplets of strains were used, with each triplet replicated three 18 
times in each of the combinations, giving a total of 𝑛 = 540 chimeric combinations. Each 19 
strain was also measured clonally three times in each replicate giving a total of 𝑛 = 540 clonal 20 
measurements. In the second set of experiments we explored a wider range of relatedness 21 
values by increasing the number of strains in each group. For this we created groups of N 22 
strains (where N was 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, or 20) in which all strains were at a frequency 23 
of 1/𝑁 in the group, which means that the average relatedness in each group is 1/𝑁. Each of 24 
the ten conditions were replicated an average of 5.1 times, for a total of 𝑛 = 510 chimeric 25 
combinations.  26 
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Table 1. Combinations of frequencies used in three-player experiments. Each column 1 
represents one of ten combinations for the two treatments, where one strain was held at a 2 
relatedness 𝑟1 = 0.2 or 0.8.  3 
Transect 1: 𝑟1 = 0.2 
𝑟2 = 0.79 0.03 0.06 0.71 0.67 0.63 0.20 0.24 0.49 0.40 
𝑟3 = 0.01 0.77 0.74 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.60 0.56 0.31 0.40 
Transect 2: 𝑟1 = 0.8 
𝑟2 = 0.01 0.18 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.10 
𝑟3 = 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.10 
 4 
  5 
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Measurement of spore allocation 1 
The protocols for quantifying spore allocation in D. discoideum are well-documented 2 
(e.g. see Kessin, 2001; Buttery et al., 2009) and so described only briefly here. Strains were 3 
grown on Klebsiella aerogenes as a food source. After growth, amoebae were harvested and 4 
washed by centrifugation in KK2 buffer (16.1 mM KH2PO4 & 3.7 mM K2HPO4). Amoebae 5 
were then counted on a haemocytometer and resuspended in KK2 at a density of 108 cells per 6 
ml. Chimeric or clonal groups were created by adding cells from each strain at the relevant 7 
relative frequency in a 1.5ml Eppendorf and mixing thoroughly. 107 cells of each mix were 8 
then spread evenly on a 6cm petri dish containing 1.5% nutrient-free agar in KK2 and left to 9 
develop for 24 hours in an incubator at 22ºC. For collective investment measures (see below), 10 
all fruiting bodies were harvested in 5ml of spore buffer and counted on a haemocytometer. 11 
The total number of spores gave a measure of 𝑇𝐺 (chimeric groups) or 𝑇𝑖 (clonal groups) to be 12 
used for quantifying investment. 13 
Measurement of fruiting body stability 14 
To measure fruiting body stability we created groups of N strains following the same 15 
approach as described above in which all strains were at a frequency of 1/𝑁 in the group, with 16 
N = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, or 20). For fruiting body collapse we simply counted the total number 17 
of fruiting bodies on a plate, and the number of fruiting bodies that had collapsed after 24 18 
hours. The percentage of total fruiting bodies that had collapsed was the measure of fruiting 19 
body collapse used. Each of the ten conditions were replicated an average of 4.4 times, for a 20 
total of 𝑛 = 440 chimeric combinations. 21 
Estimating contribution to public goods 22 
The total level of collective investment by a group was estimated from the production 23 
of spores by the group, 𝑇𝐺, which reflects the inverse of allocation to the stalk (since cells not 24 
allocated to the stalk are necessarily allocated as spores). Because strains vary in their clonal 25 
level of investment in stalk, we normalized the behaviour of a strain in chimera to its behaviour 26 
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when clonal. For this, we measure spore production by a strain in clonal groups (𝑇𝑖) and used 1 
this to calculate the expected spore production of a group as the weighted average of the clonal 2 
behaviour of each strain (where the clonal spore production by strains is weighted by their 3 
frequency in the group):  4 
 5 





Because we expect strains to be investing at a level that corresponds to the optimum (θ), the 7 
value of 𝐸𝐺  is expected to reflect the level of spore production when strains are investing at 8 
their optimal levels and hence provides an estimate of 1 − 𝜃 in the model. A measure of the 9 
spore production was then calculated by comparing the measured spore production of the 10 
group, 𝑇𝐺, with the expectation if all strains were acting the same as they do when they develop 11 








Therefore, 𝑆𝐺 will be greater than one if a chimeric group produces more spores than clones, 15 
which reflects a shift of cells away from stalk production into spore production. Because spore 16 
production is the inverse of allocation to stalk, this measure can be linked to the collective 17 
investment measure from the model (xi) by simply taking the inverse of relative spore 18 










This expression implies that, when 𝐼𝐺 = 1 strains are showing the optimal level of investment 2 
(θ), and values less than one represent a reduction in stalk investment compared to the clonal 3 
expectation 𝐸𝐺 . 4 
Comparing empirical data to model predictions 5 
To allow a direct comparison between model predictions and empirical data, we 6 
calculated collective investment from the model using the same method which is used to 7 
estimate the measure from empirical data. For this we need to express collective investment 8 
in terms of spore allocation scaled to the clonal expectation (equation 10). Therefore, the 9 
predicted collective investment from the model (𝑥𝐺; eqn. 1) has an expected value (denoted 10 









Statistical Analysis 15 
Collective investment and fruiting body collapse across different number of strains 16 
(with all strains at equal relatedness) was modelled using mixed models fitted by maximum 17 
likelihood. In each model, group (which identified each unique combination of strains) was 18 
fitted as a random effect to control for variation in the collective behaviour of different strain 19 
combinations, and significance was assessed from an ANOVA of two models that differed 20 
only in the presence of absence of the ‘number of strains’ effect. 21 
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To test the robustness of the general patterns of decreased contribution to public goods 1 
as a function of relatedness, we test the effects of changing model parameters. One such key 2 
parameter is the ‘strength of selection’ 𝑆 on the public good, which can be derived as the rate 3 
at which group fitness (equation 4) declines as a function of collective investment: 𝑆 = 𝑏𝑐. In 4 
order to vary the strength of selection while holding the optimal level of collective investment 5 
constant we simply rearranged equation (5) to solve either for b or c, and then solved the ESS 6 
(equation 9). We derived model predictions for a total of twelve different combinations of 7 
costs and benefits (with corresponding variation in the strength of selection S=2.98, 3.56, 4.27, 8 
5.14, 6.25, 7.68, 9.59, 12.25, 16.17, 22.5, 34.32, 64). 9 
In order to test the ability of the model to make quantitative predictions of collective 10 
investment (and therefore the tragedy of the commons) we searched for the set of parameters 11 
(b, c, e, and f) that provided the best fit between the given model’s prediction of collective 12 
investment, and the empirical data for collective investment. When fitting models, we 13 
accounted for overall scale issues by allowing a small intercept (I) in the model, that is added 14 
to all empirical datapoints. The best-fit model has a small intercept (I =0.03) that improves the 15 
fit compared to a model with no intercept. 16 
To find the best fit model, we firstly defined a large search-space of the four variables, 17 
b, c, e, and f (2 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 10; 1 ≤ 𝑐 < 2; 0 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 1;  0 < 𝑓 ≤ 1) with 20 values chosen for each 18 
parameter. For each unique combination of b, c, e, and f, we then derived the optimal strategy 19 
(equation 6) for each combination of b, c, e, and f. We then used our approach to modelling 20 
error (see ‘Imperfect Information’ section) to calculate the optimal strategy with error. 21 
Individual investment was converted to predicted collective investment (equation 11) 22 
corresponding to each of the unique social scenarios (relative relatedness of all players) for 23 
which we had empirical data. The fit between the prediction and the empirical data was 24 
assessed using a least-squares approach. To test the quality of the model fit to data, we used a 25 
paired t-test of each pair of empirical data and corresponding model prediction. 26 
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To calculate confidence intervals around the best-fit model we use a resampling 1 
approach. Briefly, we took samples of each datapoint from distributions corresponding to the 2 
empirical data, and calculated the best-fit parameters using the same approach as above. We 3 
then repeated this approach for 𝑛 = 100 iterations. To calculate confidence intervals for each 4 
parameter, we used the range between the 5th and 95th percentiles of the deviations between 5 
the parameter value of the overall best-fit model and the parameter value of each iteration. For 6 
plotting, we calculate a single confidence interval around the overall best fit as the 7 
combination of upper and lower confidence intervals of all three parameters that gives the 8 
greatest deviation in predicted investment from the overall best-fit model. As such, our 9 
confidence interval is a conservative estimate of confidence in the true values of the 10 
parameters.  11 
To assess the utility of adding another variable, error in relatedness estimation, to the 12 
model fit, we first used a broad search-space of parameters 𝑏 and 𝑐 and a least-squares 13 
approach to fit the perfect information model with the 𝑏 and 𝑐 values that best matched the 14 
data. Next, we added another parameter, 𝑒, to make an imperfect information model, where 𝑒 15 
is the standard deviation of the error in measuring relatedness (see ‘Imperfect information’ 16 
section). To test for the significant of difference in fit between perfect and imperfect 17 
information models, we used an F-test.  18 
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Comment 2: Constraints on conditional cooperation  1 
The preceding paper provided an analysis of how non-adaptive constraints can lead to 2 
beneficial outcomes for chimeric mixes of Dictyostelium discdoideum. Here, I use these 3 
findings to speculate on the possible mechanism through which strains are able to engage in 4 
conditional cooperation.   5 
 A classic expectation of mechanisms of social discrimination is that these mechanisms 6 
would evolve such that social partners can be recognised with lower error (Hamilton, 1964b). 7 
Yet, a ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 1971) that inhibits recognition mechanisms could be 8 
selected under special conditions (Ridley, 2000), such as the meiotic scrambling of 9 
information about which genes are passed on to offspring under sexual recombination (Haig 10 
& Grafen, 1991). For a veil of ignorance to be favoured, an individual must benefit from 11 
reducing their own level of information, which would only occur if, concurrently, competitors 12 
also had a reduced level of information. In this way, an unconditional strategy of cooperation 13 
could only selectively replace a conditional strategy of cooperation if the unconditional 14 
strategist can remove the advantages that information provides to a conditional strategist. 15 
Although conditional cooperation may be less cooperative on average, the ESS level of 16 
cooperation of an unconditional strategist may not be very high (depending on the probability 17 
distribution of frequencies that a player experiences). Consequently, the dilemma within the 18 
tragedy of the commons cannot be escaped by unconditional strategy – a point that is often 19 
missed (e.g. Queller & Strassmann, 2013). Therefore, whilst it is true that more perfect social 20 
discrimination is likely to facilitate a more effective conditional strategy, better information 21 
does not always benefit individuals because it can exacerbate the tragedy of the commons.  22 
 Paper 3 showed that biological constraints that limit the ability of an individual to 23 
modulate their conditional strategy can increase the level of cooperation between individuals. 24 
These constraints are non-adaptive, for it remains true that if an individual could overcome 25 
them then it would reap an advantage – though this advantage would be short-lived (until the 26 
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better-informed genotype has gone to fixation) and ultimately detrimental to group fitness (in 1 
exacerbating the tragedy of the commons). In D. discoideum, strains play their strategy of 2 
conditional cooperation under constraints: informational constraints wherein a strain is not 3 
able to detect their true frequency within the aggregate, developmental constraints wherein a 4 
strain is not able to freely change how their cells differentiate, and selective constraints 5 
wherein a strain’s strategy is not selected to optimise their fitness at a particular frequency. 6 
The selective constraint is potentially interrelated with the other forms of constraint, but also 7 
has an independent quality even if selection is unable to improve a strain’s ability to detect 8 
their frequency or change how cells differentiate. All these different sources of constraint are 9 
likely to have some role, but the evidence presented in Paper 2 suggests that informational 10 
constraints are probably the most important because only high error in the ability to detect 11 
focal strain frequency produces the characteristic pattern of investment behaviour in the data.  12 
 Although there are numerous biochemical mechanisms through which a strain could 13 
detect its frequency within an aggregate, the evidence in Paper 2 suggests that strains do not 14 
respond to the number or frequency of other players. In other words, strains appear to use self-15 
referential information only. Consequently, there are two basic options for signalling this 16 
information: a secreted molecule and a cellular receptor or a cell-surface signal-receptor. A 17 
candidate secreted signal might be DIF-1, which is known to induce stalk cell differentiation 18 
in D. discoideum (Thompson & Kay, 2000). In principle, strains could direct their own stalk 19 
cell differentiation whilst ignoring the DIF signal in a competing strain (Parkinson et al., 20 
2011). However, there is no known polymorphism in any of the DIF molecules in D. 21 
discoideum. Perhaps there are other secreted molecules that are yet unknown, but secreted 22 
molecules might readily provide some selective pressure for interfering with other strains by 23 
producing both a self-signal and another nonself-signal to disrupt the competing strain, and 24 
there is no evidence of overproduction of stalk (compared to the clonal level) by any strain 25 
combination. Alternatively, a candidate cell-surface signal might be TgrB1/C1, which are a 26 
linked pair of cell binding proteins that each bind the other. Previous analysis has shown that 27 
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Tgr protein binding strength predicts segregation behaviour (Gruenheit et al., 2017), which 1 
Paper 1 showed to be frequency-dependent. The Tgr proteins are likely to cause segregation 2 
through the direct action of cell binding, as groups of cells are more likely to remain in the 3 
same aggregate if they more strongly bind one another. Although the process of cellular 4 
differentiation is likely to be more complicated than cell binding (i.e. involving many other 5 
genes), similar proteins could be involved in a signalling cascade that leads to downstream 6 
effects. The tgr gene family is very large, with numerous duplicated genes and pseudogenes 7 
(but unpublished data shows that tgrb1/c1 does not explain frequency-dependent investment 8 
behaviour). Nonetheless, the tgr loci are amongst the most polymorphic loci in D. 9 
discoideum’s genome, and are the only signal-receptors amongst the genes with high enough 10 
polymorphism to explain frequency-dependent investment behaviour in the test-set of 11 
naturally co-occurring strains (Gruenheit et al., 2017; de Oliveira et al., 2019). Therefore, I 12 
would suggest that it is most likely that a self-binding protein is responsible for how cells 13 
detect their frequency within an aggregate.  14 
 Whether the signalling relies on a secreted or cell-surface mechanism, a major 15 
evolutionary problem for understanding how conditional cooperation is possible in D. 16 
discoideum is how selection favours strains with different self-signals (which defines whether 17 
a cell belongs to one strain or other). It is the general expectation that self-signals have a 18 
common-type advantage; a common self-signal should go to fixation because its frequency 19 
means that is more likely to interact with other variants that share the same self-signal, and 20 
therefore it is simply more likely to engage in cooperation. This problem – known as Crozier’s 21 
paradox – would suggest that all D. discoideum (or at least all naturally co-occurring types) 22 
would effectively belong to one strain because they all bear the same self-signal.  23 
Paper 2 has demonstrated how many of the predictions of the Collective Investment 24 
game are inaccurate because of constraints in the social system of D. discoideum. Comment 2 25 
has speculated on what the deviations from predictions imply about the mechanism of 26 
conditional cooperation in D. discoideum. Next, I move onto considering the Collective 27 
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Investment game as a generalised framework for understanding conditional cooperation, with 1 
a view to finding a solution to Crozier’s paradox in this specific context.  2 
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 6 
Abstract 7 
Group-beneficial behaviours have presented a long-standing challenge for evolutionary theory 8 
because, whilst their benefits are available to all group members, their costs are borne by 9 
individuals. Consequently, an individual could benefit from ‘cheating’ their group-mates by 10 
not paying the costs while still reaping the benefits. There have been many proposed 11 
evolutionary mechanisms that could favour cooperation (and disfavour cheating) in particular 12 
circumstances. However, if cooperation is still favoured in some circumstances then we might 13 
expect evolution to favour strategic cooperation, where the level of contribution toward group-14 
beneficial behaviour is varied in response to the social context. To uncover how and why 15 
individuals should contribute toward group-beneficial behaviour across social contexts, we 16 
model strategic cooperation as an evolutionary game where players can quantitatively adjust 17 
the amount they contribute toward group-beneficial behaviour. We find that the evolutionarily 18 
stable strategy (ESS) predicts, unsurprisingly, that players should contribute in relation to their 19 
relatedness to the group. However, we surprisingly find that players often contribute to 20 
cooperation in such a way that their fitness is inverse to their relatedness to the group such 21 
that those that contribute to cooperation end up with the same return from group-beneficial 22 
behaviour, essentially removing any potential advantage of higher relatedness. These results 23 
bring to light a paradox of group-beneficial cooperation: groups do best when they contain 24 
highly related individuals, but those with the highest relatedness to the group will often have 25 
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the lowest fitness within the group.  1 
 2 
Keywords: cooperation, social behaviour, public goods, kin selection, group selection 3 
 4 
Introduction 5 
Group-beneficial social behaviour is near-universal across the diversity of life, 6 
ranging from communal care in vertebrates (Clutton-Brock, 2009) through self-sacrificial 7 
defensive behaviours in eusocial insects (Wilson & Hölldobler, 1990) to secreted metabolic 8 
molecules in micro-organisms (West et al., 2006). Despite covering wildly different taxa and 9 
ecologies, these types of social behaviours all share a common paradox: the benefits are 10 
available to everyone in the group, and yet their costs are borne by the particular individuals 11 
that perform them (Wilson, 1977; Frank, 1995; Rankin et al., 2007; Johnstone & Rodrigues, 12 
2016). Why should an individual pay the cost of group-beneficial behaviour rather than 13 
‘cheating’ their group-mates by not paying their fair share of the costs? In general, the 14 
evolutionary problem of cheating is expected to lead natural selection to disfavour group-15 
beneficial behaviours (Frank, 2003; Foster, 2004; Travisano & Velicer, 2004; West et al., 16 
2007a; Bourke, 2011), but there are numerous mechanisms that tip the balance of selection in 17 
their favour within specific contexts, such as high relatedness between social partners 18 
(Hamilton, 1964a), strong reciprocal interactions (Trivers, 1971), and enforcement 19 
mechanisms like punishment (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995) or policing (Frank, 1995). 20 
Logically, if cheating is favoured in some circumstances and not in others, then we 21 
might expect selection to favour ‘strategic’ cooperation, where individuals modulate the 22 
amount they contribute toward group-beneficial behaviour in different situations. Although 23 
learning could potentially play a role in strategic cooperation, here we are focused on genetic 24 
strategies that evolve to optimally adjust the level of cooperation by an individual to suit its 25 
social context. Such strategic cooperation could appear as facultative cooperation, where 26 
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individuals contribute toward group-beneficial behaviour when it is profitable (in terms of 1 
fitness), whilst withholding contributions when it is not. However, strategic cooperation need 2 
not appear as an all or none pattern of behaviour. Indeed, an individual would often do better 3 
by strategically adjusting their contribution to cooperation in response to the relative costs and 4 
benefits. In this way, strategic cooperation is not a mechanism that prevents or avoids cheating 5 
but, rather, an adaptation that allows individuals to maximise their fitness within any given 6 
social context (whether this means making contributions toward cooperation or free-riding on 7 
the contributions of others).  8 
Strategic cooperation is most likely to evolve when social contexts are highly variable, 9 
and hence natural selection can favour different levels of cooperation in different situations. 10 
For example, pairs of female house mice have been shown to adjust their contribution to 11 
communal care in response to unequal litter sizes, increasing the time spent caring for the 12 
group’s offspring when their own offspring make up a larger fraction of the group (Ferrari et 13 
al., 2016). Similarly, soldier-producing aphids increase their contributions toward gall defence 14 
behaviour when in highly related groups, which comes at a cost to their personal reproduction 15 
(Abbot et al., 2001). Likewise, strains of a social amoebae modulate the fraction of cells that 16 
differentiate into non-reproductive stalk cells (that help the remaining spores cells to disperse) 17 
dependent upon their frequency within the group (Madgwick et al., 2018). These examples, 18 
from cooperatively breeding vertebrates, eusocial insects and social micro-organisms, indicate 19 
that strategic cooperation can occur across diverse taxa and that it need not require complex 20 
cognitive skills. Consequently, strategic cooperation may help explain why group-beneficial 21 
behaviours persist throughout nature, despite the potential advantages of cheating. Strategic 22 
cooperation may also explain the ‘missing cheaters’ phenomenon – why obligate cheater types 23 
are so surprisingly rare in nature (Gilbert et al., 2007). Instead, if individuals are able to show 24 
flexible social strategies where they strategically modulate their level of cooperation to best 25 
exploit their social environment, we would expect any individual to appear to be a contributor 26 
or a free-rider (i.e. appear to be a cheater) in different situations.  27 
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To uncover how individuals should change their contributions toward group-1 
beneficial behaviour in different social contexts, we develop a general theoretical framework 2 
to model strategic cooperation as a flexible social strategy where individuals can quantitatively 3 
adjust their contributions toward group-beneficial ‘public goods’. We identify the 4 
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), which represents a quantitative pattern of how much an 5 
individual should contribute towards cooperation across social contexts to maximise their 6 
fitness. To elucidate the factors that shape the ESS, we examine the evolutionary logic of 7 
strategic cooperation within different conceptual frameworks (kin and group selection).  8 
 9 
Models and Results 10 
 We model cooperation through a group-beneficial behaviour that generates a ‘public 11 
good’ that benefits all group members (Hamburger, 1973; Fox & Guyer, 1978; Dionisio & 12 
Gordo, 2006; Frank, 2010). Hence, our analysis does not include cooperative behaviours that 13 
are limited to one-way transactions, such as where an actor either helps or harms a recipient. 14 
Across different scenarios, the prevailing feature of public goods is that they are costly to 15 
produce, leading to a trade-off between the production of public goods and other fitness related 16 
traits (Haldane, 1932; Wright, 1945; Maynard Smith, 1964; Wilson, 1975a; Frank, 1995). 17 
Cooperation through production of costly public goods is widespread, but the form of 18 
cooperation can vary widely. Public goods could refer to a physical product, such as secreted 19 
molecules in microbes that come at an energetic cost to the cells that produce them (which 20 
presumably reduces the growth rate of those cells), while being available to all cells in the 21 
local environment (West et al., 2006). For example, iron-scavenging siderophores in the 22 
bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa (Griffin et al., 2004) and extracellular enzymes within 23 
biofilms in the virus Vibrio cholerae (Drescher et al., 2014) are energetically costly to produce 24 
and increase the fitness of all cells in the local area. Similarly, individuals can cooperate in the 25 
production of physical structures that act as public goods, such as the fruiting body stalk that 26 
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facilitates dispersal in the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum (Madgwick et al., 2018) 1 
and social bacteria Myxococcus xanthus (Velicer et al., 2000), which comes at a clear cost to 2 
the cells that are sacrificed for its production. Public goods could also arise from behavioural 3 
services (Foster, 2004), such as vigilance in meerkats (Santema & Clutton-Brock, 2013) and 4 
monkeys (Gaynor & Cords, 2012), which is costly because it competes with time that an 5 
animal could use for other purposes and may also expose the individual to direct danger, while 6 
benefiting all individuals in the local area who can respond to an alarm call (signalling an 7 
approaching predator). Likewise, cooperatively breeding animals may often generate public 8 
goods through indiscriminate communal care (Riehl, 2013; Ferrari et al., 2015) that benefit 9 
all the young in a communal nest, while coming at a cost to an individual’s own fecundity. 10 
Thus, given that there is a broad range of scenarios where individuals cooperate through public 11 
goods in nature, we do not construct our model to match any specific biological scenario. 12 
Instead, we implement a generalised framework (building on ref 18) that considers the 13 
problem from the perspective of competing genetic variants that are maximising their 14 
transmission, which can be adapted to fit a large range of different systems.  15 
We build a game-theoretic model where the ‘players’ are genetic variants (i.e. 16 
coreplicons; Cosmides & Tooby, 1981).  We consider groups of 𝑁 players, where each (𝑖th) 17 
player is present at a particular frequency 𝑝𝑖 within the group (such that  ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 1). We 18 
assume that a player’s frequency within a group is independent of their strategy and that 19 
variation in the frequency of a player across groups is caused by some random process that 20 
allows players to potentially experience a range of group compositions (and so we examine 21 
the consequences of variation in group composition, not the underlying causes of the 22 
variation). In the absence of any contribution to public goods, all players within a group have 23 
equal fitness that is arbitrarily assigned a value of 1, which can be viewed as the budget from 24 
which they can make a contribution toward public goods. In this way, we assume the cost of 25 
producing public goods is in units of fitness, and hence making a contribution comes at the 26 
expense of a player’s potential fitness through other traits. Players contribute a proportion (𝑥𝑖) 27 
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of this potential fitness into public goods (0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 1), which results in a reduction in fitness 1 
of c per unit contributed, making the total cost 𝑐𝑥𝑖. Because contributions are measured in 2 
units of fitness, logically 𝑐  would equal 1. However, by assigning the total cost as 𝑐𝑥𝑖 we are 3 
able to capture scenarios where fitness declines at a rate that is more or less than the linear 4 
expectation across the relevant range of contributions (i.e. between zero contribution and the 5 
optimal level of contribution that maximizes fitness, which should typically capture a range 6 
far below a contribution of 1). After contributing to public goods, a player has a residual 7 
fitness of 1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖 before accounting for any fitness benefits from the public goods. The benefit 8 
from public goods depends on the total collective contribution made by all members of a group 9 
(𝑥𝐺 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ) since the public goods benefit everyone, regardless of which player ‘paid’ 10 
to produce them. Each unit of collective contribution gives a benefit of 𝑏 in units of fitness, 11 
which makes the total impact of collective contribution to public goods on a player’s fitness 12 
1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺 . Although it is possible that some systems might show a non-linear relationship, such 13 
as those with diminishing or accelerating benefits from public goods, the general patterns of 14 
results would hold under these other relationships insofar as they are monotonically increasing 15 
functions (and, moreover, even non-linear relationships may be quasi-linear in the 16 
evolutionarily relevant range of contributions). Thus, a player’s realised fitness (after 17 
accounting for the costs and benefits of public goods) is determined by the multiplicative 18 
effects of the costs from contributing to (1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖) and the benefits from the availability of 19 
public goods (1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺): 20 
 21 
𝜔𝑖 = (1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖)(1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺) (1) 
 22 
Hence, a player’s fitness is essentially the realised benefit, which depends on both the fitness 23 
cost paid for their contribution to and benefit arising from public goods (since the two are 24 
multiplicative fitness components); it is through the residual potential fitness after contributing 25 
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that players gain the fitness benefit from the public goods and so contributing to public goods 1 
reduces a player’s potential benefit from the public goods.  2 
Table 1. Notation for the model. 3 
Parameter Definition 
𝑏 Benefit (per unit of collective investment) to the group from public goods  
𝑐 Cost (per unit of investment) to a player from public goods 
𝑁 Number of players in the group 
𝜔𝑖 Fitness of the 𝑖
th player 
𝑝𝑖 Frequency of the 𝑖
th player 
𝑥𝑖 Investment strategy of the 𝑖
th player 
𝑥𝐺 Collective investment of all players in the group 
𝑥𝑖 Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) with respect to the 𝑖
th player 
𝑛 Number of players in the group that contribute to public goods 
?̅? Average frequency of all contributing players in the group 
𝑥𝐺 
Coevolutionarily stable strategy (coESS) of collective investment by a 
group of players each pursuing the ESS 
 4 
  5 
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Although a player’s fitness depends on the total collective contributions to public 1 
goods made by the group, to understand why a player personally contributes we need to 2 
consider their marginal impact on their own fitness owing to their own contribution to 3 
collective investment: 1 + 𝑏𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖.  Given that contributing to public goods comes at a cost with 4 
respect to potential fitness 1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖, any contribution by a player must ultimately increase their 5 
fitness above their baseline fitness: (1 + 𝑏𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖) >1/(1 − 𝑐𝑥𝑖). This perspective emphasizes 6 
the dilemma of cooperation through public goods: the cost is paid directly, but benefits are 7 
diluted across the group, and therefore a genetic variant only sees a return on its contribution 8 
to public goods in relation to its frequency in the group.  9 
The biologically-relevant solution for players’ investment strategies is the 10 
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), which describes the best strategy that a player can adopt 11 
in an equilibrium population of strategies that have evolved by natural selection (Maynard 12 
Smith, 1974). An additional level of complexity for the ESS of a continuously-variable social 13 
behaviour is that the ESS must describe a player’s strategy across the full range of social 14 
contexts – and, critically, with respect to whatever information causes that player to modulate 15 
their strategy. Here we focus our attention on the most unconstrained case, where the ESS 16 
describes what proportion of a player’s fitness budget they sacrifice to produce public goods 17 
across groups with any number of players and any distribution of frequencies of players within 18 
the group. Thus, we assume that players have access to perfect information about their social 19 
context. By considering players to be genetic variants, this assumption implies that they are 20 
able to measure their frequency within the group (e.g. using a signal) and can then modify 21 
their contribution toward public goods in response (which is a necessary requirement of any 22 
frequency-dependent strategy). We further assume that each player’s response to a given 23 
social context is independent of its response to other social contexts, which simply means that 24 
the pattern of cooperation across social contexts is genetically unconstrained and can evolve 25 
to maximize a genetic variant’s fitness (Maynard Smith, 1976; Grafen, 1984; Parker & 26 
Maynard Smith, 1990; Kirkpatrick & Gomulkiewicz, 1992).  27 
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Using optimality assumptions (Maynard Smith, 1976; Grafen, 1984; Parker & 1 
Maynard Smith, 1990; Kirkpatrick & Gomulkiewicz, 1992), we can solve the ESS (which we 2 
denote 𝑥𝑖) by finding the pattern of contribution to public goods that maximizes a player’s 3 
fitness (𝜔𝑖) given their frequency in a group. We refer to this pattern as their ‘investment 4 
strategy’ to reflect the fact that the level of contribution to public goods is that which 5 
maximises the benefit against the costs. Given that a player’s investment strategy is defined 6 
as the proportion of their potential fitness that they devote towards public goods, the ESS can 7 
be given with respect to some equilibrium quantity of collective investment by the group (𝑥𝐺) 8 
by setting the derivative of Equation (1), 𝑑𝜔𝑖/𝑑𝑥𝑖), equal to zero and rearranging (see also SI 9 
Appendix, Section 1): 10 
 11 
𝑥𝑖 =




In broad terms, the ESS shows that a player contributes a larger proportion of their fitness 13 
budget toward public goods when they are at a higher frequency in a group (𝑝𝑖), but their exact 14 
level of investment can depend on the behaviour of others (which is reflected in the 15 
dependence of individual investment on group investment). Because the solution to equation 16 
(2) depends on the level of investment by the group (𝑥𝐺; i.e. including the focal player) it does 17 
not represent a closed solution (since the investment made by each group member relies on 18 
the level made by all other group members, and hence the values are all interdependent). 19 
Therefore, to solve a player’s ESS level of investment towards public goods, the expression 20 
in equation (2) must be resolved simultaneously for all players in a group.  21 
 Across all possible values of the benefit and cost terms (𝑏, 𝑐), we know of no method 22 
that can analytically solve the ESS, so we implement numerical analysis (Figure 1). However, 23 
it is possible to derive a more exact analytical description of the ESS by further resolving the 24 
quantity of collective investment by the group (𝑥𝐺) when each player contributes toward 25 
public goods at the level of the ESS for their frequency, which we refer to as the 26 
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coevolutionarily stable strategy (coESS). The coESS is the sum of the contributions made by 1 
all group members toward public goods at equilibrium across the full range of possible 2 
frequencies of players within groups. Within any particular group, not all players necessarily 3 
contribute toward public goods at the coESS because, under many conditions, one or more 4 
players pursuing the ESS do not contribute given their frequency. Consequently, at the coESS 5 
the total investment depends on a subset of investing players; for any particular group, we can 6 
therefore define that there is a set of 𝑛 players who invest, which we refer to as the 7 
‘contributors’, and 𝑁 − 𝑛  players that do not, which we refer to as the ‘free-riders’. We can 8 





𝑖=1 ), 9 
which also gives the proportion of the group that contributes ?̅?𝑛 (making the proportion of 10 
free-riders in a group 1 − ?̅?𝑛). The total investment for a group is, therefore, the sum of the 11 
investment by contributors (𝑥𝐺 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ), which we can describe with greater specificity 12 







In broad terms, the coESS shows that a group of players invest more into public goods when 16 
there are fewer contributors at a higher average frequency. Because the coESS reflects the 17 
ESS behaviour for a group of contributors, we can substitute the coESS into the ESS (eqn. 2) 18 
to arrive at a more exact analytical solution for the ESS level of investment by a contributor:  19 
 20 
𝑥𝑖 =




This solution to the ESS is only fully resolved for a particular group once players are classified 22 
as being one of the 𝑛 contributors or 𝑁 − 𝑛 free-riders. A player can be categorised as a 23 
contributor or free-rider based on their frequency in a group by finding the minimum 24 
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frequency that separates contributors from free-riders for a given group (within a numerical 1 






Figure 1. The ESS patterns of individual investment into public goods across frequencies (𝑝𝑖) 1 
under different cost-benefit scenarios. In each panel the red line indicates the ESS for the focal 2 
player in groups composed of two players (i.e., 𝑥𝑖 when 𝑁 = 2) and the blue line the ESS for 3 
the focal player in groups that contain a large number of non-focal players, each at low 4 
frequency. These lines overlap (indicated by the alternating red and blue dashed lines) when 5 
the focal players is at a frequency that is above the threshold 𝑝* (indicated by light-grey 6 
shading), which is the frequency at which the focal player is the only contributor toward public 7 
goods. In regions where these two lines do not overlap, they set upper and lower limits to the 8 
expected level of investment (since players reduce investment in response to investment by 9 
others, groups with a large number of other players will set an upper limit on investment while 10 
groups with two players sets a lower limit on investment; see eqn. 6). The purple shaded area, 11 
therefore, indicates the range of possible patterns of investment by the focal player, with the 12 
exact value depending on the distribution of frequencies across non-focal players within the 13 
group. The solid black horizontal line indicates the level of investment that maximises group 14 
fitness (𝜃; eqn. 9). The three panels show patterns corresponding to different benefit-to-cost 15 
ratios (where costs were held constant at 𝑐 = 1 and benefits b were varied), which were chosen 16 
to capture three fundamental scenarios: A) benefits relative to costs are low (𝑏 = 3/2), such 17 
that players only contribute when they have a high frequency and consequently there is only 18 
ever a single contributor, B) benefits relative to costs are high (𝑏 = 3) and consequently there 19 
is potentially a small overlap between conditions where the focal player contributes and non-20 
focal players might also contribute, and C) benefits relative to costs are very high (𝑏 = 9) and 21 
consequently there is a very large region where non-focal players may be motivated to 22 
contribute.  23 
  24 
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Table 2. The categorization of players as free-riders or contributors. All players within a group 1 
can be classed as a contributor or free-rider depending on their frequency. The frequency 2 
threshold that separates the two classes depends on the costs (𝑐) and benefits (𝑏) of investment 3 
into public goods. Once classified, players can be assigned an investment level (𝑥𝑖) and 4 
expected fitness (𝜔𝑖).   5 
Investment 
class  






















  7 
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There is a fascinating and unexpected property of the ESS: each of the 𝑛 contributors 1 
has equal transmission to the next generation, despite having different starting frequencies. 2 
Transmission refers to the number of copies of that particular genetic variant that are passed 3 
to the next generation, which is calculated as their frequency-weighted fitness (𝑝𝑖𝜔𝑖). Thus, 4 
in real terms, equal transmission would mean that genetic variants produce the same 5 
proportion of the progeny from that group, rather than (as might otherwise be assumed) a 6 
player at higher frequency in a group producing a larger proportion of all progeny produced 7 
by the group. This result can be demonstrated by examining the frequency-weighted fitness 8 
of any contributor via substituting the expression for the ESS (eqn. 4) into the expression for 9 
a player’s fitness (eqn. 1), which simplifies to: 𝑝𝑖𝜔𝑖 = (𝑐/𝑏)(1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺)
2 (Table 2). This 10 
expression means that contributors must make unequal contributions to public goods that wipe 11 
out the differences in their starting frequencies, which necessarily means that those at higher 12 
frequency are investing more (and hence are paying a larger fitness cost) than those at lower 13 
frequency. While all contributors end up with equal transmission to the next generation, their 14 
transmission is always higher than free-riders (i.e. the individual contributors each account for 15 
a larger proportion of all progeny produced by members of the group than do each of the free-16 
riders). However, free-riders have higher fitness than contributors because they do not pay for 17 
any of the costs of public goods and yet receive the same benefit as contributors.  18 
  19 
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Kin selection perspective 1 
We can understand the logic of why and how much individuals contribute to public 2 
goods by relating the model results to the kin selection perspective. For this we can examine 3 
the conditions where a player should contribute toward the production of public goods rather 4 
than being a free-rider, which we can express by finding the conditions that satisfy the 5 
inequality for when the ESS level of investment is greater than zero: 6 
 7 
𝑝𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 − 𝑛(?̅? − 𝑝𝑖)𝑏 > 0 (5) 
 8 
The first two parts of this expression (𝑝𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐) are like a simple form of Hamilton’s rule 9 
(Hamilton, 1964a; Charnov, 1977), whilst the third part −𝑛(?̅? − 𝑝𝑖)𝑏 captures how a player 10 
should adjust their investment strategy in response to the investment by their group-mates. 11 
(Formally, Hamilton’s rule would describe the quantity of investment at the ESS, which 12 
requires examination of its marginal form; see SI Appendix, Section 2.) The expression 𝑝𝑖𝑏 −13 
𝑐 captures the direct ‘profitability’ of investment into public goods (in terms of fitness), where 14 
each unit of investment results in a reduction in fitness of c and a benefit in terms of 𝑝𝑖𝑏. A 15 
player’s frequency is multiplied by the benefit term because this term scales how much a 16 
player’s contribution toward collective investment is able to impact that player’s own fitness. 17 
For example, a player at low frequency in a group is largely incapable of affecting their own 18 
fitness through their contribution to public goods, regardless of how much they might invest 19 
(because their contribution is diluted through the group in relation to their frequency). This 20 
component of equation (5) (𝑝𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐) directly matches the classic form of Hamilton’s rule since 21 
the frequency of a player in the group (𝑝𝑖) also represents its relatedness to the group (which 22 
includes itself). The last component of equation (5) (−𝑛(?̅? − 𝑝𝑖)𝑏) captures the effect of other 23 
players’ investment on the motivation for the focal player to contribute toward public goods. 24 
When a player is at a higher frequency than the average frequency of contributors, this last 25 
term will be positive and have no impact on the conditions since the first condition (𝑝𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 >26 
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0) has to be met for that player to be motivated to invest in the first place. However, if a player 1 
is at a frequency that is below the average frequency of contributors, this last term is negative 2 
and indicates that such players will have a greater incentive to free-ride on the public goods 3 
produced by others (and hence reduce their own contribution). In this way, this term (−𝑛(?̅? −4 
𝑝𝑖)𝑏) captures the conflict that arises between players, as they reduce their investment in 5 
response to the investment made by other players (cf. Queller, 1994; Frank, 1998). Therefore, 6 
overall, whether or not a player contributes toward the production of public goods or free-7 
rides depends on a combination of the potential profits of investing from a simple cost-benefit 8 
analysis and also the impact of social conflict.  9 
 We can also examine the impact of these two factors, the simple cost-benefit analysis 10 
that determines the profitability of investing in public goods and the impact of social conflict 11 
that can disincentivise contributing, in terms of the quantitative level of investment into public 12 
goods that is favoured. The ESS (eqn. 2) can be rearranged into two components that reflect 13 
these factors by splitting the collective investment by the group (the coESS) into contributions 14 
from the focal player and all other players (?̂?𝐺 = 𝑝𝑖?̂?𝑖 + 𝑝−𝑖?̂?−𝑖), which are separated into 15 



















The first term in square brackets contains the Hamilton’s rule cost-benefit balance that 19 
depends solely on a player’s frequency or relatedness to the group (𝑝
𝑖
). The second term in 20 
square brackets contains the effect of other players’ investment and, because this bracket is 21 
taken away from the first, other player’s investment always acts as a ‘conflict load’ in 22 
decreasing the quantity of investment that a player contributes compared to the simple 23 
Hamilton’s rule. Therefore, although a player’s quantitative contributions toward cooperation 24 
are not determined by a familiar Hamilton’s rule, the quantity of investment is shaped by the 25 
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same factors that determine whether or a not a player is a contributor or free-rider.  1 
 2 
Group selection perspective 3 
We can also understand the logic of why and how much individuals contribute to 4 
public goods by relating the model results to the group selection perspective. For this we can 5 
partition a player’s fitness into the product of within- (𝑢𝑖) and between-group (𝑢𝐺) 6 
components (𝜔𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖𝑢𝐺). This partitioning is in keeping with group selection models 7 
(Haldane, 1932; Wright, 1945; Maynard Smith, 1964; Wilson, 1975a), even though we are 8 
not modelling selection on groups per se because we do not consider within- and between-9 
group competition (but rather the ESS that is selected to maximize a player’s fitness within 10 
any given group context). Nevertheless, we can derive a within-group component of fitness to 11 
describe what proportion of the benefits from public goods a player receives compared to their 12 
group-mates, whilst the between-group component of fitness describes the overall magnitude 13 
of the benefits of public goods to the group. This partitioning yields an expression for within-14 







This indicates that a player has maximal within-group fitness when they do not invest at all 18 
(as long as others invest, otherwise all players would have equal fitness). The partitioning also 19 
yields an expression for between-group fitness, which is defined as the sum of the fitness of 20 
the 𝑁 players that compose the group (𝑢𝐺 = ∑ 𝜔𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ):  21 
  22 




When considering the cost-benefit relationship of public goods for the group as a whole, which 1 
is equivalent to considering a group composed of a single player (𝑁 = 1, 𝑝𝑖 = 1), the 2 
relationship between collective investment and between-group fitness is simply a quadratic 3 
function. This function captures the intuitive property of investment into public goods: more 4 
investment could potentially yield more benefits but, by sacrificing investment to the 5 
production of public goods, players necessarily reduce their ability to benefit from those 6 







Thus, the group has maximal between-group fitness at some intermediate level of investment. 10 
In this way, a player’s strategy is a compromise that reflects a trade-off between fitness at 11 
different levels because within-group fitness is maximised by no investment whilst between-12 
group fitness is maximized by some intermediate level of investment.  13 
 The difference between what is good for the player and good for the group can be 14 
examined further in a simple analysis of ‘alignment’ through the effects of parameter variation 15 
on the ESS (eqn. 4) and coESS (eqn. 3), where we consider the effect of varying each 16 
parameter when all other parameters are kept constant (Table 3). Although some parameters 17 
have the same effect on the quantity of investment by a player and quantity of collective 18 
investment by the group, such as the benefits (𝑏) and the costs (𝑐) of public goods, others have 19 
the opposite effects such as the number (𝑛) and average frequency (?̅?) of contributors. This 20 
captures how players and groups experience a common trade-off at the between-group level 21 
over the benefits and costs of public goods, but there is a social dilemma about how players 22 
contribute toward public goods arising from the within-group level (because of conflict 23 
between players strategies; see eqn. 6). Consequently, increasing a contributor’s frequency 24 
(𝑝𝑖) increases their quantity of investment just as increasing the average frequency of 25 
contributors (?̅?) increases their quantity of collective investment, but increasing the average 26 
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frequency of contributors (?̅?) decrease a contributor’s quantity of investment. In this way, the 1 
conflict between players’ strategies can be considered as a conflict between levels (i.e. within- 2 
and between-group fitness).  3 
  4 
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Table 3. The effect of increasing each parameter on the level of individual investment (𝑥𝑖; see 1 
eqn. 4) and collective investment (𝑥𝐺; see eqn. 3). The comparison is made keeping all other 2 
terms constant. 3 
Parameter  Individual investment (𝑥𝑖) Collective investment (𝑥𝐺) 
Benefit (𝑏) ↑ ↑ 
Cost (𝑐) ↓ ↓ 







† This term does not directly appear within the expression for coESS of collective investment (eqn. 4 
3).  5 




To understand how individuals should strategically modulate their contributions 2 
toward group-beneficial public goods in response to their social context, we analysed how 3 
different genetic variants should contribute to public goods in relation to the number and 4 
frequencies of other genetic variants in the group. To simplify the discussion of our analyses, 5 
we describe the genetic variants to be the ‘players’ in the game and consider their contributions 6 
to public goods as representing an ‘investment’ they make in terms of the proportion of their 7 
potential fitness that they sacrifice to produce public goods (hence their potential fitness gives 8 
their total budget they can use to produce public goods). Most intuitively, and confirming the 9 
fundamental results of other public goods models (Frank, 1996; Gavrilets, 2015; Johnstone & 10 
Rodrigues, 2016; Madgwick et al., 2018), a player should contribute a larger proportion of 11 
their fitness budget toward group-beneficial behaviour when they are at a higher frequency in 12 
a group. This is because a player at a higher frequency can realise more of the benefits from 13 
its own contribution towards public goods, making a larger investment more profitable. For a 14 
group composed of multiple players that contribute toward public goods, the level of collective 15 
investment made by all players in the group depends on the distribution of frequencies of the 16 
players within the group. Somewhat surprisingly, but following other models of facultative 17 
cooperation (Boyd & Richerson, 1988; Pepper, 2000; Gardner & Grafen, 2009), we expect a 18 
group with more contributing players to contribute less toward group-beneficial behaviour. 19 
This outcome is a consequence of each contributor being at a lower frequency in the group, 20 
which disincentives each from investing (even in situations where they collectively have the 21 
same total frequency as a smaller number of contributors). Thus, within our model of strategic 22 
cooperation (i.e. not facultative cooperation because we consider quantitative contributions 23 
toward public goods), a group of players contribute more toward group-beneficial behaviour 24 
when the average frequency of all contributors is larger. Finally, and most surprisingly, we 25 
find that all contributors are expected to have equal transmission to the next generation 26 
irrespective of differences in their frequencies in the group. When contributors are at different 27 
133 
 
frequencies in a group, this invariance pattern must reflect compensatory investment, where 1 
the contributors at higher frequency sacrifice a larger proportion of their potential fitness to 2 
produce public goods than those at lower frequencies, which wipes out any advantage from 3 
having a higher frequency. Invariance results have been demonstrated in previous 4 
evolutionary models of sex ratio and dispersal (e.g. Frank 1987; Rodrigues and Gardner 2016), 5 
but our result represents a novel finding among evolutionary models of public goods. Further, 6 
whilst analogous results to fitness invariance to frequency have been uncovered in previous 7 
economics models of public goods (Warr, 1983; Bergstrom et al., 1986), we demonstrate that 8 
invariance can be evolutionarily stable and hence can be biologically relevant in the patterns 9 
of strategic cooperation.  10 
Why haven’t other evolutionary models of public goods uncovered fitness invariance 11 
to frequency? The invariance result is tightly connected to the multiplicative costs and benefits 12 
of public goods. Fitness invariance across frequencies requires players to quantitatively adjust 13 
their level investment into cooperation to cancel out the quantitative change in their 14 
frequencies. Additive costs and benefits lead to facultatively all-or-none cooperation from the 15 
threshold within this single fitness effect, as maximal cooperation is favoured when the 16 
benefits outweigh the costs (and not otherwise) (Marshall, 2015). Multiplicative costs and 17 
benefits lead to quantitively variable level of cooperation from the trade-off between separate 18 
fitness effects, so multiplicative fitness effects make fitness invariance possible – and additive 19 
models of public goods would not have this possibility. Other similar multiplicative models 20 
of public goods (e.g. Frank 1995) have failed to derive an informative analytical solution to 21 
players’ evolutionarily stable strategy which would imply fitness invariance (though it has 22 
been speculated; Frank 1996). Our novel method of analysis has enabled fitness invariance to 23 
be uncovered, and indeed can be applied to other multiplicative model setups to demonstrate 24 
fitness invariance to frequency (see Supplement 3 for an application to Frank 1995).  25 
Fitness invariance to frequency is intriguing because it suggests that players are 26 
willing to pay more for public goods up to the level at which they come away with the same 27 
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total payoff as all other contributors (in terms of transmission into the next generation), which 1 
means that those at lower frequencies sacrifice less of their fitness to produce public goods, 2 
while gaining the same benefits. This outcome reflects a property of investing into public 3 
goods that is analogous to the snowdrift game (Rapoport & Chammah, 1966; Sugden, 1986). 4 
In the classic snowdrift game, a player is favoured to cooperate even when others do not, so 5 
an arbitrary asymmetry can cause players to adopt different roles (of contributor and free-6 
rider). In our model of strategic cooperation, the critical asymmetry is not arbitrary, but rather, 7 
reflects the fact that players are at different frequencies in a group. Those at a higher frequency 8 
have more to gain from each unit they contribute to public goods, and hence have more 9 
incentive to contribute. Logically, if players at a higher frequency contribute more than those 10 
at a lower frequency, the frequency-weighted fitness (which is their transmission into the next 11 
generation) asymmetry between players is diminished, which ultimately leads to an outcome 12 
where all contributors make contributions to public goods such that there is no remaining 13 
asymmetry. Interestingly, any free-rider always has higher fitness than any contributor since 14 
they sacrifice none of their potential fitness to produce public goods, but gain the same benefits 15 
as the contributors. Therefore, in groups that contain contributors, players will have negative 16 
frequency-dependent fitness, with free-riders having the highest fitness and contributors 17 
having fitness in inverse order to their level of investment.  18 
Given that the players are genetic variants that have information about their frequency 19 
in the group (such as a greenbeard or kin recognition gene), negative frequency-dependent 20 
fitness could lead to the maintenance of polymorphism at the causal locus. As public goods 21 
give a fitness advantage to lower frequency players that free-ride on the contributions of others 22 
(or otherwise invest less than other contributors), a new mutant that can differentiate itself as 23 
a player (presumably by producing a different signal) would potentially have a fitness 24 
advantage because of its low frequency. Consequently, even though all genetic variants are 25 
expected to play the same strategy (the evolutionarily stable strategy; ESS), negative 26 
frequency-dependence arising from the quantitative adjustment of the level of cooperation 27 
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within groups may lead to polymorphism by favouring rare genetic variants. In this way, 1 
strategic cooperation may explain how variation in social recognition persists, as a potential 2 
solution to Crozier’s paradox (Crozier, 1986; Rousset & Roze, 2007). Further, although this 3 
is not something that we model (as we focus on the patterns of a player’s ESS across social 4 
contexts), in longer-term evolution, polymorphism may lead to worse outcomes for the 5 
production of public goods in groups, which may contain a large number of genetic variants 6 
at low frequencies, such that each may lack any incentive to be cooperative.   7 
The ESS pattern of cooperation through public goods is consistent with the 8 
expectation from kin selection theory, but our analysis reveals a role for conflict that is not 9 
present in the simplest statement of the conditions for cooperation that is captured by 10 
Hamilton’s rule. Within this analysis, a player’s frequency in the group is equated with their 11 
relatedness to the group. Although the level at which players contribute to public goods 12 
reflects the relatedness-dependent profitability of such contributions (in terms of the cost-13 
benefit analysis expressed in Hamilton’s rule), players are expected to reduce their own 14 
contribution below the simple cost-benefit analysis when other members of their group are 15 
favoured to contribute toward public goods. This outcome captures the role of conflict in 16 
cooperation through group-beneficial public goods, where players potentially contribute at a 17 
level that is lower than expected under the strict profitability analysis of Hamilton’s rule. 18 
These same results can be understood from a levels of selection perspective, where 19 
contributions to public goods can reduce a player’s within-group fitness because they sacrifice 20 
a component of their potential fitness by contributing toward public goods, which can leave 21 
them with lower relative fitness compared to members of their group who contribute less. As 22 
a result, players maximise their within-group fitness by contributing less than others, which 23 
can drive down the incentive to contribute. However, contributions to public goods benefit 24 
players through their impact on the fitness of the group (since all members of a group gain the 25 
same benefits) and therefore the ESS level of investment in public goods will reflect the 26 
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disincentivising effect of within-group fitness and the incentivising effect of between-group 1 
fitness.  2 
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Comment 3: Selection for polymorphism 1 
The preceding paper provides a detailed strategic analysis of a generalised form of the 2 
Collective Investment game, explaining the factors that shape a player’s strategy. Here, with 3 
a particular focus on negative frequency-dependent fitness arising from conditional 4 
cooperation as a solution to Crozier’s paradox, I evaluate how robust these results are likely 5 
to be.   6 
A major difference between investment strategy in Paper 3 and natural systems is that 7 
players are likely to have informational constraints about their social context (see also 8 
Comment 2). As the only variable aspects of a social context that are relevant for a player’s 9 
strategy are their own frequency and the investment made by others, we would anticipate that 10 
these two social variables give two different kinds of informational constraint. Firstly, players 11 
may inaccurately assess their own frequency in a group, which should typically reflect error 12 
in their assessment of their relatedness to the group (given that the players are genetic 13 
variants). Whilst this would undoubtedly change the exact quantitative predictions, strategies 14 
are monotonic and so we would still expect that players would invest a more into public goods 15 
when they are at higher frequencies. Secondly, players may be unable to assess the 16 
composition of a group, which most plausibly means only having information on their own 17 
representation in the group instead (i.e. their own frequency in or relatedness to the group). 18 
Consequently, players may not be able to modulate their investment into public goods to their 19 
specific social context. As a result, we expect strategies to reflect a form of bet-hedging that 20 
yields the best response to the expected social context. Under these circumstances, the 21 
behaviour of players is likely to be maladaptive outside of the social contexts most often 22 
experienced in nature. Nonetheless, our model predicts that strategies that have evolved under 23 
such bet-hedging would be limited within specific bounds that depend on the expected level 24 
of investment being made by others (see Figure 2 in Paper 3). As the partitioning in equation 25 
(6) in Paper 4 emphasises, the ESS varies between the high investment scenario where others 26 
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are expected to make no investment (which occurs when there are a large number of group-1 
mates which each have too low a frequency to incentivise their own investment) and the low 2 
investment scenario where others make the maximal contribution toward public goods (which 3 
occurs when there is only one other group-mate).  4 
Generally, the quantitative pattern that players invest proportionally more into public 5 
goods when they have a higher frequency is likely to be robust to all constraints (see Paper 2), 6 
but the effects of changing the numbers of players in a group and whether there are situations 7 
with compensatory investment would depend upon the absence of plausible constraints. 8 
Herein lies the value of the properties the game’s predictions: given that the quantitative 9 
predictions about a player’s strategy are likely to be robust even if they have relatively 10 
imperfect information about their social context, the other more sensitive predictions about 11 
changing the numbers of players in a group and whether there are situations with 12 
compensatory investment can be used to interrogate what information players have access to 13 
(see Comment 2). As the genetic/phenotypic mechanisms that enable the quantitative 14 
adjustment of the level cooperation in different situations remains poorly understood in many 15 
of the study systems, these predictions provide an approach to discovering how players gain 16 
information about their social context and carry out strategic cooperation.  17 
Because the prediction that players invest proportionally more into public goods when 18 
they have a higher frequency is likely to be robust, the finding that conditional cooperation 19 
can lead to negative frequency-dependent fitness is also likely to be robust. The generalisation 20 
of the Collective Investment game clarifies that the real players of the game would not be 21 
strains as we have constructed it in previous presentations of the model for our analysis of D. 22 
discoideum (in Papers 1 and 2). Instead, the player is a genetic variant that is responsible for 23 
deciding whether a biological entity belongs to one player or other, like a greenbeard or kin-24 
recognition allele. A major problem for the theory of genetic recognition mechanisms is the 25 
maintenance of the polymorphism that is needed for these systems to work – a problem known 26 
as Crozier’s paradox. It has long been held that genetic recognition mechanisms controlling 27 
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the expression of cooperative behaviour is highly unlikely because there would be a common-1 
type advantage leading one genetic variant to go to fixation and eliminate the polymorphism 2 
required for genetic recognition. The common variant gains this advantage because its 3 
frequency means that is more likely to interact with other variants that share a recognition 4 
signal, and therefore it is simply more likely to engage in cooperation. Models highlighting 5 
this problem are based on facultative cooperation, where cooperation switches between non-6 
cooperation and full-cooperation (e.g. Crozier, 1986; Rousset & Roze, 2007; Ben-Zion et al., 7 
2018), which is very different from the Collective Investment game where there are 8 
continuous levels of cooperation through public goods. At the ESS (i.e. when a single 9 
frequency-dependent strategy has gone to fixation), conditional cooperators invest more into 10 
cooperation when they are at higher frequency, which affords a fitness advantage to lower 11 
frequency conditional cooperators. In this way, we would expect the conditional cooperation 12 
to lead to diversifying selection which could be a broadly applicable mechanism for the 13 
maintenance of polymorphism.   14 
Paper 3 analysed a generalised form of the Collective Investment game and 15 
discovered that players (self-signal variants) are expected to have negative frequency-16 
dependent fitness, which Comment 3 has suggested is likely to be broadly applicable 17 
whenever there is conditional cooperation. Next, I examine what this might mean for the 18 
selection of the mechanism of conditional cooperation across study systems, where there is a 19 
significant dearth of evidence – and so I focus on the recent suggestions of conditional 20 
cooperation via greenbeard genes. Whilst this may seem like an odd restriction, candidate 21 
greenbeard genes are amongst the best studied genetic recognition systems: with a clear 22 
candidate gene, a suggested signalling mechanism and a specific social effect. Many of these 23 
genes have also been suggested to be kin-recognition genes, and this does not dispute the 24 
utility of looking into them as plausible genes that enable conditional cooperation.  25 
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Abstract 7 
Greenbeard genes were proposed as a cartoonish thought experiment to explain why altruism 8 
can be a selfish strategy from the perspective of genes. The likelihood of finding a real 9 
greenbeard gene in nature was thought to be remote because they were believed to require a 10 
set of improbable properties. Yet, despite this expectation, there is an ongoing explosion in 11 
claimed discoveries of greenbeard genes. Bringing together the latest theory and experimental 12 
findings, we argue that there is a need to dispose of the cartoon presentation of a greenbeard 13 
to refocus their burgeoning empirical study on the more fundamental concept that the thought 14 
experiment was designed to illustrate. 15 
 16 
Keyword: kin selection, social evolution, altruism, cooperation, gene conflict 17 
 18 
Highlights 19 
• The greenbeard concept was conceived to illustrate why genes are always 20 
fundamentally ‘selfish’, rather than to provide empirically-testable predictions about 21 
the properties of real genes underlying social behaviours.   22 
146 
 
• Despite their apparent implausibility in nature, in recent years there has been an 1 
explosion of claimed examples of greenbeard genes.  2 
• The theory of greenbeard genes has largely recognised the underlying principle that 3 
the concept set out to explain, whilst the empirical study of greenbeards has been 4 
constrained by inessential features of its cartoonish presentation. 5 
• Kin selection and the greenbeard effect are alternative explanations for the evolution 6 
of a social behaviour, which can be experimentally distinguished with appropriate 7 
evidence.  8 
• Experimental findings of how greenbeard genes function and evolve both inform and 9 
contradict theoretical expectations. 10 
 11 
From thought experiment to real gene 12 
To help readers understand why altruism (see Glossary) is selfish from the 13 
perspective of genes, Dawkins (1976) reformulated a thought experiment originally devised 14 
by Hamilton (1964b), where a gene is able to produce a signal (like a ‘green beard’), identify 15 
that signal in others, and respond by being altruistic towards those individuals. By directing 16 
altruism towards individuals that contain copies of itself, these ‘greenbeard’ genes benefit 17 
their own replication, even if paying the cost of such altruism harms the success of other genes 18 
in the same genome. The fanciful nature of Dawkins’ cartoon scenario caught the imagination 19 
of evolutionary biologists, but greenbeard genes were thought to require a series of special 20 
properties that render them biologically unrealistic, or at least highly unlikely to be detected 21 
(see Table 1) (Dawkins, 1979, 1982; Grafen, 1984; Crozier, 1986; Hamilton, 2001; Grafen, 22 
2006a; West & Gardner, 2013). 23 
Despite appearing fantastical, in recent years there has been an explosion in claimed 24 
discoveries of greenbeard genes (Keller & Ross, 1998; Queller et al., 2003; Smukalla et al., 25 
2008; Pathak et al., 2013; Heller et al., 2016; Gruenheit et al., 2017), as well as the 26 
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reinterpretation of known genes as greenbeards (Ridley & Grafen, 1981; Haig, 1996, 2013; 1 
Gardner & West, 2010; Unterweger & Griffin, 2016; Danka et al., 2017; Gruenheit et al., 2 
2017). This explosion coincides with the application of new methodologies from molecular 3 
biology to understand the evolution of social behaviour, especially in focusing on cellular 4 
interactions and social behaviours in microbes (Haig, 1996; West et al., 2006; Foster, 2009). 5 
With such new focus and techniques, recent studies have found evidence that real genes can 6 
exhibit the properties that Dawkins identified (i.e. signal, receiver, altruism). However, the 7 
scope of these empirical advances has often been impeded by researchers losing sight of the 8 
fact that these properties were never intended to represent a rigid set of ‘necessary and 9 
sufficient’ criteria for the greenbeard effect (Dawkins, 1979, 1982). Rather, they were 10 
presented in this abstract way to provide a simple and intuitive illustration of the fundamental 11 
phenomenon of genes manipulating a social behaviour to suit their own self-interest (Dawkins, 12 
1976, 1982). This disconnect has led to confusion about how to apply the greenbeard thought 13 
experiment to nature (e.g. what constitutes evidence), and ultimately how to convert its 14 
abstract logic into a useful concept for empirical research. 15 
In contrast to empirical applications, work on the theoretical side has largely 16 
recognised the underlying logic of the fundamental principle that Hamilton (1964b) identified 17 
and Dawkins (1976) set out to explain (Hamilton, 1964b, 1972, 1975; Ridley & Grafen, 1981; 18 
Queller, 2011; Grafen, 1984, 1985; Queller, 1984, 1992; Biernaskie et al., 2011, 2013; 19 
Marshall, 2015). Therefore, while empirical work has been constrained by Dawkins’ 20 
cartoonish setup of the greenbeard thought experiment, theory has continued to expand 21 
applications of Hamilton’s concept to understand its role in broader evolutionary phenomena. 22 
In the process, theoretical advances have shifted expectations about when and where 23 
greenbeard genes can arise, how they evolve, and the kinds of situations that can favour their 24 
evolution. These advances have even applied the greenbeard concept to shed light on 25 
seemingly disparate evolutionary problems: e.g. habitat choice (Dawkins, 1979; Pepper & 26 
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Smuts, 2002), Müllerian mimicry (Guilford, 1985, 1988), interspecific mutualism (Frank, 1 
1994; Quickfall & Marshall, 2017), sexual selection (Keller, 2002; Faria et al., 2018). 2 
Despite the continued empirical pursuit of greenbeard genes in nature and the 3 
concurrent development of related theory, there continues to be a disconnect between the two 4 
which hinders progress on both sides. Empirical researchers are still often focused on seeking 5 
evidence for the presentation of the greenbeard concept as laid out by Dawkins (1976). 6 
Theoretical research often operates at a level of abstraction that provides limited grounding in 7 
natural systems. Here, making use of recent advances from empirics and theory, we argue that 8 
there is a timely need to completely dispose of the cartoon illustration of a greenbeard 9 
presented by Dawkins in order to refocus empirical research on the more fundamental concept 10 
originally laid out by Hamilton (1964b), and to guide the further development of greenbeard 11 
theory towards models that make predictions that can be tested in empirical research. 12 
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Table 1. Arguments for why greenbeards are unlikely to be found in nature.  1 
Argument  For Against 
 
Existential arguments: why greenbeards are unlikely to evolve in the first place 
 
Far-fetched 




Greenbeards require three distinct 
functions (Hamilton, 1964b; Dawkins, 
1976, 1982). Such pleiotropy seems 
highly unlikely because it requires a 
single locus – whether being a single 
gene or multiple linked genes – to gain 
access to the right information and, at 
the same time, have the ability to 
modulate a social behaviour (Dawkins, 
1976, 1982; Gardner & West, 2010). 
 
Some types of genes can encode 
proteins with the three functions (e.g. 
genes for cell surface receptors) (Haig, 
1996, 2013) or multiple genes can form 
a greenbeard locus by linkage. But, a 
locus does not need to directly ‘encode’ 
those three functions to be a greenbeard 
(e.g. it could regulate rather than 
produce the social behaviour)  
(Hamilton, 1975; Haig, 1996; Pepper & 





Greenbeards require a relatively 
deterministic mapping between the 
genotype and phenotype (West et al., 
2007a; Zhang & Chen, 2016), which is 
not found in many species, especially 
not among vertebrates where 
development introduces significant 
environmental variation into organisms’ 
phenotypes (which is liable to provide 
information for kin recognition via the 
‘armpit effect’) (Dawkins, 1982; 
Hamilton, 2001; West et al., 2007a). 
 
The strongest evidence for genes 
evolving under the greenbeard effect 
comes from microbes that have a simple 
relationship between genotype and 
phenotype (Gardner & West, 2010). 
However, we might also expect 
greenbeards in ‘complex’ multicellular 
organisms, governing molecular-level 
interactions (rather than behaviours that 
are controlled by the central nervous 
system), which can make the genotype-
phenotype relationship simpler (Haig, 
1996, 2013; Springer et al., 2011). 
  
 







Greenbeards are likely to evolve under 
strong selection, leading a greenbeard 
allele to rapidly spread to fixation 
(Dawkins, 1982; Crozier, 1986). Once at 
fixation, the allele is no longer 
detectable as a greenbeard because it 
would not exhibit a conditional social 
behaviour (Dawkins, 1982; Queller et 
al., 2003; Gardner & West, 2010; 
Biernaskie et al., 2013). 
 
There can be genetic constraints that 
prevent a single greenbeard allele from 
reaching fixation, like homozygote 
lethality (e.g. Gp-9) (Hurst & McVean, 
1998; Keller & Ross, 1998; Hamilton, 
2001) or, more commonly, a rare-type 
advantage (Grafen, 1990; Jansen & van 
Baalen, 2006; Biernaskie et al., 2013; 






When greenbeards are involved in costly 
social behaviours that reduce individual 
fitness, a modifier allele at another locus 
could benefit from silencing the 
expression of a greenbeard (Alexander 
& Borgia, 1978; Dawkins, 1982; 
Rothstein & Barash, 1983). If 
greenbeard genes were not modified, 
they might rapidly accumulate and – 
owing to their deleterious effects on 
individual fitness – drive their host-
species to extinction (Hamilton, 2001). 
 
Although silencing a greenbeard gene 
can sometimes benefit a modifier, this 
may not be possible due to pleiotropic 
constraints (i.e. essential functions). 
Some greenbeard genes can provide a 
net benefit to the individuals that carry 
them, potentially making them immune 
to modification (Ridley & Grafen, 
1981). After-all, a greenbeard is selected 
because its benefits outweigh its costs, 
so greenbeards are unlikely to cause 
host-species extinction (Pepper & 
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Smuts, 2002; Gardner & West, 2010; 
Biernaskie et al., 2011). 
 
 






The association between the signal-
receiver and behaviour functions of the 
greenbeard is liable to be disrupted by 
partial modification by genes at other 
loci, recombination (if the greenbeard is 
formed by linked genes), or mutation to 
knock-out the behaviour function, 
which can produce ‘falsebeards’ that 
possess the greenbeard signal but do not 
engage in a social behaviour. Because 
the social behaviour is expected to be 
costly, falsebeards can cheat 
greenbeards and drive them extinct 
(Dawkins, 1976, 1982; Ridley & 
Grafen, 1981; West et al., 2007a; 
Gardner & West, 2010; Biernaskie et al., 
2011, 2013).   
  
In some systems, falsebeards may not be 
able to evolve due to the signal-receiver 
directly causing the social behaviour 
(Haig, 1996). When falsebeards can 
evolve, greenbeards can persist by rare-
type advantage, which leads to signal-
receiver polymorphism (‘beard colour’ 
variants) (Grafen, 1990; Jansen & van 
Baalen, 2006; Biernaskie et al., 2013; 
Krupp & Taylor, 2015). Such signal-
receiver polymorphism reduces the 
advantage of being a falsebeard, which 
can lead to their extinction (or non-
invasion) or a mixed equilibrium with 
greenbeards and falsebeards (Grafen, 






Many types of greenbeards have 
frequency-dependent invasion 
conditions (see Box 1). The benefits of 
being a greenbeard only arise once a 
greenbeard allele’s frequency is above a 
critical threshold, because the social 
behaviour is otherwise too costly 
(Grafen, 2006a; Jansen & van Baalen, 
2006; Gardner & West, 2010; 
Biernaskie et al., 2011, 2013).  
 
This problem affects greenbeards of all 
types except facultative-helping because 
all other types of greenbeard express 
their costly social behaviour when rare, 
which can also be accentuated by higher 
signal costliness (‘beard cost’) (Gardner 
& West, 2010; Biernaskie et al., 2011, 
2013). Population structure can alleviate 
this condition by giving new mutants 
locally higher frequency (Gardner & 
West, 2010; Faria et al., 2018).   
 
 1 
† Falsebeard-driven extinction is the primary reason why greenbeards have not been expected to be 2 
found in nature since the greenbeard thought experiment was originally conceived.  3 
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The fundamental principle in the greenbeard concept 1 
Dawkins’ (Dawkins, 1976) presentation of the greenbeard thought experiment was a 2 
simple illustration of Hamilton’s (Hamilton, 1964b) more general scenario, and so many of 3 
the features of cartoonish presentation are inessential. In the general scenario, a greenbeard 4 
gene enhances its fitness by modulating the targeted recipients of a social behaviour via an 5 
‘assortment factor’ (Pepper & Smuts, 2002), which indicates (or is at least associated with) 6 
the presence or absence of the gene within social partners. For example, the greenbeard could 7 
create the assortment factor, such as a ‘green beard’ phenotype, and cause individuals to 8 
behave altruistically in response to its presence. But, a greenbeard gene need not create the 9 
assortment factor, it only needs to respond toward it (Hamilton, 1975; Dawkins, 1979). For 10 
example, the greenbeard could cause individuals to follow a scent to a particular flower species 11 
and then act altruistically to those that are on that flower. In this case, the assortment factor 12 
would be the act of following that flowers’ scent, which increases the likelihood that the 13 
recipients of the altruistic behaviour share the greenbeard gene. In this way, Dawkins’ 14 
(Dawkins, 1976) presentation of the greenbeard thought experiment is but one of the ways 15 
which a greenbeard can enhance its own fitness (see Box 1 for further details). 16 
 The greenbeard effect is conceptually analogous to other related, but fundamentally 17 
different, forms of selection. Hence it is important that we distinguish the properties that make 18 
greenbeard genes different from genes shaped by these other forms of selection. Most 19 
critically are kin-selected genes, which, like greenbeard genes, also increase their own fitness 20 
by modulating the recipients of social behaviour (Hamilton, 1964a; Grafen, 1985; Frank, 21 
1998). However, despite their conceptual similarity, the two types of genes give rise to 22 
fundamentally different fitness effects, reflecting the key differences in the process driving 23 
their evolution. Kin selection relies upon the individuals being affected by the social 24 
behaviour sharing the causal gene with the actor due to common ancestry (Dawkins, 1982; 25 
Grafen, 1985; Frank, 1998; West & Gardner, 2013). But common ancestry does not ensure 26 
that individuals share an allele at a particular locus, it only means that individuals have some 27 
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increased probability of sharing alleles at any locus in the genome (which is determined by 1 
the degree of relatedness). In contrast, greenbeard genes utilise an assortment factor that 2 
specifically changes the probability of sharing an allele at the greenbeard locus. Hence, we 3 
would expect to see elevated relatedness of interactants at the greenbeard locus, while all other 4 
loci would show the background level of relatedness (determined by the ancestral relationship 5 
of the individuals). Thus, a greenbeard gene can enhance its own fitness in excess of the other 6 
genes in the rest of the genome, whilst a kin-selected gene enhances its own fitness alongside 7 
the other genes in the rest of the genome. In this way, the greenbeard effect is a form of ‘kind 8 
selection’ (Queller, 2011), which clarifies that a greenbeard (unlike a kin-selected gene) is a 9 
selfish genetic element. Like other kind-selected (e.g. meiotic drive) genes, a greenbeard can 10 
generate genetic conflict with other loci elsewhere in the genome (Biernaskie et al., 2011; 11 
Gardner & Úbeda, 2017). However, a greenbeard differs from other selfish genetic elements 12 
by enhancing its fitness using an interaction between individuals (i.e. social behaviour) rather 13 
than within an individual (e.g. gamete killing). This difference can have important 14 
ramifications for how gene conflict plays out (Ridley & Grafen, 1981; Gardner & West, 2010; 15 
Biernaskie et al., 2011), and therefore it is important to differentiate greenbeards from other 16 
types of selfish genetic element. Thus, when contrasted with other related phenomena (kin 17 
selection and other forms of kind selection), the critical feature of the greenbeard concept is 18 
that a gene is selected because it manipulates a social behaviour to enhance its own fitness in 19 
excess of other genes in the rest of the genome. 20 
In empirical studies, the distinction between greenbeards and kin-selected genes has 21 
historically been ignored because greenbeards were dismissed as biologically unrealistic. 22 
Consequently, studies have tended to focus on testing whether or not a social behaviour 23 
evolves under individual selection or kin selection, rather than finding ways to distinguish 24 
between kin and kind selection. Furthermore, because of the challenges inherent in identifying 25 
the genes governing social behaviours, empirical research has tended to make assumptions 26 
like the ‘phenotypic gambit’ (Grafen, 1984) that explicitly ignore any genetic conflicts that 27 
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could indicate a role for greenbeards. However, recent advances in molecular biology have 1 
enabled the first steps towards a greater understanding of the genetics behind social 2 
behaviours, permitting greenbeards to become a more easily testable explanation of social 3 
behaviour.  4 
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Box 1: Different types of greenbeard genes 1 
Greenbeards manipulate social behaviour to enhance their own fitness in excess of 2 
other genes in the rest of the genome using an assortment factor that ensures that they direct 3 
the social behaviour towards individuals dependent upon their possession of the greenbeard 4 
gene (Hamilton, 1964a; Grafen, 1985; Frank, 1998). The possible mechanisms by which a 5 
greenbeard can achieve this outcome are highly variable: using phenotypic or environmental 6 
assortment factors, different forms of Hamiltonian social behaviours (altruistic, mutualistic, 7 
selfish, and spiteful behaviours; Hamilton, 1964a), targeting individuals with or without the 8 
greenbeard gene and so on. Because the possible mechanisms that greenbeards can exploit are 9 
so varied, greenbeards are more often grouped into types based on their associated 10 
evolutionary dynamics. To this end, two details of their mechanisms are critical, which in 11 
combination create four basic types of greenbeard (Gardner & West, 2010) (Box 1 Figure I). 12 
This is not to say that outside the abstract neatness of theoretical classifications real genes 13 
could not be intermediate types (e.g. Unterweger & Griffin, 2016) – as, indeed, this is what 14 
we often find (see Table 2). 15 
Greenbeards can be helping or harming, which determines whether their associated 16 
social behaviour causes recipients to gain or lose fitness (Gardner & West, 2004b, 2010). A 17 
helping greenbeard targets a beneficial effect toward individuals with a copy of itself, and 18 
therefore the behaviour increases in frequency as the greenbeard allele increases in frequency 19 
(Box 1 Figure IA and IB). In contrast, a harming greenbeard targets a detrimental effect toward 20 
individuals without a copy of itself, which occurs at its maximum at intermediate frequency 21 
because of the balance between having a large frequency of social partners to both give and 22 
receive harm (Figure IC and ID). 23 
Greenbeards can also be facultative or obligate, depending on how actors and 24 
recipients engage in the social behaviour (Queller, 1984; Gardner & West, 2010). A facultative 25 
greenbeard only pays the cost of performing the social behaviour upon interacting with a social 26 
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partner that the social behaviour targets (i.e. conditional action), whilst an obligate greenbeard 1 
always pays the cost of performing the social behaviour, but the social partner is only affected 2 
by it if they are the social behaviour’s target (i.e. conditional response). Consequently, a 3 
facultative greenbeard pays the costs of social behaviour at the rate at which it encounters 4 
target social partners (Figure IA and IC), whilst an obligate greenbeard always pays a fixed 5 
cost of social behaviour irrespective of whether it finds its target (Figure IB and ID). 6 




Box 1 Figure I. The patterns of frequency-dependence for the four different types of 2 
greenbeard (figure redrawn from Gardner & West, 2010). The x-axis is the greenbeard allele’s 3 
frequency (0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1) and the y-axis corresponds to either the frequency of the greenbeard-4 
associated social behaviour in the population (black) or the magnitude of the fitness effect for 5 
greenbeard carriers (green). For obligate greenbeards (B&D), the frequency of the behaviour 6 
equals the frequency of the greenbeard gene 𝑝 since the behaviour is always expressed. For 7 
facultative greenbeards (A&C), the frequency of the behaviour is the frequency at which 8 
greenbeard carriers interact with either other greenbeard carriers 𝑝2 (facultative-helping) or 9 
non-carriers 𝑝(1 − 𝑝) (facultative-harming). Facultative greenbeards (A&C) receive the 10 
fitness effect of the behaviour at the same frequency as they exhibit the behaviour, since the 11 
behaviour is only exhibited in the presence of the target recipients (either carriers or non-12 
157 
 
carriers). Obligate greenbeards (B&D) receive the fitness effect at the frequency that carriers 1 
interact with recipients, which equals 𝑝2 for helping greenbeards and 𝑝(1 − 𝑝) for harming 2 
greenbeards. 3 
  4 
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Evidence that a gene is a greenbeard 1 
Why do we want to describe real genes as greenbeards? The greenbeard thought 2 
experiment, was never intended as an empirically-useful concept, but describing a gene as a 3 
greenbeard can be a useful working hypothesis for understanding its evolution (e.g. generating 4 
revealing predictions). A greenbeard is a selfish genetic element, enhancing its own fitness in 5 
excess of other genes in the rest of the genome, and so a greenbeard hypothesis suggests ‘who 6 
benefits’ from the gene’s function, which could explain or predict unusual properties. To 7 
demonstrate that a gene is a greenbeard, there would need to be conclusive evidence that the 8 
gene has evolved (or is evolving) because of its greenbeard effect. It would obviously be 9 
necessary to show that there are allele-specific outcomes for social interactions, but exactly 10 
what represents ‘conclusive evidence’ is an open question that we believe is best settled within 11 
the constraints of an empirical system (see also Outstanding Questions). 12 
We believe that all empirical systems currently fall short of ‘conclusive evidence’, but 13 
we propose that there is a pivotal piece of (often absent) evidence required to constructively 14 
hypothesise that a gene is a greenbeard. There must be evidence that the assortment factor is 15 
– at least, in part – independent of common ancestry (see Box 2). We consider kin selection 16 
to be the ‘null hypothesis’ for why a gene would modulate social behaviour, and so kind 17 
selection has the onus of proof. To this end, patterns associated with a candidate gene must be 18 
examined within natural settings, because the assortment factor may have a correlation with 19 
the genome-wide probability of sharing an allele in nature that is absent in artificial laboratory 20 
settings. For example, a gene for helping your neighbours could evolve under kin or kind 21 
selection depending on the cause of population structure. For kin selection, limited dispersal 22 
could mean that neighbours all share a common ancestor and thereby have the same 23 
probability of sharing any gene in the genome (Hamilton, 1964a). For kind selection, if an 24 
allele causes individuals to congregate in the same habitat, then neighbours would only have 25 
an elevated probability of sharing the greenbeard allele (Dawkins, 1979) and some 26 
background level of relatedness at the rest of the genome (which will depend on various 27 
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factors, like recombination rates and population viscosity). In a laboratory setting, the 1 
population structure may not mirror natural settings and consequently may incorrectly suggest 2 
that one or other driver is at work.   3 
 4 
Preliminary findings about real genes 5 
Numerous greenbeard genes have been identified across a broad range of biological 6 
systems and modes of action: e.g. bacteriocins (Gardner & West, 2004b, 2010; Biernaskie et 7 
al., 2013), cell-binding proteins (Haig, 1996), contact-dependent inhibition factors 8 
(Unterweger & Griffin, 2016; Danka et al., 2017), quorum-sensing pherotypes (Pollak et al., 9 
2016; Ben-Zion et al., 2018), imprinted RNAs (Haig, 2013). However, empirical studies of 10 
greenbeards are still often preliminary, with few directly demonstrating that the gene has 11 
evolved by kind rather than kin selection in natural settings (Table 2). Nevertheless, these 12 
empirical studies can hint at the features of real greenbeards that are underappreciated or 13 
contrary to the expectations of current theory (see also Box 2).  14 
To understand the nature of empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that a gene 15 
is a greenbeard, we can first consider a cautionary example where new data has drastically 16 
altered the understanding of a proposed greenbeard gene. A queen-killing phenotype was 17 
observed in the fire ant Solenopsis invicta, which was explained by allelic variation at the gp-18 
9 locus that encodes an odour-binding protein (Keller & Ross, 1998; Trible & Ross, 2015). 19 
The greenbeard was suggested to be facultative-harming (Hurst & McVean, 1998), but 20 
subsequently the gp-9 locus has been located on a social chromosome (Sb), which is a large 21 
linkage group (or supergene) containing over 600 genes that act as a single greenbeard locus 22 
(Wang et al., 2013; Pracana et al., 2017). Such linkage at a greenbeard locus doesn’t appear 23 
unusual; similar social chromosomes have also been discovered in other ant species (Huang 24 
& Wang, 2014; Purcell et al., 2014) and many other candidate greenbeard systems involve 25 
large linkage groups (Linksvayer et al., 2013; Thompson & Jiggins, 2014). But it does caution 26 
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the ascription of properties to candidate greenbeards as, for example, Sb appears responsible 1 
for numerous social traits other than queen killing, including polygyny (i.e. forming nests with 2 
multiple queens). As such, the initial characterisation of the greenbeard was incomplete 3 
because it did not recognise Sb’s role in both helping (polygyny) and harming (queen-killing) 4 
social behaviours. Consequently, out of caution, we restrict our discussion to systems where 5 
the putative greenbeard genes that have received the most attention, whilst accepting that all 6 
the findings are potentially subject to changes in evidence. 7 
The ever-increasing array of examples of greenbeard genes suggests that theory has 8 
underappreciated the relationship between allorecognition (i.e. detecting self from nonself) 9 
and the greenbeard effect. Although vertebrate immune genes have been discussed as 10 
greenbeards (Haig, 1997), it is likely that these genes are predominantly selected for asocial 11 
reasons (e.g. killing parasites) that are under individual selection. However, allorecognition 12 
also applies to organisms that interact with conspecifics in ways that allows allorecognition 13 
systems to also serve a role in the genetic recognition of potential social partners, such as in 14 
marine invertebrates and bacterial colonies (Grafen, 1990; Crampton & Hurst, 1994). 15 
Examples of candidate greenbeards broadly fall into the categories of genes governing 16 
aggregation for a particular cooperative endeavour and fusion for longer-term cooperation 17 
(Table 2). Fusion often involves rejecting or killing individuals that do not possess the right 18 
recognition signal, whether these be migrants or mutants. Therefore, in both cases, 19 
greenbeards have a functional role in ‘privatising’ a group’s resources for the exclusive use of 20 
those that share the same greenbeard allele. Consequently, greenbeards explain why detecting 21 
self from nonself is useful – because avoiding interactions with social partners that are unlikely 22 
to cooperate (or, worse, cause harm) (Buss, 1982) enables the causal genes to help others that 23 
share the gene and harm those that do not. 24 
As examples of greenbeard genes continue to accumulate, they suggest that 25 
greenbeard genes often possess two apparently puzzling properties. Firstly,  examples of real 26 
greenbeard genes show that they often possess multiple ‘colour’ variants, which is only 27 
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theoretically anticipated when each colour variant has its own ‘falsebeard’ cheater (Grafen, 1 
1990; Biernaskie et al., 2013). In general, greenbeard genes are expected to exhibit a common-2 
type advantage against one another leading to monomorphism (Crozier, 1986; Grafen, 1990). 3 
However, there is little evidence of any falsebeard alleles in any of the current examples. This 4 
empirical observation raises the theoretical challenge of explaining why greenbeard colour 5 
polymorphism is maintained. Secondly, many of the examples of greenbeard genes involve 6 
multiple (most often a pair of) tightly-linked genes and, in some cases, there are multiple 7 
unlinked greenbeard genes involved in the conditional expression of the social behaviour. For 8 
example, successful outer-membrane fusion in the social bacteria Myxococcus xanthus is 9 
reliant upon cells having matching traA/B alleles for incipient cell fusion, but fusion only 10 
persists if cells have matching alleles at the unlinked sitAI locus (Vassallo et al., 2017). To the 11 
best of our knowledge, no theoretical analysis has ever examined the co-evolution of two or 12 
more greenbeard genes at different loci, presumably because one greenbeard gene was thought 13 
implausible enough. Overall, preliminary empirical findings suggest that theoretical work has 14 
yet to fully characterise the properties of greenbeard genes, and emphasises an increasing need 15 
for theoretical and empirical work to study real greenbeard genes in unison. 16 
  17 
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Table 2. Greenbeard loci that have received the most attention in the literature, grouped by 1 
their mode of action in governing aggregation or fusion.  2 
Gene and Species Signal-Receiver † Social Behaviour ‡ 
 
Aggregation: genes governing which individuals come together 
 
csA 
Social Amoeba  
(Dictyostelium 
discoideum)  




The csA locus is responsible for the 
production of the gp80 protein that is 
necessary for cells to bind one another 
during streaming, which can be shown 
in the lab using knock-outs (Queller et 
al., 2003). In nature, strains do not 
show allelic variation at the csA locus, 
and so it is not clear whether or not the 
origin and maintenance of this gene is 
because of a greenbeard effect.  
 
Facultative helping. 
As adhesion itself is the social 
behaviour, there is no clear distinction 
between a ‘signal-receiver’ and the 
‘social behaviour’, as these two 
aspects are pleiotropic functions of the 
same physical act of cell-binding 
(Haig, 1996; Queller et al., 2003). The 
csA gene does not control any 
downstream social behaviours like 
fruiting-body formation, though it 
could clearly influence the identity of 
social partners if it were polymorphic.   
 
flo1 
Budding Yeast  
(Saccharomyces 
cerevisiae)  




FLO1 is a cell membrane protein that 
binds cell wall carbohydrates 
(Smukalla et al., 2008). Variation in 
the number of 100bp repeats 
determines binding affinity, where 
genes with fewer repeats produce 
FLO1 proteins with stronger binding 
affinities (Verstrepen et al., 2005). 
However, this variation does not 
produce different beard ‘colours’. 
Rather, there is one greenbeard colour 
(dependent on whether or not cells 
have a function copy, flo1+), and 
various different ‘shades of green’ that 
determine how strongly cells bind one 
another (Gruenheit et al., 2017). 
Facultative helping. 
Cells that bind together are protected 
from external stresses by reducing 
contact with the environment through 
aggregation (Smukalla et al., 2008). 
There is no clear distinction between a 
‘signal-receiver’ and the ‘social 
behaviour’ itself, as these two 
functions are pleiotropic functions of 
the same physical act of aggregation.  
   
                  
 
Fusion: genes governing which individuals successfully merge together 
 
gp-9 (or Sb) 
Fire Ant  
(Solenopsis 
invicta) 
(Keller & Ross, 
1998) 
Informative polymorphic.  
The gp-9 locus produces an odour-
binding protein that, along with 9 of 
24 other odour-binding genes, are 
located on the Sb social chromosome. 
Sb contains over 600 genes, which 
have become tightly-linked into a 
supergene via chromosomal inversion 
(Wang et al., 2013; Pracana et al., 
2017). Unsaturated cuticular 
hydrocarbons are likely to provide the 
signal (Trible & Ross, 2015). Genetic 
variants of the b allele (b′ alleles) have 
never been shown to naturally or 
Facultative helping/harming. 
BB homozygote queens are killed by 
b-carrying workers, but bb queens die 
prematurely for developmental 
reasons, leading to stable behavioural 
variation (Keller & Ross, 1998; Trible 
& Ross, 2015). The gp-9 locus has 
previously been described as a 
facultative-harming greenbeard 
(Hurst & McVean, 1998; Gardner & 
West, 2010), but Sb also controls 
polygynous nest formation by mated 
queens returning to their mother’s nest 
(Pracana et al., 2017). Thus, the allele 
must also be facultative-helping 
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experimentally co-occur in the same 
colony. 
 
because of its pleiotropic effect on 
social behaviours, which provide the 
social conditions for queen-killing to 






(Pathak et al., 
2013) 
Informative polymorphic.  
The tra genes are tightly linked and 
highly polymorphic, encoding cell-
surface receptors that bind to each 
other (Pathak et al., 2013). There are 
>60 major recognition groups based 
on traA/B similarity (Cao et al., 2019). 
Switching a single residue in traA is 
sufficient to change the recognition 
group of a strain (Cao & Wall, 2017).  
 
Facultative helping. 
Matching at traA/B leads to fusion and 
outer membrane exchange. The exact 
reasons for this are unknown, but the 
transfer of lipids and proteins has 
several potential benefits, including 
coordinating social interactions and 





(Vassallo et al., 
2017) 
 
Causal polymorphic.  
The sitAI genes are polymorphic 
toxin-antitoxin pairs that are 
transferred between cells matching at 
the tra locus (Vassallo et al., 2017). In 
natural conditions, incompatibility 
between strains often occurs 
independently of tra similarity, and 
cannot be fully explained by sitAI 
(Wielgoss et al., 2018).  
 
Obligate harming. 
Matching at traA/B leads to fusion and 
outer membrane exchange. After 
initial fusion, sitA toxins can be 
transferred to social partners that are 
killed if they lack the matching sitI 
immunity protein (Vassallo et al., 
2017). 
tgrB1/tgrC1 
Social Amoeba  
(Dictyostelium 
discoideum) 




The tgr genes are tightly-linked 
(Benabentos et al., 2009) and are 
amongst the most diverse genes in the 
genome (Gruenheit et al., 2017). Tgr 
proteins are cell surface proteins, 
where TgrB1 acts as a receptor to bind 
the TgrC1 ligand (Benabentos et al., 
2009; Hirose et al., 2011). Reciprocal 
transplantation of variant sequences of 
the tgr genes demonstrates that 
matching tgr alleles causes a change 
in social behaviour due to the act of 
successful binding, which has 





Because chimeric aggregations can be 
costly, strains may segregate out and 
develop a separate fruiting body 
(Benabentos et al., 2009; Hirose et al., 
2011; Gruenheit et al., 2017). Thus, 
successful aggregation is reliant upon 
Tgr-binding, as segregation is 
correlated to relatedness at tgr rather 
than genome-wide relatedness 
(Gruenheit et al., 2017). Strains are 
known to exhibit partner-specific 
social behaviour after initial 
aggregation in the process of fruiting-
body development (Hirose et al., 








(Heller et al., 
2016) 
Informative polymorphic.  
The polymorphic doc1/2/3 are linked 
genes that produce cell-surface 
receptors that predict whether or not 
strains will successfully fuse together 
(Heller et al., 2016). Reciprocal allele 
transfers demonstrate that doc1 and 
doc2 are necessary and sufficient for 
defining which individuals fuse. There 
is, however, no evidence that doc1/2/3 
has any influence on the downstream 
social benefits of somatic fusion. 
 
Facultative helping. 
Somatic fusion of populations 
mediated by doc1/2/3 allows many 
possible benefits including a 
reproductive division of labour and 
benefits from sharing organelles and 
nutritional resources (Richard et al., 
2012). Further, as fusion only occurs 
with matching doc alleles, doc is 
likely to regulate fusion to share 












(Gruenheit et al., 
2017) 
 
Informative polymorphic.  
The fuhc locus contains two linked 
genes that produce a secreted and a 
transmembrane protein (Nydam et al., 
2013). A match at one or both alleles 
is required for fusion to occur, 
otherwise a rejection reaction will 
occur (Scofield et al., 1982). Although 
the genes are highly polymorphic (De 
Tomaso, 2018), lower polymorphism 
correlates with the probability of 
successful fusion (Nydam et al., 
2013). The exact function of two 
genes is, however, unclear, as fuhc 
matching has not been shown to be 
sufficient for successful fusion by 
allele replacement experiments. 
 
Facultative helping/harming. 
The joining of tissues during fusion 
has several potential benefits, many of 
which likely relate to the survival and 
fecundity benefits of larger colony 
size (De Tomaso, 2018) or the sharing 
of public goods (Scofield et al., 1982). 
If fuhc alleles don’t match then toxic 
rejection occurs, which can involve 
damage and death to cells and tissues 
(De Tomaso, 2018). The degree of 
rejection correlates with genetic 
dissimilarity at the fuhc locus 
(Scofield et al., 1982), suggesting that 
fusion has an obligate-harming side 
when a match doesn’t occur. 
 
alr1/alr2 





Informative polymorphic.  
The polymorphic alr1/2 locus encodes 
transmembrane proteins that bind to 
each other. If colonies share both 
alleles, they will fuse permanently 
(Cadavid et al., 2004). alr1/2 variation 
predicts successful fusion in wild and 
lab strains (Nicotra et al., 2009) and in 
vitro experiments demonstrate highly 
specific Alr binding (Karadge et al., 
2015).   
 
Facultative helping. 
Fusion of colonies mediated by alr1/2 
has several potential benefits, such as 
increased colony size aiding strong 
spatial competition (Karadge et al., 
2015). Successful fusion may also 
help to avoid germline parasitism, 
given that some cells can differentiate 




† Causal vs informative: a causal gene encodes both the signal-receiver component and the social 2 
behaviour itself, because the two are one and the same. For example, the flo1 locus houses the gene for 3 
a cell surface receptor that binds carbohydrates on the surface of other cells, thereby bringing together 4 
cells with flo1 alleles (where aggregation itself is the social behaviour because it protects cells from 5 
environment stressors). An informative gene only encodes the signal-receiver component, which acts 6 
to regulate the downstream social behaviour that is itself encoded by other genes. For example, the Sb 7 
genes do not directly encode all the proteins involved within the process of polygynous nest formation, 8 
but they do encode the signal-receiver proteins that set a whole chain of interactions in motion between 9 
a great many proteins leading to these outcomes. 10 
‡ Monomorphic vs polymorphic: there is only a single greenbeard ‘colour’ variant, vs multiple colour 11 
variants. Colour variation reflects different signal-receiver forms only, rather than different social 12 
behaviours in response to signalling.  13 
  14 
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Box 2: Are greenbeard genes involved with simple or sophisticated social traits? 1 
Theory has suggested that greenbeards should be associated with simple traits, whilst 2 
kin-selected genes would be associated with more complex traits (Grafen, 1985, 2006b; Frank, 3 
1998; West & Gardner, 2013). There are indeed many examples of greenbeards that do little 4 
more than produce a protein that directly causes individuals with that protein to aggregate 5 
together (see Table 2; e.g. flo1, Smukalla et al., 2008). However, suggesting that greenbeards 6 
are only associated with simplistic traits likely reflects the original scenario envisioned by 7 
Dawkins, where the greenbeard gene directly produces a behaviour, which is not a necessary 8 
feature of real greenbeard genes. To be favoured by selection, a real greenbeard gene simply 9 
needs to be able to modulate social traits in a way that gives them an advantage by ensuring 10 
that the social behaviour’s recipients share (or do not share) the greenbeard. As such, 11 
greenbeards can be ‘informative’ master regulators – directing a social behaviour toward some 12 
recipients rather than others, instead of producing the social behaviour itself (Hamilton, 13 
1964b). In this role, greenbeard genes can be involved with social traits that are just as 14 
‘sophisticated’ as those associated with kin-selected genes, which is supported by empirical 15 
findings because many examples of greenbeards involve fusion (see Table 2; e.g. doc, Heller 16 
et al., 2016) – a complex social behaviour involving the concerted action of many genes.  17 
Greenbeard genes and kin-selected genes are both favoured because they 18 
preferentially affect the fitness of other carriers of the gene, and hence they may often work 19 
together in producing the same social trait. However, because they are expected to show a 20 
different relationship to social partners, they can also conflict with each other about the social 21 
trait’s optimum (Biernaskie et al., 2011; Gardner & Úbeda, 2017). This difference arises 22 
because the greenbeard’s relatedness to social partners depends on its assortment factor, whilst 23 
all other (non-greenbeard) genes’ relatedness depends on the ancestral relationship between 24 
social partners. Consequently, greenbeard genes have greater certainty of sharing (or not) a 25 
particular allele with social partners, so they can benefit from more marginal gains than can 26 
kin-selected genes (Box 2 Figure I). Although this creates the potential for gene conflict 27 
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(Gardner & Úbeda, 2017), a kin-selected gene may be unable to prevent a greenbeard’s 1 
‘corruption’ because of constraints (e.g. ‘causal’ greenbeards; see Table 1) and so the potential 2 
conflict may not precipitate into actual conflict (sensu Ratnieks et al., 2006). Thus, there is no 3 
reason why greenbeards cannot be involved with social traits that are equally as sophisticated 4 
as (or indeed may involve other) kin-selected genes. 5 




Box 2 Figure I. The potential for conflict between a greenbeard and kin-selected gene (which 2 
acts as a fully-suppressing modifier) that govern the expression of altruism across social trait 3 
values. Potential conflict is assessed using a simple Hamilton’s rule 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0, where 𝑏 is a 4 
measure of benefits to recipients, 𝑐 the costs to the actor r gives the relatedness between 5 
interacting individuals. The greenbeard gene leads to assortment such that actors interact with 6 
recipients that share the greenbeard (𝑟 = 1), whilst the kin-selected gene leads actors to 7 
interact with recipients that are siblings (𝑟 = ½). For genes along a chromosome (inspired by 8 
Grafen, 1985); A), the greenbeard (and any linked gene) has greater certainty as to whether 9 
two individuals share the greenbeard (𝑟 = 1; blue) or not (𝑟 = 0; red) compared to other loci 10 
in the genome (𝑟 = ½; black). Across benefit and cost parameters (inspired by Gardner & 11 
Úbeda, 2017); B), the greenbeard gene is favoured when 𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0 (below the green line; 12 
indicated by green arrows) whilst the kin-selected gene is favoured when ½𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0 (below 13 
the black line; indicated by black arrows). Under conditions where a greenbeard is favoured 14 
whilst the kin-selected gene is not (grey-shading; as shown by green and black arrows pointing 15 
opposite directions), there is potential for conflict as a kin-selected gene would be favoured to 16 
fully-supress the greenbeard gene. 17 
  18 
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Concluding remarks and future perspectives 1 
The greenbeard concept was intended as a thought experiment, and it is immensely 2 
surprising that experimental research suggests that these genes may actually exist. However, 3 
we believe that the future direction of these important empirical studies into candidate 4 
greenbeard genes should not get bogged down in trying to interpret real genes through the lens 5 
of the thought experiment laid out by Dawkins (1976). Instead, experimental work should 6 
focus on the more fundamental underlying concept from Hamilton (1964b), which Dawkins’ 7 
cartoon was designed to illustrate. With the benefit of hindsight, Dawkins’ suggestion of a 8 
cartoon scenario of a greenbeard gene is in fact amongst the most unlikely forms of 9 
greenbeard, in supposing a pleiotropic gene governing multiple aspects of cognitive behaviour 10 
in humans. Although greenbeards are possible in humans, they are more likely to mediate 11 
social behaviours via interactions played out at the molecular level rather than the cognitive 12 
processes of the central nervous system (see Table 1). Furthermore, the last major review of 13 
greenbeard genes (Gardner & West, 2010) highlighted how Dawkins formulation of the 14 
greenbeard thought experiment was but one of four possible types of greenbeard gene (whilst 15 
also dealing with arising misconceptions). We have emphasised an even broader range of 16 
types of greenbeard (informative vs causal), alongside a persistent disconnect between 17 
theoretical work that recognised the underlying logic of the fundamental principle originally 18 
identified by Hamilton (1964b) and experimental research that has been overly-wedded to 19 
features of Dawkins’ (1976) presentation of that fundamental principle. Therefore, we propose 20 
that there is a need to dispose of the cartoon illustration of a greenbeard presented by Dawkins 21 
which can help to align theoretical and experimental research to study greenbeards in unison. 22 
Although there is only preliminary evidence that any gene is a greenbeard, Dawkins 23 
cartoon can begin to be replaced with the diversity of genes that capture Hamilton’s more 24 
fundamental principle – grounding the greenbeard concept within genuine expectations for 25 
empirical examples. We are only just beginning to understand the possible functions of 26 
greenbeard genes, with preliminary evidence suggesting a common role within allorecognition 27 
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in establishing a group of cooperative social partners. For the most part, greenbeards do not 1 
appear to be involved with the production of the social behaviour, but instead they act as a 2 
master regulator in governing which individuals the social behaviour targets. Within this 3 
capacity, greenbeards have a number of genetic properties, several of which are hard to explain 4 
from current theory, such as polymorphism of colour variants (rather than different 5 
falsebeards). 6 
The study of greenbeards is only in its infancy, but it clear that empirical work has 7 
established the plausibility of finding greenbeard genes in nature, and now we need to 8 
investigate their importance (see Outstanding Questions). This involves empirically testing 9 
kin and kind selection as alternative hypotheses for the evolution of social behaviour, which 10 
necessarily involves a greater understanding of the genetics behind social behaviours in order 11 
to investigate any candidate greenbeard gene’s role. We tentatively suggest that greenbeard 12 
genes may be far more common than previously anticipated, contrary to arguments against 13 
their biological relevance (Table 1), because species across the tree of life encounter the 14 
problem of allorecognition which (from empirical research) appears to be a setting where 15 
greenbeards evolve. However, establishing how and why this scenario favours greenbeards 16 
remains an open question for theoretical research.   17 
 18 
Outstanding questions 19 
At present, there are numerous suggestions for genes that may be greenbeards (or indeed may 20 
be kin-selected) and many genes that are currently thought to be kin-selected may turn out to 21 
be greenbeards. For empirical research, there is a great need to amass further evidence for both 22 
new and existing candidate greenbeards, especially in marrying evidence of plausibility that a 23 
gene operates like a greenbeard with evidence that rules out other explanations (especially kin 24 
selection). There are some groups of organisms (e.g. plants) and types of behaviour (e.g. 25 
mutualism) where greenbeard genes have yet to be proposed, and it would be interesting to 26 
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uncover whether this represents a lack of data or a genuine absence. When approaching any 1 
study system, we think there are three critical points to establish if the greenbeard effect is to 2 
be constructively suggested to have any role: 3 
1. For a conditionally expressed social behaviour, what exactly is the assortment factor? 4 
Are individuals responding to the presence or absence of that factor?  5 
2. Given the recognition of an assortment factor, what exactly is the social behaviour? 6 
Have we correctly identified all downstream effects and consequences of assortment?  7 
3. Does the assortment factor correlate with common ancestry in natural settings? Why 8 
doesn’t kin selection explain the observed patterns of the social behaviour?    9 
For theoretical research, there is a need to seek greater empirical grounding. Within the 10 
‘Preliminary findings about real greenbeard genes’ section, we identified some key puzzles:  11 
4. How is greenbeard colour polymorphism maintained? And why don’t falsebeard 12 
cheaters invade or be maintained? 13 
5. How do greenbeards at different loci coevolve? How does relatedness between 14 
individuals impact genetic conflict arising from greenbeard genes? 15 
6. What factors drive the linkage of greenbeards from different loci? And when do we 16 
expect the evolution of greenbeard supergenes? 17 
 18 
Glossary 19 
Social behaviour: any interaction between individuals of the same species. Although the term 20 
is sometimes used more broadly to include interspecific interactions, we use the traditional 21 
and more restrictive definition that requires interactants to be conspecifics, which critically 22 
means that that social partners may be genetically related.    23 
Altruism: social behaviour that is costly to the actor whilst benefitting a recipient.  24 
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Individual selection: the form of selection that favours genes because they enhance the fitness 1 
of the individual that carries them.  2 
Kin selection: the form of selection that favours a gene with a given social behaviour because 3 
of its effect on others that share the gene based on the genealogical relationship between social 4 
partners.  5 
Relatedness: the probability that two individuals share the same alleles over and above the 6 
random expectation.   7 
Kind selection: the form of selection that favours a selfish genetic element because of a 8 
conditional fitness effect, depending on the presence or absence of that specific gene among 9 
interactants. 10 
Selfish genetic element: a gene produces a function that enhances its own fitness in excess of 11 
the other genes in the rest of the genome. 12 
Greenbeard effect: a form of kind selection, whereby a ‘greenbeard gene’ enhances its own 13 
fitness in excess of the other genes in the rest of the genome by modulating a social behaviour 14 
that affects the fitness of others that share the greenbeard gene because of an assortment factor. 15 
Assortment factor: a distinguishing feature that correlates with the presence or absence of a 16 
gene within social partners, thereby assorting individuals into those that share the gene and 17 
those that do not.  18 
Falsebeard: an allele competing at the same locus as a greenbeard allele that appears to 19 
have the greenbeard phenotype but does not perform the associated social behaviour (as a 20 
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Comment 4: Population genetics of greenbeard concepts 1 
Following on from the general absence of data about the mechanisms of conditional 2 
cooperation, the preceding paper used current theory and the latest experimental findings to 3 
evaluate and hone the empirical utility of the greenbeard concept, setting up new questions for 4 
future research. I leave those questions for the future, but here I build on some of the verbal 5 
arguments within Paper 4 with simple mathematical models to elaborate on the central 6 
narrative and its implications for the evolution of conditional cooperation.  7 
 Paper 4 argued that the Dawkins (1976) presentation of the greenbeard thought 8 
experiment has had an enormous impact on how the fundamental principle within the 9 
greenbeard concept is understood. Much of the subsequent literature has analysed the 10 
greenbeard concept through the framework of indirect fitness accounting (e.g. West et al., 11 
2007a), which emphasises how greenbeards are susceptible to falsebeards (Dawkins, 1982; 12 
Gardner & West, 2010). Indeed, this vulnerability is the most-often cited reason why 13 
greenbeards would not be anticipated in nature, and to that extent is wholly misleading given 14 
that greenbeards do appear to be plausibly found in nature. When Hamilton (1964b) first 15 
envisaged the greenbeard concept, he did not use the framework of inclusive fitness to make 16 
this case, but instead verbally presented a different kind of model that is much more simplistic. 17 
Hamilton’s description was very similar to Dawkins’ (1976), but had an additional part that 18 
discussed a cost-free concept that Dawkins dropped in The Selfish Gene. The cost-free concept 19 
is closer to the ‘master regulator’ concept that we emphasised in Paper 4, highlighting that a 20 
greenbeard need not directly cause the social behaviour in the manner that Dawkins (1976) 21 
imagined. An important implication of this concept is how greenbeard genes can run into 22 
intragenomic conflict with kin-selected ‘modifier’ genes (Ridley & Grafen, 1981; Biernaskie 23 
et al., 2011). Lastly, when Haig (1996) reinvented the greenbeard concept for empirical 24 
research by suggesting how it could be achieved by molecular mechanisms, he presented the 25 
greenbeard thought experiment through the lens of Dawkins (1976). However, Haig (1996) 26 
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also verbally presented a variant concept within another framework to emphasise the link 1 
between greenbeards and meiotic drive, which emphasises how greenbeards can be selected 2 
despite harming individual fitness. Here, I describe and contrast these three variant 3 
presentations of the greenbeard concept in Hamilton (1964b), Dawkins (1976) and Haig 4 
(1996) to highlight their different implications for understanding conditional cooperation.  5 
 When Hamilton (1964b) first proposed the greenbeard concept (within a paper 6 
outlining the logic of inclusive fitness), the greenbeard gene was conceived of as influencing 7 
the recipient of a social behaviour rather than directly causing the social behaviour.    8 
“That genes could cause the perception of the presence of like genes in other individuals may 9 
sound improbable; at simplest we need to postulate something like a supergene affecting (a) 10 
some perceptible feature of the organism, (b) the perception of that feature, and (c) the social 11 
response consequent upon what was received. … If some sort of attraction between likes for 12 
purposes of co-operation can occur the limits to the evolution of altruism expressed by our 13 
first principle would be very greatly extended, although it should still never happen that one 14 
individual would value another more highly than itself, fitness for fitness. And if an individual 15 
can be attracted towards likes when it has positive effects – benefits – to dispense, it can 16 
presumably be attracted the other way, towards unlikes, when it has negative effects to 17 
dispense (i.e. when circumstances arise which demand combat, suggest robbery, and so on).” 18 
(Hamilton 1964b, p.25-26) 19 
After presenting the three requirements, Hamilton suggests that if an individual has 20 
cooperative benefits to give to a social partner then a gene governing the recipients of this 21 
behaviour might do better to give those benefits to another individual that shares that gene. In 22 
this second part of the idea’s exposition, the greenbeard gene only determines the probability 23 
that both the actor and the recipient share the greenbeard gene, which is their coefficient of 24 
relatedness – making the social behaviour itself cost-free. The greenbeard gene does not need 25 
to cause the social behaviour that they direct toward some recipients rather than others (which 26 
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is in-keeping with the master regulator concept of Paper 4, but we do not restrict our attention 1 
exclusively to refer to conditional social behaviours that are cost-free).  2 
 To examine this verbal model in greater detail, we can consider a pair of alleles in a 3 
simple haploid model. For simplicity, we only discuss the case where individuals have positive 4 
effects (𝑏 > 0) to dispense to others because it is simpler than the case where individuals have 5 
negative effects to dispense (which requires negative relatedness) because consideration of 6 
the first case is enough to demonstrate my point. The background relatedness between alleles 7 
is zero because we assume no population structure, but the greenbeard allele increases the 8 
relatedness to 𝑟 (which is interpreted geometrically as the probability of sharing the 9 
greenbeard allele over and above a random expectation). In this way, the greenbeard carriers 10 
(of frequency 𝑝) give out their benefits to a non-random subset of individuals (𝑟 + (1 − 𝑟)𝑝) 11 
whilst nonbeard carriers give out their benefits indiscriminately (1 − 𝑝), so the fitness of a 12 
greenbeard allele against a nonbeard allele is: 13 
 14 
𝜔𝐺𝐵 = 1 + ((𝑟 + (1 − 𝑟)𝑝) + (1 − 𝑝))𝑏  
 





Thus 𝜔𝐺𝐵 > 𝜔𝑁𝐵 whenever 𝑟 > 0. Within this framework, it is not clear what it would mean 16 
for an allele to be a falsebeard. An allele could reduce 𝑟 (pushing it closer to zero, i.e. 17 
indiscriminately giving out benefits) but then it is hard to intuit how this allele could disrupt 18 
the greenbeard-driven assortment of benefits to itself (by pushing 𝑟 to be less than zero). 19 
Therefore, at worst, a falsebeard would be neutral to a greenbeard in assorting to receive 20 
benefits from greenbeard actors whilst indiscriminately giving benefits to all alleles.  21 
 Hamilton’s (1964b) cost-free presentation of the greenbeard thought experiment 22 
implies a ‘master regulator’ like role for greenbeards. Instead of the greenbeard producing 23 
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some beneficial behavioural effect for those that share the gene, a greenbeard simply directs 1 
a beneficial behaviour (that it has no role in producing) to those that share the gene. 2 
Consequently, we might imagine a gene to be the ‘decision-maker’ rather than the ‘decision-3 
taker’ (cf. Bachrach & Baratz, 1962), in soliciting the behavioural effect that other genes 4 
functionally work to carry out despite potentially gaining no benefit from doing so (if they are 5 
unlinked). Those other genes may be pleiotropically constrained as part of some general 6 
behavioural mechanism and so be unable to prevent the greenbeard’s corruption, but it seems 7 
more likely that these genes could evolve as modifiers to become resistant to the greenbeard. 8 
A gene that is linked to the greenbeard locus would receive a diluted benefit in correspondence 9 
with its level of linkage, but an unlinked modifier would make no gains from the greenbeard’s 10 
regulatory intervention. Because, in equation (1), the behaviour is cost-free, an unlinked 11 
modifier that fully suppresses the greenbeard (i.e. ignores its solicitation) would not be 12 
favoured by natural selection. However, if a kin-selected decision-making gene were in 13 
competition with the greenbeard over the regulation of this behavioural effect, the unlinked 14 
genes in the genome could be selected to fully suppress the greenbeard regulator and permit 15 
the kin-selected regulator. In this way, even if a greenbeard is cost-free, it could lead to 16 
intragenomic conflict between the greenbeard locus (and other linked loci) and the rest of the 17 
genome.  18 
 Dawkins (1976) presentation of Hamilton’s (1964b) original thought experiment, 19 
which gave the concept its name, focused on the first part of the thought experiment and placed 20 
less emphasis on the verbal model that was presented in the second part (see above for 21 
comparison):  22 
“It is theoretically possible that a gene could arise which conferred an externally visible 23 
'label', say a pale skin, or a green beard, or anything conspicuous, and also a tendency to be 24 
specially nice to bearers of that conspicuous label. It is possible, but not particularly likely. 25 
… It is not very probable that one and the same gene would produce both the right label and 26 
the right sort of altruism. Nevertheless, what may be called the Green Beard Altruism Effect 27 
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is a theoretical possibility. An arbitrary label like a green beard is just one way in which a 1 
gene might 'recognize' copies of itself in other individuals.” (Dawkins 1976, p.89) 2 
Following on from this presentation, greenbeards can be understood as genes for altruism, 3 
which is clearly different from Hamilton’s verbal model. Altruism can be conceptually 4 
analysed in terms of their inclusive fitness accounting, which immediately emphasises the 5 
problem of the vulnerability of greenbeards to ‘falsebeards’ that cheat the greenbeard by 6 
presenting the right signal but not responding with altruism to others that bear the right signal. 7 
Thus a greenbeard receives a benefit of altruism (𝑏 > 0) when it interacts with itself (at its 8 
population-wide frequency 𝑝), but always pays the cost of altruism (𝑐 > 0), whilst a falsebeard 9 
only ever receives the benefit of altruism (𝑏 > 0) when it interacts with the greenbeard (at 10 
frequency 𝑝). For the sake of parity with the simple master regulator model presented above, 11 
we can consider some background level of relatedness between social partners (𝑟), so that 12 
greenbeard and falsebeard fitness is:  13 
 14 
𝜔𝐺𝐵 = 1 + (𝑟 + (1 − 𝑟)𝑝)𝑏 − 𝑐  
 





Thus 𝜔𝐺𝐵 > 𝜔𝐹𝐵 whenever 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0. Further, if a greenbeard could accurately detect itself, 16 
then it would be able to invade a nonbeard (𝜔𝐺𝐵 = 1 + (𝑟 + (1 − 𝑟)𝑝)(𝑏 − 𝑐); 𝜔𝑁𝐵 = 1), 17 
and so as long as 𝑟 > 0 then 𝜔𝐺𝐵 > 𝜔𝑁𝐵 reduces to the most favourable expression 𝑏 − 𝑐 >18 
0.  19 
 Haig (1996) presents another verbal (but mathematically oriented) model to 20 
demonstrate the similarities between greenbeard genes and meiotic drive genes: 21 
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“Suppose that a mother has limited resources available for reproduction and produces 1 
offspring one at a time. The less she invests in each offspring, the more offspring she produces, 2 
but the lower the probability of survival for each individual offspring. The amount of 3 
investment per offspring that maximizes maternal fitness can be represented by m*, the 4 
quantity that optimizes the trade-off between offspring number and offspring quality … . 5 
Consider a single Dd female in a population of dd individuals. If meiosis is fair, each of this 6 
female's offspring has an equal chance of being Dd or dd. All other mothers produce an 7 
unbroken sequence of dd offspring, each of whom receives m* (by assumption). Therefore, if 8 
D causes offspring to receive m*+δ, the Dd mother will leave fewer surviving offspring than 9 
a dd mother, even though the offspring who receive the extra amount have enhanced survival. 10 
… The analysis also clarifies the conceptual similarity between models of meiotic drive and 11 
models of parent-offspring conflict. In the former, genetic agents are able to invade a 12 
population because they distort the process of meiosis to gain access to more than 50% of 13 
successful gametes. In the latter, genes that cause increased offspring demands are able to 14 
invade a population because they distort the process of parental care to gain more than their 15 
fair share of resources.” P.6547 16 
This description suggests that greenbeards can be selected despite imposing a cost on the genes 17 
in the rest of the genome (in explicitly constructing the greenbeard gene as a selfish genetic 18 
element). This statement can be made even more explicit by considering a simpler meiotic 19 
drive model (without a maternal effect). In this setup, a meiotic drive-like greenbeard (via 20 
obligate harm) reaps a transmission advantage against a nonbeard when in a heterozygote but 21 
suffers a selective disadvantage when in a homozygote (see Paper 5). In terms of inclusive 22 
fitness, a greenbeard always carries a fixed advantage to the actor (i.e. a negative cost; 𝑐 < 0) 23 
but reaps a conditional disadvantage (i.e. a negative benefit; 𝑏 < 0) when in a homozygote 24 
(which otherwise goes to the nonbeard). The likelihood of a heterozygote forming is governed 25 
by relatedness (𝑟) as before, but here this parameter might better understood as reflecting the 26 




𝜔𝐺𝐵 = 1 + (𝑟 + (1 − 𝑟)𝑝)𝑏 − 𝑐  
 





Because meiotic drive relies on an ‘unfair’ advantage to the greenbeard in the heterozygote, 3 
relatedness has the opposite effect on whether or not the greenbeard or nonbeard allele goes 4 
to fixation. The condition for  𝜔𝐺𝐵 > 𝜔𝑁𝐵 leads to Hamilton’s rule, 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0, similar to the 5 
previous scenario but in this scenario we are supposing 𝑏 < 0 and 𝑐 < 0. Further, Equation 6 
(3.2) may look similar to Equation (2.2,) but Equation (3.2) is for a nonbeard allele not a 7 
falsebeard allele; consequently, this might imply that there is no conditionality, or alternatively 8 
that (like Equation 1) there is no real distinction between a falsebeard and nonbeard allele – 9 
as any allele can act like a falsebeard. But importantly, for appropriate values when 𝑏 < 0 and 10 
𝑐 < 0, the greenbeard can go to fixation despite imposing a load on the population (of 𝑏 − 𝑐). 11 
In this way, a gene can be selected despite leading to maladaptation in decreasing individuals’ 12 
fitness to those that carry the greenbeard.  13 
 These three models of greenbeard genes focus on different parts of the fundamental 14 
idea’s conceptualisation. Hamilton’s description draws attention to greenbeards as genes that 15 
change the relatedness between social partners. Dawkins’ description draws attention to 16 
greenbeards as genes for social behaviour (especially altruism). Haig’s description draws 17 
attention to greenbeards as selfish genetic elements. The definition of a greenbeard gene in 18 
Paper 4 drew on each of these descriptions. However, current empirical research has primarily 19 
focused on finding evidence for Dawkins’ conceptualisation, despite the details of this 20 
evidence often arguably providing better support for Hamilton’s conceptualisation (see Table 21 
2 for Hamiltonian ‘informative’ vs Dawkinsian ‘causal’ in Paper 4). But the broader point of 22 
Paper 4 is to direct attention to a more fundamental concept of what is greenbeard is. Much of 23 
the confusion surrounding greenbeard genes (e.g. whether greenbeard genes are outlaws) is 24 
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likely to have its origins in the way in which the concept can be constructed in different 1 
frameworks (as these three cases demonstrate), which each bring different evolutionary 2 
questions to the fore. However, we should be very clear that each of these perspectives 3 
correctly describes a different aspect of the greenbeard concept, and therefore there is a great 4 
need to establish how general any claims about particular greenbeard genes are within 5 
different (but supposedly general) modelling frameworks. Each of these concepts has been 6 
framed to analyse the balance of selection on a gene within the inclusive fitness partitioning 7 
of direct fitness effects to the actor (𝑐) and indirect fitness effects via the recipient (𝑏). In this 8 
framework, the master regulator greenbeard has a negligible direct fitness effect (𝑐 → 0), the 9 
indirect fitness greenbeard is for altruistic social behaviour (𝑐 < 0 and 𝑏 > 0; though spite 10 
has also been considered elsewhere) and the meiotic drive greenbeard is for selfish social 11 
behaviour (𝑐 > 0 and 𝑏 < 0; though mutual benefit has also been considered elsewhere).  12 
 The evolutionary understanding of how conditional cooperation plays out in nature is 13 
still in its early days. As Paper 4 emphasised, all of the examples that are currently suggested 14 
to be greenbeards could turn out to be kin-selected because the critical ‘naturalised’ 15 
experiments to rule out kin selection are absent. Of the examples given, the tgr gene in 16 
Dictyostelium discoideum is perhaps the most likely to be a greenbeard, given that Tgr protein 17 
binding strength correlates with tgr genetic distance but not genome-wide genetic distance 18 
(Gruenheit et al., 2017). However, I would suggest that the presence of polymorphism at the 19 
locus that encodes a signal and a specific complementary receptor governing a social effect 20 
presents strong evidence that a gene is a greenbeard because I do not see how this mechanism 21 
could detect genome-wide relatedness (or when the signal and the receptor are the same self-22 
binding protein; see also Haig 1996). The same could not be said when the locus does not 23 
encode the signal (e.g. relying upon a pleiotropically-constrained cue from some unlinked 24 
locus) because this introduces some uncertainty about the possession of the gene in in 25 
question. Further, for many systems, the greenbeard properties may simply be uninteresting 26 
(e.g. there is no intragenomic conflict) making there be no advantage to applying this concept. 27 
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To-date, the evidence of the genetic/phenotypic mechanism of conditional cooperation is best 1 
exemplified in many of these candidate greenbeard systems, and so it seems likely, given the 2 
number of different examples with signal-receptor polymorphism that are discussed in Paper 3 
4, that greenbeards could have an important part to play in the evolutionary explanation of 4 
conditional cooperation. 5 
 Taking inspiration from the logic of greenbeards, I next want to move to consider how 6 
these ideas about conditional cooperation can be applied to improve the design of gene drives. 7 
All of the different conceptions of greenbeard genes are presented in a way that suggests that 8 
that greenbeards are likely to be short-lived (Hamilton, 1964b; Dawkins, 1976; Haig, 1996) 9 
and yet, if a greenbeard and a kin-selected allele were in direct competition for control of the 10 
recipients of a social behaviour, presumably the greenbeard allele might be expected to 11 
outcompete the kin-selected allele because (paradigmatically) the greenbeard allele can 12 
ascertain which individuals share that particular allele rather than the kin-selected allele that 13 
can only ascertain some probability of sharing the allele due to common ancestry (i.e. the 14 
greenbeard has a higher relatedness coefficient). In this way, a greenbeard is a good allelic 15 
competitor, but is thought to be subject to modifiers at other loci that suppress its activity 16 
(Ridley & Grafen, 1981; Biernaskie et al., 2011). Is it possible to have a gene that is both a 17 
proficient allelic competitor and immune to suppressing modifiers? I discuss this in the applied 18 
context of gene drive technologies.  19 
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Abstract 7 
Gene drive technologies have attracted attention for providing a means of controlling 8 
disease vectors and invasive pest populations (Burt, 2003, 2014; Champer et al., 2016; 9 
Godfray et al., 2017; Marshall & Akbari, 2018; McFarlane et al., 2018). Gene drives can be 10 
used to suppress or exterminate natural populations using a selfish genetic element that 11 
propagates through a population despite incurring a cost to individual fitness. A major hurdle 12 
for proposed forms of gene drives is the rapid evolution of resistance (Champer et al., 2017, 13 
2018; Hammond et al., 2017; Noble et al., 2017, 2018; Unckless et al., 2017), which can limit 14 
their potential utility. Here, we propose how gene drives can be designed to reduce the risk of 15 
the rapid evolution of resistance (whilst still being controllable). 16 
 17 




Population genetic models suggest that gene drives are expected to rapidly spread 22 
through the population (Sandler & Novitski, 1957; Leigh, 1971; Charlesworth & Hartl, 1978; 23 
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Deredec et al., 2008), which is supported by natural examples (Palopoli & Wu, 1996; Hornett 1 
et al., 2009; Helleu et al., 2016) and laboratory experiments  (Lyttle, 1977; Price et al., 2010; 2 
Pinzone & Dyer, 2013). The spread of a drive allele creates a strong selective pressure for the 3 
rapid evolution of resistance to its effects (Champer et al., 2017, 2018; Hammond et al., 2017; 4 
Unckless et al., 2017; Noble et al., 2018). For some types of gene drive that rely upon ‘over-5 
replication’ (McLaughlin & Malik, 2017), including the (CRSIPR) homing endonucleases that 6 
have received the most attention (Burt, 2003, 2014; Champer et al., 2016; Godfray et al., 2017; 7 
Marshall & Akbari, 2018; McFarlane et al., 2018), errors in the process whereby they replicate 8 
between sites within the genome can readily lead to the creation of a resistant allele – which 9 
has been experimentally shown to occur on very short timescales (Hammond et al., 2017; 10 
Noble et al., 2017; Unckless et al., 2017; Champer et al., 2018). Obviously, for a gene drive 11 
to be successful, it is essential to minimize the risks of resistance rapidly evolving, and there 12 
are means by which over-replication gene drives can do this (Champer et al., 2017, 2018; 13 
Hammond et al., 2017; Unckless et al., 2017; Noble et al., 2018). However, no matter how 14 
much these techniques reduce the effects of replication error, resistance is still very likely to 15 
evolve for over-replication gene drives in the shorter-term because they create a selective 16 
advantage for a modifier at another locus elsewhere in the genome that suppresses their 17 
activity (Prout et al., 1973; Hartl, 1975; Thomson & Feldman, 1976). In this way, recent 18 
advances in the theory of gene drives have tended to prioritise maximizing the possible extent 19 
of population suppression (Burt, 2003, 2014; Champer et al., 2016; Godfray et al., 2017; 20 
Marshall & Akbari, 2018; McFarlane et al., 2018), rather than minimising the risk of 21 
resistance – both of which are necessary for an effective gene drive (Bull & Malik, 2017). 22 
Although over-replication gene drives have received the greatest attention (Burt, 23 
2003, 2014; Champer et al., 2016; Godfray et al., 2017; Marshall & Akbari, 2018; McFarlane 24 
et al., 2018), the potential for rapidly evolving resistance in these systems is highly 25 
undesirable, and so it is worthwhile considering whether any alternatives would be more 26 
effective at minimizing the risk of resistance. Other types of selfish genetic element that rely 27 
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upon transmission distortion (McLaughlin & Malik, 2017) could also be used for gene drives, 1 
such as a zygote- or gamete-killer. Transmission distorters replicate alongside the rest of the 2 
genome, but they bias the process of gamete production to ensure that offspring have an 3 
elevated probability of possessing the transmission distorter, which often comes at a cost of 4 
reducing their carrier’s fertility. In these systems, the most common source of resistance in the 5 
shorter-term is not likely to be the evolution of a resistant allele at that locus (because there is 6 
no error-prone over-replication process) but, rather, the evolution of modifier alleles at other 7 
loci that suppress the transmission distorter and restore fairness to sexual reproduction 8 
(because modifiers are simply a larger mutational target). Of the selfish genetic elements for 9 
transmission distortion, the zygote-killer Medea (Beeman et al., 1992; Wade & Beeman, 1994; 10 
Buchman et al., 2018) has received the most attention for gene drive because it is relatively 11 
easy to genetically engineer. However, like homing endonucleases, Medea is just as 12 
susceptible to suppression by modifiers at other loci (Prout et al., 1973; Hartl, 1975; Thomson 13 
& Feldman, 1976). Therefore, moving beyond the ‘usual suspects’, it is interesting to note that 14 
by far the most numerous form of selfish genetic element that have been detected in natural 15 
populations are gamete-killers (Burt & Trivers, 2008; Lindholm et al., 2016), which may 16 
suggest that they have some ability to evade the evolution of resistance and persist, at the very 17 
least, on shorter timescales. Here, we argue that some mechanisms of gamete-killing are more 18 
likely to evade the rapid evolution of resistance than others and, for this reason, we put forward 19 
one mechanism of gamete-killing that may potentially generate a more effective gene drive 20 
for controlling natural populations. 21 
Let us imagine a gamete-killing gene drive that uses a toxin-antitoxin system to 22 
generally refer to both killer-target or poison-antidote systems (Bravo Núñez et al., 2018), 23 
which could plausibly be genetically engineered from current methods (e.g. Chen et al., 2007). 24 
We can consider the three types of killer depending on when the toxin is expressed and takes 25 
effect during meiosis (Haig & Grafen, 1991), which determines how cells in different haploid 26 
and diploid combinations interact (see Figure 1). Logically, for any invadable killer gene 27 
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drive, the toxin must always take effect by killing a haploid sister or daughter cell because 1 
otherwise killing a diploid parental cell would render a heterozygote infertile (and the killer 2 
could not invade). Consequently, the three types of killers reflect the only viable routes for a 3 
gamete-killing gene drive. First, the toxin can be expressed before meiosis in a diploid parental 4 
cell (or, indeed, some other somatic gonadal cells), but have its effect on the haploid sister or 5 
daughter cells. Second, the toxin can be expressed by and have an effect on the haploid sister 6 
cells after the first reductional division of meiosis and before the second equational division 7 
of meiosis. Third, the toxin can be expressed by the haploid daughter cells (i.e. the gametes) 8 
after the second equational division at the end of meiosis, having an effect on either the haploid 9 
sister or daughter cells. The difference between the second and third types is in the way in 10 
which the cells expressing the toxin interact, with sister cells interacting as a dyad rather than 11 
daughters cells interacting as a tetrad. We refer to these three activity profiles of expression 12 
and effect as pre-meiotic, meso-meiotic, and post-meiotic killing respectively.  13 





Figure 1. A simplified diagram showing the potential for different types of game-killing gene 3 
drive throughout the steps of the meiotic divisions in a double heterozygote (patterns in other 4 
genotypes are illustrated in SI Appendix, Figure S3). During meiosis, a diploid parental cell 5 
undergoes a first reductional division into two haploid sister cells followed by a second 6 
(mitosis-like) equational division into four haploid daughter cells. Different cells are presented 7 
with solid outlines, and different interactions between cells are presented with dashed outlines 8 
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(except for the possible interaction between the parent cell and the sister cells it produced). 1 
Alleles at the drive locus are presented in red (𝐷 = drive and 𝑑 = nondrive) and alleles at the 2 
modifier locus are presented in blue (𝑀 = modifier and 𝑚 = nonmodifier). A drive allele for 3 
a toxin-antitoxin pair can distort its transmission to the next generation by producing a toxin 4 
(indicated by out-facing arrows from the producer cell) that leads to the presence of the toxin 5 
within that given interaction (indicated by the light-grey shading in dashed outlined box). The 6 
presence of the toxin kills gametes that do not also produce the antixotin, with cell death 7 
indicated by the dark-grey shading in solid outlined boxes). The modifier allele (𝑀) only has 8 
an effect on the drive (𝐷) allele if it is within the same cell, which is indicated by the turnstile 9 
symbol ⊢ that indicates that the drive allele has blocked some function of the drive allele (with 10 
different scenarios illustrated in A and B). As such, in the double heterozygote scenario 11 
presented here, there is no potential for pre-meiotic killing, where the diploid parent cell 12 
produces the toxin that kills haploid sister or daughter cells, because the modifier blocks toxin 13 
production. However, there is potential for meso-meiotic killing between sister cells (of which 14 
there are two potential genotypic combinations represented by different interactions in dashed 15 
boxes) and post-meiotic killing between daughter cells (ignoring the potential for daughter 16 
cells to kill sister cells in this simplified diagram). A) The case of a fully suppressing modifier 17 
that blocks toxin and antitoxin production by the drive allele, rendering it susceptible to the 18 
toxin produced by other cells. B) The scenario of a partially suppressing modifier blocks that 19 
toxin production only, and so remains resistant to the toxin produced by other cells.     20 
  21 
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As a one-locus system, all three forms of killing are phenotypically equivalent. This 1 
basic scenario can be modelled using a simple framework (following Leigh, 1971) where a 2 
drive allele (𝐷, with frequency 𝑓𝐷) is competing against a nondrive allele (𝑑, with frequency 3 
𝑓𝑑). Whenever an individual carries the drive allele, their gametes suffer a selective 4 
disadvantage (−𝑠) from being poisoned by the toxin in spite of the antitoxin (where this cost 5 
is scaled to vary between 0 and 1), which provides a component of hard selection against the 6 
drive allele. In this way, the toxicity cost (−𝑠) determines the magnitude of the fitness load 7 
(which is expected to be manifested as reduced fecundity, and hence represents the utility of 8 
the drive allele for population suppression) when the drive allele is at fixation in the 9 
population, reducing individual fitness from 1 to 1 − 𝑠 (Figure 2). The drive allele also 10 
imposes a transmission disadvantage on the nondrive allele (−𝑒) that arises from killing of 11 
nondrive carrying gametes by the toxin, which gains the drive allele a transmission advantage 12 
(+𝑒), and hence the drive allele can potentially promote its own transmission despite the 13 
toxicity cost through this component of soft selection. The transmission advantage, which only 14 
arises in heterozygotes (because it requires an interaction between the drive and non-drive 15 
alleles), is scaled from a minimum of 0 for a fair meiosis and a maximum of 1 for the case 16 
where only drive allele carrying gametes survive. In heterozygotes, the toxicity cost (−𝑠) and 17 
transmission effect (±𝑒) are multiplicative because the former determines the number of 18 
viable gametes produced (hence representing hard selection) whilst the latter determines the 19 
proportion of those gametes that contain the drive allele (hence representing soft selection; 20 
Table 1). Therefore, the overall fitness of the drive allele is the frequency-weighted average 21 
of its fitness when homozygous (where it pays the toxicity cost) and its fitness when 22 
heterozygous (where it pays the cost, but also gains the transmission advantage), with 23 
corresponding implications for the nondrive allele: 24 
 25 




𝜔𝑑 = 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑠 − 𝑓𝐷𝑒(1 − 𝑠)  (1b) 
 1 





(1 − (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)) (2) 
 4 
Logically, recapitulating a classic result (Leigh, 1971), the drive allele is always able to invade 5 
whenever the product of the toxicity cost and transmission advantage is greater than one (i.e. 6 
(1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) > 1; or 𝑒 > 𝑠/(1 − 𝑠); see SI Appendix, Figure 1S). Consequently, the drive 7 
allele will be more likely to be favoured (and selection favouring the drive allele would be 8 
stronger) the smaller the selective disadvantage (−𝑠) and the larger the transmission effect (𝑒).  9 
These conditions highlight the challenge of population control via a gamete-killing drive 10 
allele. As the selective disadvantage (−𝑠) is expected to manifest itself as a fecundity cost, 11 
there is a trade-off between the capacity for the drive allele to invade and to suppress the 12 
population: the lower the fecundity cost the less restrictive the invasion criteria, but also the 13 
lower the impact on mean fitness as the drive allele goes to fixation (where population mean 14 
fitness goes from 1 in the starting population to 1 − 𝑠 when the drive allele is at fixation). If 15 
there is a negligible fecundity cost, the drive allele can easily invade and spread to fixation 16 
against the nondrive allele, but this accomplishes nothing with respect to population control. 17 
To provide the most effective population suppression, the fecundity cost has to be as large as 18 
possible, but 𝑠 has to be less than ½ for the drive allele to invade. Consequently, the drive 19 
allele cannot cause a population cannot to lose more than half of its fecundity, which limits 20 
the scope of population suppression through this approach.  21 




Figure 2. The spread of the drive allele and its effect on population suppression. The figure 2 
illustrates a scenario where there is a large selective disadvantage (𝑠 = 0.45) and transmission 3 
effect (𝑒 = 0.95) that result in strong population suppression (reducing population mean 4 
fitness from 1 to 0.55). The figure presents the frequencies of the three alleles (drive allele 𝐷 5 
in red, nondrive allele 𝑑 in grey, and resistant allele 𝛿 in blue, with corresponding frequencies 6 
𝑓𝐷, 𝑓𝑑 and 𝑓𝛿) and the corresponding value for population mean fitness (?̅?) being indicated by 7 
the dashed black line (where ?̅? = 𝜔𝐷𝑓𝐷 + 𝜔𝑑𝑓𝑑 + 𝜔𝛿𝑓𝛿; with fitness corresponds to the 8 
equations in Table 1) across generations. Because population mean fitness is scaled to start at 9 
a value of 1 in the absence of the drive allele, the value of ?̅? across generations represents the 10 
degree of population suppression. The drive allele is introduced at a 1% frequency (𝑓𝐷 = 0.01) 11 
in generation (𝑡) 25 and the resistant allele is introduced at a 1% frequency (𝑓𝛿 = 0.01) in 12 
generation 100.  The population genetic model used to calculate the allele frequency dynamics 13 
follows (Burt, 2003).  14 
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Table 1. Fitness of different alleles at a drive locus, arising from different genotype 1 
combinations within diploid individuals. Table entries correspond to the fitness of the allele 2 
to the left of each row when in a genotype with the allele listed at the top of each column, 3 
where fitness can be broadly conceived as the number of gametes of that genotype that are 4 
produced. There are three alleles at the drive locus: the drive locus has a drive allele 𝐷, which 5 
encodes a toxin and antitoxin, and nondrive allele 𝑑, and the ‘resistant’ allele 𝛿, which encodes 6 
the antitoxin only. The drive allele encodes a toxin-antitoxin pair which incurs a selective 7 
disadvantage (−𝑠) due to toxicity, but can gain a transmission advantage (+𝑒) against a 8 
nondrive allele. The resistant allele encodes the antitoxin only, and so is resistant to the drive 9 
allele though it still incurs the toxin’s selective disadvantage when paired with it.  The total 10 
fitness of each allele depends on the frequency with which it interacts with each of the three 11 
other alleles, which depends on their frequencies in the population.     12 
 𝐷 𝑑 𝛿 
𝐷 1 − 𝑠 (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 1 − 𝑠 
𝑑 (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 1 1 
𝛿 1 − 𝑠 1 1 
 13 
  14 
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We next consider selection on a modifier locus to understand the evolution of 1 
resistance to the drive system. For simplicity, we do not consider linkage disequilibrium here 2 
(but see SI Appendix, Section 1 for an analysis and justification of ignoring it here). We 3 
postulate that modifier activity is constrained such that a modifier allele is only able to 4 
influence the expression of a drive allele if they are in the same cell. We consider modifiers 5 
of two basic forms: a modifier that achieves suppression by blocking the production of both 6 
the toxin and the antitoxin, and a modifier that shows partial suppression by blocking the 7 
production of the antitoxin only. Although each of the three forms of killing that we consider 8 
is modelled via the same basic one-locus system, they differ from one another with respect to 9 
the opportunities for modifiers to alter the outcome of the interaction. This difference arises 10 
because the components of hard selection (caused by the toxicity of the drive allele; captured 11 
by −𝑠) and soft selection (arising from transmission effect; captured by ±𝑒) only apply to the 12 
interacting cells among which killing takes place, which varies across the different scenarios. 13 
We first evaluate a drive allele for pre-meiotic killing, where the drive allele is 14 
expressed in diploid cells (either parental or somatic). Given that we assume that a modifier 15 
can only influence the expression of a drive allele if they are in the same cell, a modifier allele 16 
for full or partial suppression has the same effect because the modifier is always in the same 17 
cell as all the drive alleles within the individual. Consequently, the modifier is able to block 18 
all toxin production, which means that the drive allele is only active in the absence of the 19 
modifier. In this way, the modifier has a ‘dominant’ phenotype, with one allelic copy being 20 
able to perform the same role as two allelic copies. With the addition of the modifier (𝑀, with 21 
frequency 𝑓𝑀) and nonmodifier (𝑚, with frequency 𝑓𝑚) alleles to form a two-locus system 22 
(where there is a drive locus and a modifier locus), the drive (𝐷) and nondrive (𝑑) alleles have 23 
fitness (see also SI Appendix, Table S1): 24 
 25 
𝜔𝐷 = 1 + 𝑓𝑚




𝜔𝑑 = 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚
2(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠))  (3b) 
 1 
The condition for the drive allele to have higher fitness than the nondrive allele is the same as 2 
before (see eqn. 2), but the two alleles have equal fitness when the modifier allele is at fixation 3 
(i.e. 𝑓𝑀 = 1, and hence 𝑓𝑚 = 0). At the modifier locus, the modifier (𝑀) and nonmodifier (𝑚) 4 
alleles have fitness:  5 
 6 
𝜔𝑀 = 1  (4a) 
  
𝜔𝑚 = 1 − (1 − 𝑓𝑑
2)𝑓𝑚𝑠  (4b) 
 7 
Consequently, the modifier allele is expected to go to fixation because it always has higher 8 
fitness than the nonmodifier allele, though the two alleles trivially have equal fitness when the 9 
drive allele is extinct (i.e. 𝑓𝐷 = 0). Therefore, a drive allele for pre-meiotic killing is 10 
susceptible to a modifier for full (and/or partial) suppression.  11 
We can next examine a drive allele for post-meiotic killing, where the drive allele is 12 
expressed in the haploid daughter cells (i.e. gametes) after meiosis has taken place. We first 13 
consider a modifier that fully suppresses the drive allele by blocking both toxin and antitoxin 14 
production. In this scenario, the modifier has no control over the expression of the toxin and 15 
antitoxin within the gametes that do not carry the modifier. Consequently, for an individual 16 
that is heterozygous at the drive and modifier loci (i.e. the diploid genotype is 𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑚), the 17 
modifier allele blocks the expression of the toxin and antitoxin in 25% of the gametes but 18 
another 25% of the gametes still produce the toxin and antitoxin without being blocked by the 19 
modifier. Therefore, the modifier has a ‘recessive’ phenotype, as an individual has to be 20 
homozygous for the modifier to block toxin production in all gametes. In this scenario (see SI 21 
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Appendix, Table S2A), the fitness of each allele in the two-locus two-allele system is given 1 
by: 2 
  3 
𝜔𝐷 = 1 + (1 − 𝑓𝑀
2)(−𝑠 + 𝑓𝑑𝑒(1 − 𝑠))  (5a) 
  
𝜔𝑑 = 1 − 𝑓𝐷(1 − 𝑓𝑀
2)(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠))  (5b) 
  
𝜔𝑀 = 1 − 𝑓𝑚(1 − 𝑓𝑑
2)(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠))  (5c) 
  
𝜔𝑚 = 1 + (1 − 𝑓𝑑
2)(−𝑠 + 𝑓𝑀𝑒(1 − 𝑠))  (5d) 
 4 
Note the symmetries between the fitness equations of alleles 𝐷 (drive allele) and 𝑚 5 
(nonmodifier allele), and between alleles 𝑑 (nondrive allele) and 𝑀 (modifier allele), which 6 
captures the nature of selection in this system. The modifier allele receives the same fitness as 7 
the nondrive allele because the modifier allele exhibits the phenotype of the nondrive allele; 8 
the modifier allele prevents the expression of the drive allele, and so avoids producing its 9 
toxicity costs whilst also making itself susceptible to drive. Concurrently, the fitness of the 10 





(1 − (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)) (6) 
 13 
This condition recapitulates the condition where the drive allele is favoured in a one-locus 14 
system (eqn. 2) when the nonmodifier allele is at fixation (𝑓𝑚 = 1) but, as the frequency of 15 
the nonmodifier allele declines, the frequency above which the drive allele is favoured 16 
increases. Due to this interdependence, the conditions that favour the drive allele also favour 17 
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the nonmodifier allele (and vice versa). Thus, we expect the drive allele to go to fixation and 1 
the modifier allele to go extinct.  2 
 Staying with the scenario of post-meiotic killing, we can next consider the case where 3 
a modifier allele partially suppresses the drive allele by only blocking toxin production (whilst 4 
not blocking antitoxin production). There are only two diploid genotypes (𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑚 and 5 
𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑚) in which the drive allele has different fitness under partial and full suppression by 6 
modifiers, where a fully suppressing modifier allele is the victim of transmission distortion 7 
whilst a partially suppressing modifier allele avoids this fate. Within these different 8 
interactions (see SI Appendix, Table S2B), there is no change to the fitness of alleles at the 9 
drive locus (see eqn. 5) and so the conditions favouring the drive allele are the same as for full 10 
suppression (eqn. 6), but the fitness of alleles at the modifier locus are changed:  11 
 12 
𝜔𝑀 = 1 − (1 − 𝑓𝑑
2)𝑓𝑚𝑠  (7a) 
  
𝜔𝑚 = 1 − (1 − 𝑓𝑑
2)𝑠  (7b) 
 13 
Consequently, the modifier allele is expected to go to fixation because it always has higher 14 
fitness than the nonmodifier allele (except the trivial case where the drive allele is extinct, i.e. 15 
𝑓𝐷 = 0). Therefore, a drive allele for post-meiotic killing is not susceptible to a modifier allele 16 
that causes full suppression, but it is susceptible to a modifier allele that causes partial 17 
suppression.  18 
 Lastly, we examine the scenario of meso-meiotic killing, where the drive allele is 19 
expressed in sister cells after the first reductional meiotic division and before the second 20 
equational meiotic division. We first consider a modifier allele that fully suppresses the drive 21 
allele by blocking both toxin and antitoxin production. As with the post-meiotic killing 22 
scenario, these modifier alleles that cause full suppression of the drive allele have no control 23 
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over the expression of the toxin and antitoxin within the gametes that do not carry the modifier. 1 
The meso-meiotic and post-meiotic killing scenarios only differ in the pattern of allelic fitness 2 
in the double-heterozygote individuals (𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑚; see SI Appendix, Figure S3) because, in all 3 
other scenarios, the two sister cell genotypes are the same as the four daughter cell genotypes; 4 
in the double-heterozygotes, post-meiotic killing takes place between all four daughter cells 5 
(which have all possible haploid genotypes) but meso-meiotic killing takes place between 6 
sister cells that always have the opposite genotype. Thus, in the double-heterozygotes, toxin 7 
production only takes place in one sister cell pair (𝐷𝑚x𝑑𝑀; not 𝐷𝑀x𝑑𝑚), limiting which 8 
gametes suffer the selective disadvantage (−𝑠) and transmission effect (±𝑒). In this way (see 9 
SI Appendix, Table 3SA), the fitness of each allele in the two-locus two-allele system is given 10 
by: 11 
 12 
𝜔𝐷 = 1 + 𝑓𝑚(−𝑠 + 𝑓𝑑𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑀𝑓𝑚𝑠  (8a) 
  
𝜔𝑑 = 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠))  (8b) 
  
𝜔𝑀 = 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠))  (8c) 
  
𝜔𝑚 = 1 + 𝑓𝐷(−𝑠 + 𝑓𝑀𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑚𝑠  (8d) 
 13 
Again, the drive allele and the nonmodifier are favoured under the same conditions as for the 14 
case of post-meiotic killing (see eqn. 6). Further, similarly to modifier alleles that cause full 15 
suppression under post-meiotic killing, there are symmetries between the fitness of the drive 16 
allele (𝐷) and nonmodifier allele (𝑚), and between the nondrive allele (𝑑) and the modifier 17 
allele (𝑀) which capture the nature of selection in the system.  18 
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We can next consider the case where a modifier allele partially suppresses the drive 1 
allele by only blocking toxin production. In the scenario with meso-meiotic killing, partial 2 
suppression is very similar to full suppression except, when the drive allele is homozygous 3 
and the modifier allele is heterozygous (𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑚), there is no drive despite there being toxin 4 
production (by the 𝐷𝑚 sister cell) because both sister genotypes produce the antitoxin. 5 
Consequently, the fitness of the alleles at the drive locus are unchanged from the full 6 
suppression scenario (see eqn. 8; see also SI Appendix, Table S3B), but the fitness of the 7 
alleles at the modifier locus are: 8 
 9 
𝜔𝑀 = 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚(𝑠 + 𝑓𝑑𝑒(1 − 𝑠))  (9a) 
  
𝜔𝑚 = 1 + 𝑝(−𝑠 + 𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑀𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑚𝑠  (9b) 
 10 
Given that the fitness of alleles at the drive locus are the same as in the case where modifiers 11 
cause full suppression, the drive allele is favoured under the same condition as it is in the 12 
scenario with post-meiotic killing (see eqn. 6). But the slightly different expressions for fitness 13 
of alleles at the modifier locus mean that the modifier allele is favoured under a slightly 14 





(1 − (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)) 
(10) 
 17 
Given that the condition (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) > 1 has to be met for the drive allele to invade, the 18 
RHS is positive for all relevant parameter space (see SI Appendix, Figure S2). Consequently, 19 
a modifier allele that blocks toxin production must exceed a threshold frequency to invade the 20 
nonmodifier allele (though once it has exceeded this threshold, it is expected to spread to 21 
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fixation). The threshold frequency declines as the drive allele’s frequency increases to the 1 
point where the modifier is always able to invade when the drive allele is at fixation (𝑓𝐷 = 1). 2 
The reason for this frequency threshold is the fitness asymmetry when both the drive and the 3 
modifier loci are heterozygous (i.e. the diploid genotype is 𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑚): a modifier allele (𝑀) can 4 
lose out from unfair meiosis when it is in a gamete with a nonmodifier allele (𝑚), whilst it 5 
blocks toxin production to restore fair meiosis when the situation is reversed. As a result, a 6 
gene drive by meso-meiotic killing can resist the spread of partially suppressing modifiers that 7 
block toxin production across most relevant parameter values (i.e. when (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) > 1 8 
and 0 ≤ 𝑓𝐷 < 1). Moreover, this means that the conditions that promote invasion by the drive 9 
allele (small 𝑠 and large 𝑒) also prevent the invasion of the modifier that blocks toxin 10 
production.  11 
Although a gene drive via meso-meiotic killing can evade the evolution of resistance 12 
in the shorter-term (arising from either fully or partially suppressing modifiers), the evolution 13 
of resistance in the longer term seems likely because a resistant allele could arise at the drive 14 
locus through a mutation that renders the toxin non-functional (whilst retaining a functional 15 
antitoxin). As applies for all three types of killing we have discussed, the resistant allele would 16 
always be favoured because the drive allele would never get the chance to reap a transmission 17 
advantage (𝑒) against it. In contrast to a partially suppressing modifier under meso-meiotic 18 
killing, a resistant allele is favoured whilst a resistant-creating modifier allele is not because 19 
the resistant allele does not suffer the asymmetric drive outcomes in the diploid 20 
genotype 𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑚 (see above). Further, because the resistant allele would not produce a 21 
functional toxin, it would not suffer the selective disadvantage (−𝑠) when it is homozygous. 22 
Thus, when the resistant allele (𝛿) competes against the other alleles at that locus (the drive 𝐷 23 
and nondrive 𝑑 alleles), their fitness can be expressed as (Table 1): 24 
 25 




𝜔𝑑 = 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑠 − 𝑓𝐷𝑒(1 − 𝑠)  (11b) 
  
𝜔𝛿 = 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑠  (11c) 
 1 
Thus, the resistant allele (𝛿) always has higher fitness than the nondrive allele (𝑑), and is 2 
expected to go to fixation because the resistant allele (𝛿) also has higher fitness than the drive 3 
allele (𝐷) whenever the nondrive allele (𝑑) has a low frequency. However, the resistant allele 4 
(𝛿) only has a marginally higher fitness when the drive allele (𝐷) is near fixation, and so is 5 
expected to spread to fixation slowly (compared to the drive allele’s rapid spread to fixation 6 
against the nondrive allele; see Figure 2). In this way, there is an unavoidable vulnerability of 7 
a gamete-killing gene drive to resistant alleles, which seem likely to arise in the longer-term. 8 
 In summary, we have analysed the impact that the timing of when a gamete-killing 9 
drive allele is active during meiosis has on selection for modifiers at other loci that can fully 10 
or partially suppress the drive allele (and thereby generating resistance to the drive allele). We 11 
propose that meso-meiotic killing provides the best timing for a drive allele to be active 12 
because a meso-meiotic killing drive allele is invulnerable to both full and partial suppression 13 
by modifiers. In this way, the meso-meiotic killing drive allele can evade the rapid evolution 14 
of resistance in the shorter-term. However, in the longer-term, all forms of gamete-killing 15 
(including meso-meiotic killing) are susceptible to a resistant allele at the drive allele’s locus. 16 
Whilst this might seem to limit the utility of transmission distorting gene drives by meso-17 
meiotic killing, susceptibility to a resistant allele can be potentially desirable because it makes 18 
the gene drive system controllable. For example, a resistant allele could be introduced to limit 19 
the spread of a drive allele beyond a target population or to reverse a population suppression 20 
were it to have unintended consequences. A limitation of this control is that the population 21 
becomes immune to the drive allele (in as far as the resistant allele persists), and so a new 22 
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drive construct would need to be created to attempt any further population controls (e.g. a new 1 
toxin-antitoxin pair). 2 
Beyond the problem of improving gene drive efficacies, meso-meiotic killing may 3 
explain the surprisingly long-term persistence (or stability) of well-documented meiotic drive 4 
systems despite the potential for strong selection of resistance (Lindholm et al., 2016). For 5 
example amongst the well-studied autosomal drives, segregation distorter (SD) in Drosophila 6 
melanogaster has persisted for over 1 million years (Kovacevic & Schaeffer, 2000), the t-7 
haplotype in Mus musculus has persisted over 2 million years (Silver, 1993) and spore killer 8 
(Sk) in Neurospora intermedia may have persisted for up to 0.5 million years (Svedberg et al., 9 
2018). As it stands, the mechanistic details about how these meiotic drives function remains 10 
incomplete, but meso-meiotic killing presents an interesting hypothesis that when these drive 11 
alleles become active during meiosis could be an important part of explaining their surprising 12 
evolutionary longevity. The critical feature of this hypothesis is that the drive occurs during 13 
the interaction between the pair of cells that have just undergone reductive division, and so 14 
for species that have ‘inverted meiosis’ (where the reductive division takes place after an 15 
equational division) the same hypothesis can still be considered.  16 
When looking for plausible systems with the profile of meso-meiotic killing, the many 17 
examples of meiotic drive that are known to operate through the disruption of the equational 18 
division could be plausible cases, like the Paris XSR chromosome which disrupts 19 
heterochromatin during anaphase II (Cazemajor et al., 2000) – though this system has 20 
numerous differences to the one modelled here. The Paris XSR chromosome only operates in 21 
males during the formation of sperm. Although we have not modelled gamete-killing taking 22 
place within a specific sex, there is in principle no change to the selection on modifiers in as 23 
far as the sex ratio is not distorted. Sperm-killing may be more common than means of gamete-24 
killing than egg-killing because, in many taxa (including Drosophila for the Paris XSR 25 
chromosome system), meiotic products are compartmentalised during spermatogenesis whilst 26 
they are not during oogenesis, giving greater potential for targeted killing. However, the Paris 27 
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XSR chromosome does distort the sex ratio, which gives greater potential for selection to favour 1 
both fully and partially suppressing modifiers under broader conditions to restore an equal sex 2 
ratio. Additionally, meso-meiotic killing requires expression in the sister cells, which is not 3 
thought to be the case for the Paris sex ratio distorter where there is evidence that the killing 4 
protein is expressed and binds the Y-chromosome (leading to its eventual destruction in 5 
anaphase II) pre-meiotically (Helleu et al., 2016); the Paris XSR chromosome is one of the few 6 
systems where the critical expression data has been collected. Although the meso-meiotic 7 
killing hypothesis fails to describe this case, the general mechanism of the Paris XSR 8 
chromosome’s meiotic drive in heterochromatin disruption is a possible pathway to targeted 9 
killing between sister cells. Furthermore, speculating in the general vacuum of relevant 10 
evidence either way, as meso-meiotic killing has equivalent results to post-meiotic killing, 11 
many examples that are assumed to reflect post-meiotic killing may actually be of this meso-12 
meiotic form.  13 
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Comment 5: From greenbeards to unbeatable genes 1 
Inspired by newly-discovered greenbeard genes, the preceding paper provides an exploration 2 
of how to design gene drives in a way that avoids resistance from modifier genes. Here, I 3 
develop the core logic to present the concept of an unbeatable gene.  4 
Under natural selection, we expect genes to become proficient at maximizing their 5 
replication into the next generation (Dawkins, 1976). The most proficient genes are 6 
undoubtedly selfish genetic elements, which pillage the organism to maximize their 7 
replication, often at the expense of the replication of other genes in the rest of the genome 8 
(Werren et al., 1988). However, as replication necessarily invokes sociality, a successful gene 9 
would do well to work together with copies of itself against its competitors (Hamilton, 1972). 10 
Therefore, at its best, a gene in an actor would conditionally cooperate with a recipient only if 11 
it shared a copy of that gene (Hamilton, 1964b, 1972). Such a gene is a greenbeard, changing 12 
its behaviour dependent on whether or not others share a copy of the greenbeard gene 13 
(Hamilton, 1964b; Dawkins, 1976). Yet, as Paper 4 clarified (see Table 1 in Paper 4), it has 14 
been the general expectation that greenbeard genes are vulnerable to modifiers for full/partial 15 
suppression or falsebeards that cheat the greenbeard signal. In this way, not all greenbeards 16 
are going to be ‘unbeatable genes’ because, although they are good competitors against other 17 
alleles, many greenbeards are likely to be poor competitors against genes at other loci. The 18 
claims of greenbeard discoveries might suggest that some greenbeards have found ways 19 
around the problem of modifiers, but it remains unclear how any real greenbeards might do 20 
this. It seems likely that the biological constraints of the particular systems are important, just 21 
as the structure of the interaction between cells during meiosis is important in Paper 5.   22 
As a definition: an unbeatable gene is a gene that can outperform all its allelic 23 
competitors whilst also being immune to modification by genes at other loci. In practical 24 
terms, I would make the case that an unbeatable gene would be a selfish genetic element 25 
because these genes have an elevated rate of transmission compared to other genes at a locus. 26 
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Further, I would also claim that there is an intimate (if not exclusive) relationship between an 1 
unbeatable gene and a greenbeard because the social interaction between different individuals 2 
that carry genes provides a way in which the gene can escape modification. Although not 3 
explicitly addressed, the idea that sociality provides an escape from modification is found 4 
within Paper 5, which showed that a meiotic drive gene can distort its transmission into the 5 
next generation whilst also escaping modification. All the killing phenotypes can be 6 
conceptualised as forms of social interaction between cells with different genotypes, which is 7 
the link to greenbeards. There are parallels between Hamilton’s (1964b) cost-free concept of 8 
a greenbeard and the pre-meiotic killer because both are susceptible to fully suppressing 9 
modifiers that are kin-selected based on a different background level of relatedness between 10 
the drive and modifier allele. Further, both concepts give no distinction between a modifier 11 
for full or partial suppression. There are also parallels between Dawkins’ (1976) indirect 12 
fitness concept of a greenbeard and the post-meiotic killer because both are exclusively 13 
vulnerable to a partially suppressing modifier which creates a (falsebeard) cheater. Further, 14 
there is no intragenomic conflict in either case because both are also vulnerable to cheater 15 
alleles. Finally, Haig’s (1996) meiotic drive concept of a greenbeard and the meso-meiotic 16 
killer share many similarities. Although Haig (1996) directly states that a meiotic drive-like 17 
greenbeard would be vulnerable to modifiers, the direct analogy between meiotic drive and 18 
greenbeards does implicitly identify the critical idea that social interaction has a special 19 
property for immunity to modification because modifiers’ effects cannot necessarily access 20 
all the interacting genotypes. Consequently, the meso-meiotic killer has some resistance to 21 
modifiers because of the structure of the social interaction among sister cells (see Figure 1 in 22 
Paper 5).  23 
The meso-meiotic killer is not an unbeatable gene for two reasons, which may reduce 24 
its utility as a means of gene drive. First, the drive allele for meso-meiotic killing is vulnerable 25 
to partially suppressing modifiers when it is at fixation. In principle, from the perspective of 26 
gene drive design, there may be ways of designing the toxin-antitoxin system to negate (or, at 27 
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least, make harder to evolve) the possibility of a partially suppressing modifier, such as having 1 
a single promoter for the toxin and antitoxin genes. Second, the drive allele for meso-meiotic 2 
killing is vulnerable to a resistant (i.e. falsebeard) allele that only produces the antitoxin, and 3 
so is not able to outcompete all of its allelic competitors. This point was advanced as a 4 
beneficial feature because it means that the gene drive could be eliminated if it had 5 
unintentional consequences. For this reason, gene drive technologies would usually do well to 6 
evade resistance, but not permanently escape it, as a hypothetically unbeatable gene would do. 7 
Nonetheless, there are purposes (e.g. population eradication) where an unbeatable gene may 8 
be preferred over a more controllable gene that is vulnerable to resistant alleles.   9 
 Although the question of how unbeatable genes could work remains wide open, they 10 
are interesting to speculate on, especially in the context of gene drive where they have a 11 
practical purpose. Herein, the language of modifiers provides a way of talking about how 12 
genes at multiple loci coevolve together (Leigh, 1971; Hurst et al., 1996). In its historical 13 
usage, a modifier for almost any effect has been discussed (e.g. effecting mutation rate, 14 
recombination rate, suppressing or enhancing a phenotype etc), but to avoid being 15 
impractically speculative is important to discuss modifiers in a disciplined way. In Paper 5, 16 
using a genetic construct of a toxin and antitoxin, of which there are numerous possible 17 
biochemical mechanisms (Burt & Trivers, 2008; Bravo Núñez et al., 2018), I considered fully 18 
suppressing modifiers that either prevent toxin and antitoxin production or partially 19 
suppressing modifiers that only prevent toxin production whilst permitting antitoxin 20 
production – which are both mechanistically reasonable. Consequently, I would suggest that 21 
meso-meiotic killing gene drive comes the closest to presenting a realistic gene that could be 22 
unbeatable, even though it falls short of the mark.  23 







My thesis makes the case that conditional cooperation is likely to be a more important 2 
part of the evolutionary explanation of cooperation in nature than current evidence might 3 
suggest, using a mixture of theoretical and experimental arguments. In the Introduction, I 4 
exposed how there has been a great deal of confusion surrounding this claim, which has been 5 
confounded with issues relating to the conflation of altruism and cooperation, the over-6 
emphasis of the problem of cheating, and both theoretical and experimental attention focusing 7 
on facultative forms of conditionality. Setting these issues aside, there are two primary sources 8 
of scepticism about the role that conditional cooperation plays in the broader evolutionary 9 
explanation of cooperative behaviour: first there is little evidence for conditional cooperation, 10 
and second it is unclear through what mechanism conditional cooperation could operate. 11 
Whilst my thesis presents some evidence to rebut the first claim, it is beyond the scope of this 12 
thesis to comprehensively demonstrate any general rebuttal given the general absence of 13 
evidence. Nonetheless, starting from the observation that different strains of Dictyostelium 14 
discoideum appear to exhibit condition cooperation when mixed at different frequencies 15 
(Buttery et al., 2009), Paper 1 generated game theoretic predictions for how chimeric mixes 16 
of two strains are expected to vary their level of cooperation across frequencies, and then 17 
tested these predictions using naturally co-occurring strains to show a strikingly close fit of 18 
theory and data. Paper 1 also sought to explain the predicted patterns of conditional 19 
cooperation with appeal to the familiar logic of the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift 20 
games, which were explored in more detail in Comment 1. Across frequencies, strains with 21 
near-equal frequencies experienced a social dilemma that was more similar to the prisoner’s 22 
dilemma, whilst strains with more unequal frequencies experienced a social dilemma that was 23 
more similar to the snowdrift. In Comment 1, I went into more detail to calculate the boundary 24 
condition (in the ‘snowdrift rule’), which clarified how a strain’s level of cooperation is self-25 
interested – to ensure that the strain reaps the majority (>50%) of the benefit from its 26 
investment.  27 
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 Although the fit between predictions and data was striking (as a rebuttal to the first 1 
source of scepticism), Paper 1 provided no details of the mechanism through which strains 2 
were adjusting their level of cooperation in different social situations (i.e. without providing 3 
any answers to the second source of scepticism). Paper 2 examined the predictions in chimeric 4 
mixes with more than two strains, confirming the general patterns of conditional cooperation 5 
for chimeras of two strains (from Paper 1) for chimeras of three strains. However the 6 
predictions, which are made assuming that strains have perfect information about the 7 
investment of other strains, do not accurately predict how strains should be uncooperative for 8 
groups with a large number of players (even after adjustment for imperfection information 9 
about each strains’ relatedness to the group). As Comment 2 examines further, strains do not 10 
appear to be able to detect the number of competing strains they are in a chimera with, which 11 
is suggestive of the mechanism through which they detect their relatedness to the group. This 12 
inability to detect the number of competing strains suggests that a self-binding signal-receptor 13 
may be providing the information (like TgrB1/C1), creating a nonadaptive constraint that 14 
limits how uncooperative strains will be. This opens up the question of how any ‘self’ 15 
signalling system could maintain the polymorphism needed for successful genetic recognition 16 
(known as Crozier’s paradox). Paper 3 explores a potential explanation for Crozier’s paradox 17 
by examining the underlying game theoretic model in greater detail to explain the logic of 18 
conditional cooperation. Surprisingly, for any number of players (like strains), the model 19 
shows that higher relatedness players have lower fitness because of conditional cooperation: 20 
higher relatedness players contribute more toward cooperation giving a disproportionate 21 
advantage to lower relatedness players – akin to negative frequency-dependent fitness, which 22 
provides a resolution to Crozier’s paradox. The model is abstract, and so Comment 3 examines 23 
how robust this result is to real-world mechanisms. The property of negative frequency 24 
dependence is shown to be a fundamental prediction of the form of conditional cooperation 25 
we consider.  In this way, Papers 2 and 3 provide some clarity as to the plausible mechanisms 26 
that can sustain conditional cooperation under a broad range of conditions.  27 
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 To examine one potentially plausible mechanism of conditional cooperation, Paper 4 1 
examines the recent surge of experimental evidence for greenbeard genes across study 2 
systems. Greenbeard genes, which rely on conditional social behaviour, have been dismissed 3 
as unimportant to the evolutionary explanation of social behaviour. However, numerous 4 
examples have received considerable empirical support in the last few years, though whether 5 
or not they are really greenbeards remains contentious (as they may be kin recognition genes). 6 
Either way (whether greenbeard or kin recognition), these study systems provide a molecular 7 
mechanism for conditional cooperation, showing the evolutionary potential to underlie 8 
conditional cooperation through their (often extreme) polymorphism. Of these examples, it is 9 
unclear whether or not adjustment of the level of cooperation could help to explain their 10 
polymorphism, but Paper 1 presented evidence that the segregation behaviour in D. 11 
discoideum that is controlled by tgrb1/tgrc1 greenbeard (Gruenheit et al., 2017) varies both 12 
adaptively and quantitatively across different frequencies in chimera. As Paper 4 pointed out, 13 
tgrb1/tgrc1 is probably the most plausible of the greenbeard (not kin-selected) genes because 14 
there has been the critical demonstration that segregation correlates to relatedness at the 15 
tgrb1/tgrc1 locus rather than genome-wide relatedness (Gruenheit et al., 2017). This claim is 16 
bolstered because tgrb1/tgrc1 locus is one of very few genes (among other members of the tgr 17 
gene family) with high enough polymorphism to explain the partner specificity of segregation 18 
behaviour that has been observed among the test-set of naturally co-occurring strains 19 
(Gruenheit et al., 2017; de Oliveira et al., 2019). For a similar reason, it seems likely that tgr-20 
like genes are also responsible for the partner specificity of relatedness-dependent investment 21 
behaviour – though the details about how this could work remain obscure. Therefore, although 22 
the observed behaviour from Paper 1 and 2 is suggestive of a polymorphic signal-receptor, 23 
and Paper 3 suggests that such polymorphism could be maintained by conditional cooperation 24 
in this system, and Paper 4 hints that a greenbeard gene may be responsible, the quest for the 25 
gene that causes conditional cooperation through stalk investment behaviour in D. discoideum 26 
remains to be discovered.  27 
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Moving on from D. discoideum, Comment 4 clarifies the logic of different 1 
presentation of the greenbeard thought experiment using some simple models, showing how 2 
different conceptions of greenbeard genes make different predictions about their properties. 3 
Greenbeard genes have variously been described to draw attention to their role in changing 4 
the relatedness between social partners, causing a social behaviour and being selfish genetic 5 
elements that can harm individual fitness. All of these conceptions of greenbeards are 6 
possibilities that highlight different aspects of the fundamental greenbeard concept (see Paper 7 
4). Even with this diversity of views, there are many outstanding questions about greenbeard 8 
genes that provide exciting areas for future research. One of the most intriguing aspects of 9 
newly-discovered greenbeard genes is their role in sophisticated ‘fusion’ behaviours that 10 
involve the concerted action of many other genes. For these social behaviours, the greenbeard 11 
takes on the role of the signal gene that determines the recipient of the behaviour and has little 12 
causal role in the production of the behaviour itself. Given that the behaviour is a polygenic 13 
trait, it would seem eminently plausible for the genes involved in the production of the social 14 
behaviour to act as modifiers to suppress the greenbeard, but observationally this is not the 15 
case. How greenbeard genes might escape modification is fascinating, and likely to be related 16 
to the particular biological constraints at play. To consider this idea in greater detail in a more 17 
applied concept, Paper 5 took inspiration from greenbeard genes to consider how gene drives 18 
could be designed to reduce the risk of modifiers suppressing them (and preventing their 19 
population suppressing effects). Using the logic of conditional cooperation to consider gamete 20 
killers, Paper 5 suggests how the risk of resistance can be reduced if the killing takes place 21 
among sister cells during meiosis (i.e. meso-meiotically) because of the particular structure of 22 
the cellular interaction. Starting from the greenbeard concept, Comment 5 develops the 23 
concept of an unbeatable gene as a design objective for gene drives, suggesting that meso-24 
meiotically killing is amongst the closest to this ideal.  25 
Therefore, starting from a puzzling observation, this thesis presents the case that 26 
conditional cooperation is indeed an important part of the evolutionary explanation of 27 
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cooperation. I have presented evidence for conditional cooperation through cellular 1 
differentiation in Dictyostelium discoideum, and suggested a plausible mechanism for 2 
conditional cooperation through the tgr genes. Further, I have shown that conditional 3 
modulation of the level of cooperation can be sufficient to maintain the polymorphism needed 4 
for conditional cooperation to persist (contra Crozier’s paradox). Lastly, I have examined 5 
conditional cooperation in a broader context to consider other plausible systems with the 6 
hallmarks of conditional cooperation and how understanding these systems could provide 7 
useful applications through the improvement of gene drives. In this way, I would claim that 8 
conditional cooperation is likely to be an important part of the evolutionary explanation of 9 
cooperation and should not be dismissed on the grounds of limited evidence or a lack of 10 
plausible mechanisms – because I have shown that evidence can be found when it is carefully 11 
looked for and that there are numerous study systems with the hallmarks of conditional 12 
cooperation. Furthermore, by considering a useful application of the evolutionary logic of 13 
conditional cooperation, I have shown that conditional cooperation is all the more important 14 
for its practical utility.  15 
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Figure S1. Patterns of individual investment, relative payoffs and collective investment for 1 
different optimal levels of collective investment (G) and strengths of selection (). Each of 2 
the first two rows (parts A to F) show the same relationships as in Figure 2, but for two 3 
different optimal levels of collective investment (G = 0.2 for A to C and G = 0.4 for D to 4 
F), with lines in each figure showing the pattern expected for varying strengths of selection 5 
() (which essentially cover the entire possible range of parameter space from very weak to 6 
very strong selection on investment; the legend imbedded in the first figure of each row gives 7 
the line color of each strength of selection, with all nine panels using the same color coding). 8 
The last two rows (parts G to L) show these same relationships for two different strengths of 9 
selection (= ¼ for G to I and  = 12 for J to L), with the lines in each figure showing the 10 
pattern for different optimal levels of collective investment. The labels in parentheses relate 11 
the figures to the patterns expected for the D. discoideum system. The first figure in each row 12 
(A, D, G and J) shows the pattern of individual investment into the public good (stalk 13 
investment) as a function of the player’s relatedness to (frequency in) the group. The second 14 
figure in each row (B, E, H, and K) shows the pattern of relative payoff (fitness) as a function 15 
of the player’s relatedness to (frequency in) the group. The last figure in each row (C, F, I, 16 
and L) shows the pattern of collective investment as a function of a focal player’s relatedness 17 






Figure S2. Patterns of absolute fitness as a function of relatedness (frequency in a group). A) 2 
Patterns of fitness (which represents the total payoff) as a function of relatedness (frequency 3 
in a group) when individuals show the ESS pattern of investment in the public good. All 4 
patterns were calculated for the same optimal level of investment (G = 0.3), with the different 5 
lines corresponding to different strengths of selection (). B) Patterns of absolute fitness as a 6 
function relatedness (frequency) with varying degrees of error in measurement of relatedness 7 
(frequency). All patterns were calculated for the same optimal level of investment (G = 0.3) 8 
and the same strength of selection ( = ), with different values of error (). C) The pattern 9 
of absolute fitness calculated following the same method used to process the experimental 10 
data. Parameter values match those used in Figure 4. D) Experimental estimates of absolute 11 
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fitness based on the patterns of stalk investment (Figure 4D) and the probability of fruiting 1 
body collapse (Figure 6A). The black points represent the estimates at the measured 2 
frequencies. The line represents the best fit line based on a cubic regression using these 3 
estimates, with the shaded region indicating one standard error on either side of the best fit 4 
line. 5 




Figure S3. The distributions of errors in players’ measurement of relatedness (frequency) that 2 
were used to generate patterns under imperfect information. Illustrated are five different 3 
probability density functions that differ in the level of error in the measurement of relatedness 4 
(frequency) (). The distributions are Gaussian with a mean of zero and a standard deviation 5 
given by . The deviations represent the difference between the relatedness (frequency) that 6 
player estimates for their group and their true relatedness. Because relatedness (frequency) is 7 
constrained to the range of zero to one, the distribution is necessarily truncated when used in 8 
calculations. For example, if a player’s true relatedness is 0.25, the deviations will be truncated 9 
at −0.25 and 0.75 (where the mean of zero indicates that they have correctly measured their 10 




Figure S4. Predicted patterns of individual investment, relative payoffs and collective 2 
investment for different strengths of selection () and levels of error in measurement of 3 
relatedness (frequency) (). The general structure of the figures follows that of Figure S1, 4 
except the rows show the same relationships for two different strengths of selection ( = ½ 5 
for A to C, and  = 12 for D to F), which, combined with the values illustrated in Figure 3 6 
essentially cover the entire range of parameter space. The lines in each figure show the pattern 7 
expected for varying amounts of error in the measurement of relatedness (frequency) () (see 8 
the legend imbedded in the first figure). All examples were calculated for the same optimal 9 
level of collective investment (G = 0.3) since the exact optimum has a minor effect on the 10 
patterns (see Figure 2 and S1). The labels in parentheses relate the figures to the patterns 11 
expected for the D. discoideum system. 12 




Figure S5. Patterns of stalk investment, relative fitness, and collective investment as a 2 
function of the frequency of a strain in a chimeric aggregation for two high resolution pairs of 3 
natural strains combined in chimeras. A) Stalk investment (𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) by NC105.1 (in red) and 4 
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NC34.2 (in blue) in chimeric mixtures of the two, plotted as a function of the frequency of 1 
NC105.1 (designated as the focal strain) in the mix, B) Stalk investment (𝐼𝑖∣𝑝𝑖) by NC63.2 (in 2 
red) and NC28.1 (in blue) in chimeric mixtures of the two, plotted as a function of the 3 
frequency of NC63.2 (designated as the focal strain) in the mix. C) Relative fitness (𝜌𝑖) of 4 
NC105.1 (in red) and NC34.2 (in blue) in chimeric mixtures of the two, plotted as a function 5 
of the frequency of NC105.1 in the mix. D) Relative fitness (𝜌𝑖) of NC63.2 (in red) and 6 
NC28.1 (in blue) in chimeric mixtures of the two, plotted as a function of the frequency of 7 
NC63.2 in the mix. E) Collective stalk investment (𝐼𝐺) by chimeras composed of NC105.1 8 
and NC34.2 as a function of the frequency of NC105.1 in the mix, F) Collective stalk 9 
investment (𝐼𝐺) by chimeras composed of NC 63.2 and NC28.1 as a function of the frequency 10 
of NC63.2 in the mix. Each panel shows the estimated means (with their standard errors) at 11 
each frequency measured (with values estimated by the mixed model describe in the Methods, 12 
but using frequency as a categorical factor). In all cases, the y-axis values are scaled as 13 
proportions of the maximum value observed. In parts A to D the bold curve represents the 14 
best-fit estimated from the cubic regression model (here fitted to the estimated means) and the 15 
like-colored shaded regions give approximate 95%-confidence intervals around those curves. 16 
For parts E and F the curve represents the best-fit estimate from a quadratic regression model 17 
(fitted to the estimated means) and the shaded region gives the 95% confidence interval around 18 
that relationship. 19 




Figure S6. Spontaneous fruiting body collapse as a function of focal strain frequency for six 2 
strain pairs. Points represent the mean observations (with standard error bars) and the curve 3 
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illustrates the best-fit polynomial relationship (with 95%-confidence intervals as grey-1 
shading). The six pairs appear as: A) NC28.1+NC105.1, B) NC60.1+NC99.1, C) 2 
NC34.2+NC105.1, D) NC99.1+NC105.1, E) NC60.1+NC34.2 and F) NC60.1+NC63.2. 3 




Figure S7. Representative images of fruiting bodies for six strain pairs across a range of focal 2 
strain frequencies. A) NC34.2+NC105.1, B) NC60.1+NC34.2, C) NC60.1+NC63.2, D) 3 
NC99.1+NC105.1, E) NC60.1+NC99.1 and F) NC28.1+NC105.1. 4 




Figure S8. The pattern of relative fitness as a function of frequency in a group. The parts in 2 
blue correspond to the estimated pattern for chimeric mixes. They therefore match the pattern 3 
of relative fitness shown in Figure 4E and are included here for comparison. The parts in red 4 
correspond to the pattern for clonal self-mixes, which were estimated following the same 5 
method used to calculate the chimeric pattern, with the labelled cells considered as the ‘focal’ 6 
strain. The points indicate the means and the bars their standard errors, both estimated from a 7 
mixed model. The lines represent the best fit relationship (which is cubic for the chimeric data 8 
and linear for the clonal data), with the shaded region indicating one standard error on either 9 
side. The slope of the best fit line for the clonal data is not significant (F1, 195 = 1.65, p = 0.2, 10 
but is included as an illustration of the relationship. 11 
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Paper 2 1 
In this supplement to the main text, we analyse the nature of error that strains have in 2 
estimating their relatedness to the group. In particular, we examine 1) consistent 3 
overestimation of relatedness by stains, and 2) bet-hedging strategies in response to error in 4 
estimating relatedness. The ESS for the error function used in the main-text is shown in Figure 5 
S1A for comparison to the different forms of error analysed here. 6 
 7 
Overestimation of relatedness 8 
In the main text we present an analysis of the game where players have imperfect 9 
information about their relatedness to the group. Here we analyse the game where players 10 
have a one-sided bias in their information, always over-estimating relatedness. This is 11 
achieved by modelling a population of players, each of which make a systematic 12 
overrepresentation of magnitude 𝑆𝑖 of their relatedness to the group 𝑟𝑖. Relatedness is therefore 13 
defined as 𝑟𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖 , and truncated such that 𝑟𝑖 is ≤ 1. This has the effect of making deviations 14 
from the true value for relatedness greatest when at intermediate relatedness (as any deviation 15 
is less likely to be truncated). In any one instance, each player plays the perfect information 16 
ESS for the relatedness it estimates. 17 
We created a population of players, each with a value of 𝑆𝑖 drawn from a biased 18 
distribution such that smaller biases were more likely than larger biases. For any value of 𝑟𝑖 19 
each strain has an ESS level of investment 𝑥𝑖. The average across a large population of strain 20 
was used as the population-wide ESS for systematic overestimation of relatedness. 21 
The ESS for the average player with overestimation in relatedness is shown in Figure 22 
S1B. The obvious finding is that overestimation of relatedness leads to an increase in 23 
investment for any value of 𝑟𝑖, and investment is greater than 0 even when a player is very 24 
rare. Investment is also much more linear than the perfect information game, with no evidence 25 
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for the threshold switch between 0 investment and intermediate investment characteristic of 1 
the perfect information models.  2 
Overestimation of relatedness is a plausible mechanism for the tragedy of the 3 
commons to be avoided, but seems unlikely to be relevant in D. discoideum based on several 4 
lines of evidence. Firstly, the signature of overestimation is that strains invest at the optimal 5 
level even when their true relatedness to the group is less than one, a fact that is inconsistent 6 
with empirical data (Madgwick et al., 2018). A second defining feature of overestimation is 7 
that strains never reach a plateau of zero investment at low relatedness to the group, which is 8 
also inconsistent with the data. Further, whilst all errors in relatedness estimation for 9 
individuals are non-adaptive, consistent overestimations seems likely to be the easiest to ‘fix’ 10 
evolutionarily, as it could require a simple retuning of a gene that governs the response to 11 
information, rather than having to respond to substantial stochastic noise. For these reasons, 12 
we can reject a consistent overestimation of relatedness as being a relevant factor in the 13 
patterns of investment we observe in D. discoideum, and suggest that it’s wider importance is 14 
likely to be reduced compared to other forms of error. 15 






Figure S1. Predictions for optimal investment with different kinds of imperfect information 1 
over a strains relatedness to the group. A) Noise: strains make stochastic, normally distributed 2 
errors in their estimation of relatedness to the group. B) Overestimation: strains consistently 3 
overestimate their relatedness to the group at all relatedness values. C) Bet-hedging: strains 4 
play the strategy that maximises their expected return given normally distributed probabilities 5 
of differences between their measured relatedness to the group and their true relatedness to 6 
the group. For all panels coloured lines represent variation in the magnitude of the errors, with 7 
blue representing small errors and red large errors. 8 
  9 
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Bet hedging 1 
In biology bet-hedging is characterised through variation in the fitness of traits in 2 
different environments. If the environment is not known or predictable, then there is a trade-3 
off between the fitness of different strategies in the different environments. The optimal 4 
strategy in this scenario can be bet-hedging – choosing a strategy that maximises fitness given 5 
the range of possible environments and their relative likelihood (Cohen, 1966). Bet-hedging 6 
can have important consequences on the evolution of cooperation (Kennedy et al., 2018), and 7 
can be one of two main types of 1) maximise expected fitness across all environments, or 2) 8 
minimise variance in fitness (Philippi & Seger, 1989; Olofsson et al., 2009). 9 
In the main text, we present an analysis of imperfect information through players 10 
measuring their relatedness as a deviation from ‘true’ relatedness. For every value of ‘true’ 11 
relatedness, players used the average fixed ESS for ‘measured’ relatedness across a probability 12 
distribution of measured relatedness. As such, this is simply error in measurement, rather than 13 
a bet-hedging strategy. 14 
We implement a bet-hedging strategy here by taking each value of measured 15 
relatedness 𝑟𝑖 and creating a Gaussian probability distribution with a mean ?̅? equal to the 16 
player’s measured relatedness to the group, and a standard deviation 𝑠 that represents the error 17 
in estimating relatedness. Each value on this distribution therefore represents a possible ‘true’ 18 
relatedness that a player could have, with the probability distribution representing the relative 19 
likelihood of having each value of ‘true’ relatedness. We can then ask what strategy maximises 20 
expected fitness for any value of measured relatedness, given the possibility of true relatedness 21 
being at each different value. This is achieved for any value of measured relatedness 𝑟𝑖 by 22 
finding the strategy 𝑥𝑖 that has highest fitness on average given the probability distribution of 23 
possible ‘true’ relatedness. As such, we use a bet-hedging strategy that maximises expected 24 
fitness. A ‘conservative’ bet-hedging strategy that minimises the variance in fitness rather than 25 
expected fitness is not appropriate here, because the strategy that minimises the variance in 26 
fitness often has consistent extremely low fitness. The ESS solution is found using the ‘brute-27 
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force’ iterative approach of calculating average fitness of each possible strategy, with Nelder-1 
Mead optimisation to decrease computational time. As with imperfect information within the 2 
main text, we assume that players are best at estimating their relatedness when at the extremes 3 
of relatedness within the group. 4 
The ESS for varying level of error in estimating relatedness is shown in Figure S1C. 5 
Lower errors are shown in blue, with the highest errors shown in red. The size of the error 6 
changes the range and relative likelihood of ‘true’ relatedness that a player could have for any 7 
measured relatedness. The general pattern is somewhat similar to stochastic errors in 8 
relatedness shown in the main text; players tend to overinvest compared to the perfect 9 
information model when rare and underinvest when common. Further, this effect is stronger 10 
when error is larger. The effect isn’t however nearly as pronounced as stochastic error (Figure 11 
S1A). In this way, a bet hedging strategy gives only marginally different predictions to perfect 12 
information, which fit significantly worse to the data than the error model presented in the 13 
main text. 14 
The players in the Collective Investment game are genetically distinct genotypes that 15 
invest a portion of their cells into the stalk (the public good). In practise, each individual cell 16 
becomes either a spore or a stalk cell. With information received from cell-cell contact, it is 17 
easy to see that any noise in the system will change the probability of each cell becoming 18 
either a spore or a stalk cell. In this way, the strategy is a function of the random noise in 19 
information experienced by each cell – which is the basic logic we used to model imperfect 20 
information in the main text. For bet-hedging to occur, the error that each cell experiences 21 
through variation in the probability of interacting with self would have to be centrally 22 
processed to produce an ‘optimal’ probability for a cell to become a stalk vs spore, something 23 




Frequency-dependant error in relatedness estimation 1 
In the main text, we model imperfect information through a Gaussian error function 2 
based on the simple logic of the variance in probability of a cell meeting self across a range 3 
of frequencies leading to the greatest error in estimating relatedness when 𝒓𝒊=0.5, with the 4 
magnitude of the error decreasing as 𝒓𝒊 approaches either 0 or 1. However, given that there 5 
was no shape of the possible error function between these three points that should be 6 
prioritised a priori, we modelled a range of options, based on normal distributions that had 7 
been normalised to peak at 1. The range of shapes we modelled are shown in Figure S2.  8 




Figure S2. Distribution of frequency dependant noise. Strains are assumed to make frequency 2 
(whole-group relatedness) dependant errors in estimating their relatedness. Errors in 3 
identifying self vs non-self will always be greatest when one strain is at intermediate 4 
frequency. If interactions between types (self vs non-self) are random, error will scale with 5 
p(1-p) (black line). If interactions between types are non-random, the shape of the magnitude 6 
of error with frequency will change, modelled here by a normal deviation with increasing 7 
standard deviation as the lines move from blue to red.  8 
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Paper 3 1 
Section 1: Solving the evolutionarily stable strategy  2 
In the main-text the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for an individual player was 3 
derived using a method that utilises the coevolutionarily stable strategy (coESS) for the group, 4 
which we analyse in further detail here. The coESS is an unfamiliar term (but see e.g. Eshel 5 
1985) that we use to provide our novel analysis of a generalised public goods scenario. We 6 
need to use the coESS because of the difficulty of analysing an 𝑁 player public goods game, 7 
where 𝑁 could refer to any number of players, who could also have any distribution of 8 
frequencies. Each possible group has its own coevolutionary solution, which can be derived 9 
via a numerical analysis to solve the ESS (see end of section). However, we can solve the ESS 10 
using the coESS to derive an information open-solution because the coESS depends upon 11 
group-level variables that have known properties. (NB: It is possible to provide a closed-12 
solution without need of the coESS when there are two players only, but this represents a 13 
special case that has been analysed elsewhere (Madgwick et al., 2018).)    14 
We provide a detailed solution to the ESS, using a specific notation with respect to a 15 
focal player (𝑖) and a combined set of non-focal players(s) (−𝑖). Within this notation, this 16 
means that the collective investment by the group would be written as the sum of both the 17 
focal player’s investment and any investment arising from others: 𝑥𝐺 = 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑝−𝑖𝑥−𝑖. This 18 
notation is useful because it allows us to resolve the coESS analytically, and hence the ESS in 19 
turn. The ESS is solved by starting from the optimal strategy that maximizes fitness – i.e., a 20 
player’s ‘best-response’ (?⃗?𝑖), which is dependent upon the level of investment made by other 21 
players. Players are assumed to have access to perfect information about their frequency in 22 
the group (𝑝𝑖) and the investment from all other players (𝑝−𝑖𝑥−𝑖) and so, given that strategies 23 
are restricted to within the range 0 ≤ ?⃗?𝑖 ≤ 1, the best-response is solved by setting the 24 
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The best-response is the same as the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; 𝑥𝑖) when all other 3 
players are also playing their best-response (i.e. other players are also playing the ESS: 𝑥−𝑖). 4 
To solve the ESS, the expression in equation (S1.1) must be resolved simultaneously for all 5 
players, which collectively behave as per the coevolutionarily stable strategy (coESS; 𝑥𝐺) for 6 
the group. Because the ESS describes the full conditional strategy as frequency (𝑝𝑖) varies, 7 
the ESS must be solved simultaneously across frequencies as well as across different players. 8 
When the number of players is not specified, we do not believe that it is possible to solve the 9 
investment by a given player across all frequency combinations, which is supported by the 10 
logic that each player/frequency set has its own coevolved solution. Instead we have to use a 11 
novel method to discern the critical variables underlying how a player’s strategy changes in 12 
response to their own frequency and the number/frequencies of other players.  13 
At the equilibrium where all players display the conditional ESS, not all players 14 
necessarily contribute toward the coESS because some players have too low a frequency to 15 
benefit from investment into public goods. Players in any given social context can be divided 16 
into two groups at the coESS: a set of 𝑛 ‘investors’ that contribute toward collective 17 
investment and a set of 𝑁 − 𝑛 non-investors that do not contribute (where 𝑁 is the number of 18 
players in the game). Formally, given that the best-response (eqn. S1.1) can be negative (even 19 
if an individual cannot actually display negative investment because this would be 20 
nonsensical), the set of 𝑛 investors includes all players that have a non-negative investment in 21 
the ESS (𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0), which includes the non-investing strategy where 𝑥𝑖 = 0. Therefore, players 22 
can be divided into two classes based on Equation S1.1: ‘investors’ that have investment 23 
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values 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 and non-investors that have an optimal investment below zero 𝑥𝑖 < 0, but which 1 
is constrained to be zero. However, for simplicity and given that the frequency where 𝑥𝑖 = 0 2 
exactly is infinitesimally small, we can more generally describe players as one of 𝑛 investors 3 
(𝑥𝑖 > 0) or 𝑁 − 𝑛 non-investors (whose real strategy is constrained to 𝑥𝑖 = 0) without 4 
worrying about this distinction (as we do in the main text) – and we use the terms investors 5 
and non-investors going forward. 6 
By summing up the frequency of all investors, the collective frequencies of investors 7 
is 𝑝𝑛 = ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  whilst the collective frequencies of non-investors is 1 − 𝑝𝑛. Thus, the coESS 8 
can be calculated as the sum of the contributions by ESS investors:  9 
 10 


































Given that 𝑥𝐺 = 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑝−𝑖𝑥−𝑖 by definition, the act of summing 𝑝−𝑖𝑥−𝑖 with respect to the 12 
𝑖th focal player 𝑛 times is the same as ∑ 𝑥𝐺 − 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝑛𝑥𝐺 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝑛𝑥𝐺 − 𝑥𝐺, so this 13 











− 𝑥𝐺(𝑛 − 1)] (S1.3) 
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Equation (S1.3) corresponds to equation (2) in the main-text. As the coESS reflects ESS 2 
behaviour for a group of investing players, we can substitute the coESS into the best-response 3 











































Equation (S1.4) corresponds to equation (2) in the main-text. Given that players’ investments 7 
are constrained to be non-negative (𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0), these solutions can only calculate the quantity of 8 
investment at the ESS if players can be classified as being one of the 𝑛 investors or 𝑁 − 𝑛 9 
non-investors. A player’s strategy can be categorised based on their frequency by solving the 10 
boundary condition where individuals would switch from being a non-investor to an investor, 11 
which corresponds to the value where 𝑥𝑖 = 0 (using eqn. S1.3). Given that a player is an 12 








Equation (S1.5) corresponds to an equation found in Table 2 of the main-text. Because this 16 
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limit is necessarily self-referential to the collective frequency and number of investors (𝑝𝑛, 𝑛), 1 
the ESS (eqn. S1.4) represents a closed-solution only insofar as players are correctly classified 2 
as investors or non-investors. Because the ESS has this self-referential property, solving for 3 
the exact quantity of investment at the ESS when there is more than one investing player 4 
requires a numerical solution given a particular distribution of frequency across a definite 5 
number of players.  6 
The additional insight into the ESS gained from comparison of Equation (S1.1) to the 7 
form of Equation (S1.4) permits a simple algorithm to be used to categorise players, which 8 
facilitates the search for a numerical solution to the ESS because it is computationally 9 
efficient. This simple algorithm relies upon a single assumption, which is known to be true: a 10 
player with a higher frequency invests more or equally to that of a player with lower frequency. 11 
The algorithm can solve the quantity of ESS investment of each player by ranking players in 12 
terms of their frequency (high to low) and ‘testing’ each player to examine whether or not they 13 
have a non-negative investment strategy in the new social context (i.e. when that player is 14 
included in the calculation of the collective frequency and number of investors; 𝑝𝑛, 𝑛). If the 15 
player has a non-negative investment strategy then they are an investor and the next highest 16 
frequency player can then be tested. The algorithm can stop searching for new players to add 17 
into the investor class once the next highest frequency player fails to have a positive 18 
investment. At this point, the candidate player is not added into the investor class and the ESS 19 
is fully resolved with the previous calculations of the collective frequencies and number of 20 
investors prior to the current test. To demonstrate that this algorithm is indeed effective, an 21 
alternative method using an unbiased iterator to solve the ESS can be utilised.   22 
  23 
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Section 2: Deriving a marginal Hamilton’s rule 1 
Although we point to numerous similarities between inequalities utilising the ESS and 2 
Hamilton’s rule, their formal relationship is more complicated. Under quantitative strategies, 3 
we can use Hamilton’s rule to solve the ESS, but the rule must be framed in a marginal form 4 
(Taylor & Frank, 1996; Frank, 2013) which, given relatedness (𝑟), describes the ESS as the 5 
equalisation of the specially-constructed marginal costs (𝐶𝑚) and marginal benefits (𝐵𝑚) of 6 
cooperation: 𝑟𝐵𝑚 − 𝐶𝑚 = 0. We say ‘specially-constructed’ to emphasise that these marginal 7 
costs and benefits (𝐶𝑚, 𝐵𝑚) are not the same as the cost and benefit terms (𝑐, 𝑏) in our model, 8 
and so we have to calculate them in the terms of our existing model. The two differ because 9 
the cost and benefit terms in our model are not defined with respect to fitness, but rather, are 10 
parameters that interact (multiplicatively) to determine fitness, whereas the cost and benefit 11 
terms that are relevant to Hamilton’s rule are defined in terms of additive components of 12 
fitness.  13 
In-keeping with our model, we can rearrange the ESS (eqn. 5), which has been solved 14 
by taking the derivative of fitness with respect to strategy derivative (𝑑𝜔𝑖/𝑑𝑥𝑖) given an 15 
equilibrium quantity of collective investment by the group (𝑥𝐺), into the marginal form: 16 
 17 
𝑝𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐(𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝐺) = 0 (S2.1) 
 18 
On the right-hand-side, the first two parts, 𝑝𝑖𝑏 − 𝑐, are equivalent to the classic form of 19 
Hamilton’s rule (Charnov, 1977), where a non-zero investment strategy is positively selected 20 
if the product of the public benefit from investment (𝑏) and frequency/relatedness (𝑝𝑖) 21 
outweighs the private cost (𝑐). Yet it should be remembered that 𝑝𝑖 is not a kinship coefficient 22 
of relatedness, but instead is ‘whole-group relatedness’ (Hamilton, 1975; Pepper, 2000), 23 
ranging between zero and one. The third part of this marginal Hamilton’s rule, −𝑏𝑐(𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖 +24 
𝑥𝐺), is equivalent to other derivations of Hamilton’s rules that consider the synergistic impact 25 
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of the social context on an individual (Queller, 1994; Frank, 1998), which, in our model, 1 
reflects how a focal player’s motivation to invest into public goods declines both in response 2 
to increasing their own level of investment (𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖) and the investment afforded all players 3 
within the group including themselves (𝑥𝐺). From a single player’s perspective, this means 4 
that increasing their own investment into public goods by some marginal unit of resources has 5 
a two-fold effect on disincentivising any further investment by that player, which stems from 6 
that player shifting the unit of resource both toward the production of public goods (and hence 7 
incentivising them to exploit public goods more) and away from the utilization of public goods 8 
(and hence decreasing their receipt of the benefits from public goods and thereby incentivising 9 
them to exploit public goods more again).  10 
In the marginal Hamilton’s rule, the social context of investment provided by others 11 
is a property of both the marginal costs (𝐶𝑚) and marginal benefits (𝐵𝑚) of cooperation. Thus, 12 
ignoring the connection between personal (𝑥𝑖) and collective (𝑥𝐺) investment (see Supplement 13 
1), the marginal form of Hamilton’s rule can be written by grouping the relatedness-weighted 14 
(i.e. multiplied by 𝑝𝑖) benefits and the relatedness-independent costs: 15 
 16 
𝑝𝑖𝑏(1 − 𝑥𝑖) = 𝑐(1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺) (S2.2) 
 17 
which implies that 𝐵𝑚 = 𝑏(1 − 𝑥𝑖) and 𝐶𝑚 = 𝑐(1 + 𝑏𝑥𝐺). By including additional factors 18 
beyond the direct costs and benefits of strategic behaviour, the marginal Hamilton’s rule can 19 
be used to derive a solution to the ESS (Grafen, 1985; Queller, 1992; Taylor & Frank, 1996; 20 
Frank, 2013). However, because of the connection between personal (𝑥𝑖) and collective (𝑥𝐺) 21 
investment, this method arrives at the same circularity as in Supplement 1, requiring the 22 
adoption of novel method to derive a more informative ESS and needing numerical simulation. 23 
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Paper 5 1 
 2 
Figure S1. The frequency threshold above which a drive allele has higher fitness than a 3 
nondrive allele (see eqn. 2) across parameter space (of the selective disadvantage, −𝑠, and the 4 
transmission advantage, 𝑒) in the single locus scenario. The frequency threshold is colour-5 
scaled between <0 (purple) to 1 (yellow). The white line represents the parameter values where 6 
the drive and nondrive alleles have equal fitness: 𝑠 = 𝑒/(1 + 𝑒). When the inequality (eqn. 2) 7 
is negative (shaded purple), the drive allele always has higher fitness than the nondrive allele 8 
(𝜔𝐷 > 𝜔𝑑; hence the area below the white line is labelled ‘Always favoured’). The 9 
progression of the colour scale from purple to yellow indicates the frequency above which the 10 
drive allele has higher fitness than the nondrive allele (from low to high).  11 




Figure S2. The frequency threshold above which a modifier allele that partially suppresses a 2 
drive allele by blocking toxin production has higher fitness than a nonmodifier allele (see eqn. 3 
10) across parameter space (of the selective disadvantage, −𝑠, and the drive allele’s frequency, 4 
𝑓𝐷, when the transmission advantage is maximal, 𝑒 = 1). The frequency threshold is colour-5 
scaled between <0 (purple) to 1 (yellow) to indicate the frequency above which the modifier 6 
allele has higher fitness than the nonmodifier allele (from low to high). When the inequality 7 
(eqn. 10) is negative (purple), the modifier allele always has higher fitness than the 8 
nonmodifier allele (𝜔𝑀 > 𝜔𝑚), which occurs when 𝑠 > 𝑒/(1 + 𝑒) or, as 𝑒 = 1, 𝑠 > ½ (hence 9 
the area above the horizontal white line is labelled ‘Always favoured’). When the inequality 10 
(eqn. 10) is greater than 1, the modifier allele never has higher fitness than the nonmodifier 11 
allele (𝜔𝑀 < 𝜔𝑚), which occurs when 𝑠 > 𝑒(1 − 𝑓𝐷)/(1 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑓𝐷)) or, as 𝑒 = 1, 𝑠 >12 
(1 − 𝑓𝐷)/(2 − 𝑓𝐷) (hence the area above the black line is labelled ‘Never favoured’). In 13 
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between the two lines the progression of the colour scale from purple to yellow indicates the 1 
frequency above which the modifier allele has higher fitness than the nonmodifier allele (from 2 
low to high) 3 







Figure S3. The potential for different types of game-killing gene drive throughout the steps 2 
of the meiotic divisions across genotypic combinations (indicated in a tabular form with 3 
respect to the drive and modifier loci). During meiosis, a diploid parental cell undergoes a first 4 
reductional division into two haploid sister cells followed by a second (mitosis-like) 5 
equational division into four haploid daughter cells. Different cells are presented with solid 6 
outlines, and different interactions between cells are presented with dashed outlines (except 7 
for the possible interaction between the parent cell and the sister cells it produced). Alleles at 8 
the drive locus are presented in red (𝐷 = drive and 𝑑 = nondrive) and alleles at the modifier 9 
locus are presented in blue (𝑀 = modifier and 𝑚 = nonmodifier). A drive allele for a toxin-10 
antitoxin pair can distort its transmission to the next generation by producing a toxin (indicated 11 
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by out-facing arrows from the producer cell) that leads to the presence of the toxin within that 1 
given interaction (indicated by the light-grey shading in dashed outlined box). The presence 2 
of the toxin kills gametes that do not also produce the antixotin with cell death indicated by 3 
the dark-grey shading in solid outlined boxes). The modifier allele (𝑀) only has an effect on 4 
the drive (𝐷) allele if it is within the same cell, which is indicated by the turnstile symbol ⊢ 5 
that indicates that the drive allele has blocked some function of the drive allele (with different 6 
scenarios illustrated in A and B). As such, in the double heterozygote scenario presented here, 7 
there is no potential for pre-meiotic killing, where the diploid parent cell produces the toxin 8 
that kills haploid sister or daughter cells, because the modifier blocks toxin production. 9 
However, there is potential for meso-meiotic killing between sister cells (of which there are 10 
two potential genotypic combinations represented by different interactions in dashed boxes) 11 
and post-meiotic killing between daughter cells (ignoring the potential for daughter cells to 12 
kill sister cells in this simplified diagram). A) The case of a fully suppressing modifier that 13 
blocks toxin and antitoxin production by the drive allele, rendering it susceptible to the toxin 14 
produced by other cells. B) The scenario of a partially suppressing modifier blocks that toxin 15 
production only, and so remains resistant to the toxin produced by other cells.     16 
  17 
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Table S1. Fitness of two-locus genotypes under pre-meiotic killing, where the drive allele 1 
produces the toxin in the diploid cell (either in parental or somatic cells) making the modifier 2 
allele dominant to the nonmodifier allele (which is equivalent with modifiers for both full and 3 
partial suppression). The ‘Genotype’ column lists the nine possible unordered genotypes, 4 
whilst the ‘gametes’ column refers to the haploid gamete types that that genotype produces. 5 
The ‘Fitness’ column gives the relative production of the different gametes contributed to the 6 
next generation by that genotype. There are two loci (drive and modifier) which have two 7 
alleles: the drive locus has a drive allele 𝐷, which encodes a toxin and antitoxin, and nondrive 8 
allele 𝑑, while the modifier locus has a modifier allele 𝑀, which blocks the production of both 9 
the toxin and antitoxin, and a nonmodifier allele 𝑚. Within an interaction, when the toxin is 10 
produced it leads to a selective disadvantage (−𝑠) to all gametes and a transmission advantage 11 
(+𝑒) for those gametes that also produce the antitoxin, alongside a corresponding transmission 12 
disadvantage (−𝑒) for those gametes that do not produce the antitoxin. Shading is used to 13 
separate the sets of gametes produced by each diploid genotype.  14 
Genotype Gametes Fitness 
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝑀  1  
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑚  𝐷𝑀  1  
 𝐷𝑚 1  
𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚  𝐷𝑚  1 − 𝑠  
𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝑀  1  
 𝑑𝑀 1  
𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑚  𝐷𝑀 1  
 𝐷𝑚 1 
 𝑑𝑀 1 
 𝑑𝑚 1 
𝐷𝑑𝑚𝑚  𝐷𝑚  (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
 𝑑𝑚  (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀  𝑑𝑀  1  
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑚  𝑑𝑀  1  
 𝑑𝑚  1  
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚  𝑑𝑚  1  
258 
 
Table S2. Fitness of two-locus genotypes under post-meiotic killing, where the drive allele 1 
produces the toxin in the haploid daughter cells (i.e. the gametes) making the modifier allele 2 
(for either full or partial suppression) recessive to the nonmodifier allele. The ‘Genotype’ 3 
column lists the nine possible unordered genotypes, whilst the ‘gametes’ column refers to the 4 
haploid gamete types that that genotype produces. The ‘Fitness’ column gives the relative 5 
production of the different gametes contributed to the next generation by that genotype. There 6 
are two loci (drive and modifier) which have two alleles: the drive locus has a drive allele 𝐷, 7 
which encodes a toxin and antitoxin, and nondrive allele 𝑑, while the modifier locus has a 8 
modifier allele 𝑀 and a nonmodifier allele 𝑚. Within an interaction, when the toxin is 9 
produced it leads to a selective disadvantage (−𝑠) to all gametes and a transmission advantage 10 
(+𝑒) for those gametes that also produce the antitoxin, alongside a corresponding transmission 11 
disadvantage (−𝑒) for those gametes that do not produce the antitoxin. Shading is used to 12 
separate the sets of gametes produced by each diploid genotype. A) The modifier allele, 𝑀, 13 
causes full suppression of the drive locus by blocking the production of the toxin and the 14 
antitoxin. B) The modifier allele, 𝑀, causes partial suppression of the drive locus by blocking 15 
the production of the toxin but not the antitoxin.  16 
A) 17 
Genotype Gametes Fitness 
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝑀  1  
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑚  𝐷𝑀  (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
 𝐷𝑚 (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚  𝐷𝑚  1 − 𝑠  
𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝑀  1  
 𝑑𝑀 1  
𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑚  𝐷𝑀 (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
 𝐷𝑚 (1 + 3𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 
 𝑑𝑀 (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 
 𝑑𝑚 (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 
𝐷𝑑𝑚𝑚  𝐷𝑚  (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
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 𝑑𝑚  (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀  𝑑𝑀  1  
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑚  𝑑𝑀  1  
 𝑑𝑚  1  
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚  𝑑𝑚  1  
 1 
B) 2 
Genotype Gametes Fitness 
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝑀  1  
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑚  𝐷𝑀  1 − 𝑠  
 𝐷𝑚 1 − 𝑠  
𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚  𝐷𝑚  1 − 𝑠  
𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝑀  1  
 𝑑𝑀 1  
𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑚  𝐷𝑀 (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
 𝐷𝑚 (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 
 𝑑𝑀 (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 
 𝑑𝑚 (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 
𝐷𝑑𝑚𝑚  𝐷𝑚  (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
 𝑑𝑚  (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀  𝑑𝑀  1  
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑚  𝑑𝑀  1  
 𝑑𝑚  1  
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚  𝑑𝑚  1  
 3 
  4 
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Table S3. Fitness of two-locus genotypes under meso-meiotic killing, where the drive allele 1 
produces the toxin in the haploid sister cells (for either full or partial suppression). The 2 
‘Genotype’ column lists the nine possible unordered genotypes, whilst the ‘gametes’ column 3 
refers to the haploid gamete types that that genotype produces. The ‘Fitness’ column gives the 4 
relative production of the different gametes contributed to the next generation by that 5 
genotype. There are two loci (drive and modifier) which have two alleles: the drive locus has 6 
a drive allele 𝐷, which encodes a toxin and antitoxin, and nondrive allele 𝑑, while the modifier 7 
locus has a modifier allele 𝑀, which blocks the production of both the toxin and antitoxin, and 8 
a nonmodifier allele 𝑚. Within an interaction, when the toxin is produced it leads to a selective 9 
disadvantage (−𝑠) to all gametes and a transmission advantage (+𝑒) for those gametes that 10 
produce the antitoxin, alongside a corresponding transmission disadvantage (−𝑒) for those 11 
gametes that do not produce the antitoxin. Shading is used to separate the sets of gametes 12 
produced by each diploid genotype. A) The modifier allele, 𝑀, causes full suppression of the 13 
drive locus by blocking the production of the toxin and the antitoxin. B) The modifier allele, 14 
𝑀, causes partial suppression of the drive locus by blocking the production of the toxin but 15 
not the antitoxin. 16 
A) 17 
Genotype Gametes Fitness 
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝑀  1  
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑚  𝐷𝑀  (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
 𝐷𝑚 (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚  𝐷𝑚  1 − 𝑠  
𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝑀  1  
 𝑑𝑀 1  
𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑚  𝐷𝑀 1  
 𝐷𝑚 (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 
 𝑑𝑀 (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 
 𝑑𝑚 1 
𝐷𝑑𝑚𝑚  𝐷𝑚  (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
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 𝑑𝑚  (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀  𝑑𝑀  1  
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑚  𝑑𝑀  1  
 𝑑𝑚  1  
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚  𝑑𝑚  1  
 1 
B) 2 
Genotype Gametes Fitness 
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝑀  1  
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑚  𝐷𝑀  1 − 𝑠  
 𝐷𝑚 1 − 𝑠  
𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚  𝐷𝑚  1 − 𝑠  
𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑀  𝐷𝑀  1  
 𝑑𝑀 1  
𝐷𝑑𝑀𝑚  𝐷𝑀 1  
 𝐷𝑚 (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 
 𝑑𝑀 (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) 
 𝑑𝑚 1 
𝐷𝑑𝑚𝑚  𝐷𝑚  (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
 𝑑𝑚  (1 − 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠)  
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀  𝑑𝑀  1  
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑚  𝑑𝑀  1  
 𝑑𝑚  1  
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚  𝑑𝑚  1  
 3 
  4 
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Section 1: Analysis of linkage disequilibrium  1 
 The main-text undertakes an analysis of the conditions favouring a drive allele and 2 
disfavouring a modifier that either fully or partially suppresses the drive allele under the 3 
simplifying assumption of linkage equilibrium. It is reasonable to expect linkage 4 
disequilibrium between alleles at the drive and modifier loci, which could alter the 5 
effectiveness of the gene drive by gamete-killing. Here, we undertake a simple analysis of 6 
linkage disequilibrium and provide a case for support of our analysis in the main-text.  7 
 To analyse how natural selection builds linkage disequilibrium we need to consider 8 
haplotype frequencies. In a system with two loci each with two alleles (as here), linkage 9 
disequilibrium (D) is the deviation between the observed haplotype frequencies and those 10 
expected based on random combinations of alleles (Lewontin, 1974; Hartl & Clark, 2006): 11 
 12 
𝑓𝐷𝑀 = 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑀 + 𝐷  (S1.1a) 
𝑓𝐷𝑚 = 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚 − 𝐷  (S1.1b) 
𝑓𝑑𝑀 = 𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑀 − 𝐷  (S1.1c) 
𝑓𝑑𝑚 = 𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑚 + 𝐷  (S1.1d) 
 13 
It, therefore, follows that linkage disequilibrium is calculated: 14 
 15 
𝐷 = 𝑓𝐷𝑀𝑓𝑑𝑚 − 𝑓𝐷𝑚𝑓𝑑𝑀  (S1.2) 
 16 
Linkage disequilibrium can be built by natural selection due to additive and epistatic effects 17 
(Lewontin, 1974; Hastings, 1985; Hallgrímsdóttir & Yuster, 2008). Linkage disequilibrium 18 
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can arise from the additive effect because of the simultaneous selection of an allele at each 1 
locus, which creates interference between the selection at each locus. We anticipate that this 2 
is likely to occur in many scenarios of gamete-killing gene drive where both the drive and 3 
modifier alleles are favoured at their respective loci. However, this form of linkage 4 
disequilibrium is uninteresting because it does not favour an association between alleles due 5 
to the formation of a co-adapted haplotype – and so it does not change the outcome of natural 6 
selection (rather, it simply slows the rate of evolution). Linkage disequilibrium can also arise 7 
from the epistatic effect because some combinations of alleles form a co-adapted haplotype 8 
that has higher fitness than would be expected due to the additive contributions of each allele. 9 
The epistatic effect (E) is defined as (Hastings, 1985; Nagylaki, 1993): 10 
 11 
𝐸 = (𝜔𝐷𝑀 + 𝜔𝑑𝑚) − (𝜔𝐷𝑚 + 𝜔𝐷𝑚)  (S1.3) 
 12 
From this standpoint, the expected relationship between linkage disequilibrium (after one 13 
generation of selection from linkage equilibrium) and epistasis is: 14 
 15 
𝐷 = 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑀𝑓𝑚𝐸/?̅?
2  (S1.4) 
 16 
Thus, by calculating 𝐷 and extracting 𝐸 in different scenarios, we can assess the extent to 17 
which natural selection builds linkage disequilibrium because of co-adapted haplotypes. 18 
Logically, considering the five scenarios of gamete-killing gene drive, it is the epistatic effect 19 
that is critical to describing whether or not linkage disequilibrium would change the overall 20 
result because the modifier allele has the power to change the fitness effect of the drive allele 21 
(i.e. there is epistasis), which could potentially favour an association between alleles that 22 
changes the outcome of natural selection by making some haplotypes more common.   23 
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Table S1.1. The fitness of the four haplotypes of the combinations of drive/nondrive and 1 
modifier/nonmodifier alleles (𝜔𝐷𝑀, 𝜔𝐷𝑚, 𝜔𝑑𝑀, 𝜔𝑑𝑚) under different gamete-killing 2 
scenarios (see Tables S1, S2 and S3). A) Pre-meiotic killing, wherein full or partial 3 
suppression by a modifier allele is equivalent. B) Post-meiotic killing, under the scenarios of 4 
a fully or partially suppressing modifier. C) Meso-meiotic killing, under the scenarios of a 5 
fully or partially suppressing modifier. 6 
A) 7 
Haplotype Pre-meiotic; Full/Partial suppression 
𝐷𝑀 1 
𝐷𝑚 1 − 𝑓𝑚𝑠 + 𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑚𝑒(1 − 𝑠) 
𝑑𝑀 1 
𝑑𝑚 1 − 𝑓𝑚𝑠 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚𝑒(1 − 𝑠) 
 8 
B) 9 
Haplotype Post-meiotic; Full suppression Post-meiotic; Partial suppression 
𝐷𝑀 1 − 𝑓𝑚(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) 1 − (1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑀)𝑠 + 𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑚𝑒(1 − 𝑠) 
𝐷𝑚 1 − 𝑠 + (𝑓𝑑 + 𝑓𝑀 + 𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑀)𝑒(1 − 𝑠) 1 − 𝑠 + 𝑓𝑑𝑒(1 − 𝑠) 
𝑑𝑀 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) 
𝑑𝑚 1 − 𝑓𝐷(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) 1 − 𝑓𝐷(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) 
 10 
B) 11 
Haplotype Meso-meiotic; Full suppression Meso-meiotic; Partial suppression 
𝐷𝑀 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚𝑠 
𝐷𝑚 1 − 𝑠 + (1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚)𝑒(1 − 𝑠) 1 − 𝑠 + 𝑓𝑑𝑒(1 − 𝑠) 
𝑑𝑀 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) 1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) 





 To describe how natural selection affects linkage disequilibrium, we first calculate the 1 
fitness of the four haplotypes (𝜔𝐷𝑀, 𝜔𝐷𝑚, 𝜔𝑑𝑀, 𝜔𝑑𝑚; see Table S1.1). The fitness expressions 2 
are complicated and so, to simplify the analysis of linkage disequilibrium to an informative 3 
level, we restrict our attention to describe the quantity of linkage disequilibrium that natural 4 
selection builds in a single generation from the starting condition where there is linkage 5 
equilibrium (often called 𝐷0). This restriction simplifies the analysis without any loss of 6 
generality (because it allows us to identify and understand the phenomena that favour linkage 7 
disequilibrium while simply avoiding the complicating impacts of secondary, higher-order 8 
processes that arise once there is existing linkage disequilibrium). The linkage disequilibrium 9 
built by selection can be calculated using the haplotype frequencies after selection (see eqn. 10 
S1.2; i.e. 𝐷 = (𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑀𝜔𝐷𝑀/?̅?)(𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑚𝜔𝑑𝑚/?̅?) − (𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚𝜔𝐷𝑚/?̅?)(𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑀𝜔𝑑𝑀/?̅?)). To evaluate 11 
the evolution of linkage disequilibrium in the five scenarios of gamete-killing gene drive we 12 
use the definition of fitness given in Table S1.1. The expressions of linkage disequilibrium 13 
(Table S1.2) are complicated functions, hence we ignore interference and focus on the epistatic 14 
effect. 15 
Across scenarios, the properties of the epistatic effect remain broadly consistent: 16 
under no scenario is epistasis absent (𝐸 ≠ 0), the sign of the epistatic effect is always negative 17 
when the drive allele is spreading to fixation, and the size of the epistatic effect is frequency 18 
dependent. For pre-meiotic killing (under full or partial suppression, which are equivalent) 19 
and post-meiotic killing (under full or partial suppression, which are not equivalent), the 20 
epistatic effect is always negative (𝐸 < 0), which implies that selection favours the ‘repulsion’ 21 
allelic combinations (i.e. haplotypes: 𝐷𝑚, 𝑑𝑀). The strength of epistatic selection depends on 22 
allele frequencies, but this effect is opposite in these two scenarios: the size of the epistatic 23 
effect in pre-meiotic killing increases as a function of the frequency of the nonmodifier allele 24 
(𝑓𝑚), whilst for post-meiotic killing (especially under partial suppression) the size of the 25 
epistatic effect decreases as a function of the frequency of the nonmodifier allele (𝑓𝑚; and 26 
hence increases as a function of the modifier allele, 𝑓𝑀). Post-meiotic killing under full 27 
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suppression is also influenced by the frequency of the drive allele (𝑓𝐷), with the size of epistatic 1 
effect increasing with the frequency of the nondrive allele (𝑓𝑑). Like other scenarios, though 2 
here because of the constraint (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) > 1 for the drive allele to be favoured (see 3 
main-text), the epistatic effect under meso-meiotic killing always has a negative sign, and the 4 
size of the epistatic effect is also frequency-dependent: the size of the epistatic effect in meso-5 
meiotic killing increases as a function of the frequency of the unmodified drive haplotype 6 
(𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚). Therefore, across different gamete-killing scenarios, natural selection tends to build 7 
linkage disequilibrium in the same way: the negative epistatic effect builds linkage 8 
disequilibrium because selection favours the ‘repulsion’ allelic combinations (i.e. haplotypes: 9 
𝐷𝑚, 𝑑𝑀). This conclusion is unsurprising because, across scenarios, the 𝑑𝑚 haplotype is 10 
vulnerable to the drive allele’s toxin, which benefits the toxin-producing 𝐷𝑚 haplotype.    11 
  12 
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Table S1.2. Linkage disequilibrium under different scenarios of gamete-killing, and its 1 
relationship to the epistatic effect. Linkage disequilibrium (𝐷) built by natural selection after 2 
a single generation, starting from linkage equilibrium is calculated as 𝐷 = (𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑀𝜔𝐷𝑀/3 
?̅?)(𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑚𝜔𝑑𝑚/?̅?) − (𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚𝜔𝐷𝑚/?̅?)(𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑀𝜔𝑑𝑀/?̅?) (see eqn. S1.2). The epistatic effect is 4 
shown in red within the full expression for linkage disequilibrium: 𝐸 = (𝜔𝐷𝑀 + 𝜔𝑑𝑚) −5 
(𝜔𝐷𝑚 + 𝜔𝐷𝑚) (see eqn. S1.4).  6 








𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑀𝑓𝑚 (𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑀𝑠 − (1 + 𝑓𝑑 + 𝑓𝑀)𝑒(1 − 𝑠)














𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑑𝑓𝑀𝑓𝑚((1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚)𝑠 − 𝑓𝑑𝑒(1 − 𝑠)) (1 − 𝑓𝐷𝑓𝑚(𝑠 + 𝑒(1 − 𝑠))) /?̅?
2 
 7 
  8 
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How large is the size of linkage disequilibrium? Across multilocus systems, linkage 1 
disequilibrium arrives at a dynamic equilibrium between new linkage disequilibrium that is 2 
built by natural selection and existing linkage disequilibrium that is eroded by recombination. 3 
Numerous studies have shown that recombination is efficient at removing linkage 4 
disequilibrium unless genes are genetically linked by close physical proximity along the 5 
chromosome (e.g. Geiringer, 1944; Lewontin, 1964; see also Lewontin, 1974). As our model 6 
supposes the general case of a modifier elsewhere in the genome, we have no reason to assume 7 
physical proximity so most modifiers are likely to be unlinked, implying that recombination 8 
rate is close to its maximum rate for the erosion of linkage disequilibrium (of 50% per 9 
generation, or 0.5). Consequently, the level of linkage disequilibrium that can be maintained 10 
at a dynamic equilibrium is likely to be small. However, because gene drives can lead to a 11 
rapid selective sweep, the nonequilibrium level of linkage disequilibrium could be larger as a 12 
drive or modifier allele sweeps to fixation leading linkage disequilibrium to be temporarily 13 
built up faster than recombination erodes. This can be seen within the expressions of linkage 14 
disequilibrium, which could be relatively large (compared to 0.5) when there is a larger 15 
transmission effect (𝑒) and a smaller toxicity cost (𝑠). Given that a drive allele is favoured 16 
when (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) > 1 in the absence of a modifier allele, the choice of viable values for 17 
the transmission effect and toxicity cost in gene drive design are constrained, but (from the 18 
main-text) an effective gene drive would have a large transmission effect and a large toxicity 19 
cost because the magnitude of population suppression depends on the size of the toxicity cost 20 
(which is then balanced to make (1 + 𝑒)(1 − 𝑠) > 1 by having a larger transmission effect). 21 
This choice amounts to picking model parameters that lead to weaker selection (see Nagylaki 22 
1993), increasing the time that it takes for the drive allele to spread to fixation in a nonmodifier 23 
allele background and reducing the build-up of linkage disequilibrium. Therefore, overall, the 24 
size of linkage disequilibrium that is built by natural selection in our model is dependent upon 25 
the transmission effect and toxicity cost parameters that determine the rapidity that either a 26 
drive allele spreads to fixation; given the main-text’s argument for a larger transmission effect 27 
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and toxicity cost, the amount of linkage disequilibrium is likely to be relatively small 1 
compared to plausible rates of recombination.  2 
 Does linkage disequilibrium suggest alternative outcomes for natural selection? We 3 
should keep in mind that our analysis in the main-text suggests that either a modifier allele for 4 
full or partial suppression would successfully silence toxin production under pre-meiotic or 5 
post-meiotic killing, which prevents natural selection from building linkage disequilibrium 6 
because all alleles have equal fitness once a modifier is at fixation. So the purpose of 7 
introducing these scenarios was not to suggest that linkage disequilibrium might not be 8 
important, and in fact we have shown that natural selection favours linkage disequilibrium, 9 
but in these scenarios linkage disequilibrium only hastens the silencing of toxin production 10 
because it makes the nonmodifier allele have an even lower fitness (due to, by the negative 11 
sign of the epistatic effect, being more likely to be paired with the nondrive allele) – generally 12 
favouring the even more rapid invasion of a modifier allele (that is more likely to be paired 13 
with a drive allele). In this way, the additional complexity of incorporating linkage 14 
disequilibrium does not change the outcomes for pre-meiotic and post-meiotic killing. The 15 
meso-meiotic killing scenarios are more complicated. The size of the epistatic effect is smaller 16 
in these scenarios, especially when the drive and nonmodifier alleles are rare (see Table S1.2). 17 
This follows logically because the fitness of all haplotypes except the unmodified drive 18 
haplotype (𝐷𝑚) are near (if not exactly) equal, so linkage disequilibrium is only arising 19 
because of the fitness advantage to the unmodified drive haplotype. Consequently, the linkage 20 
disequilibrium favours the more rapid invasion of the drive allele. When meso-meiotic killing 21 
is evaluated with a partially suppressing modifier, the more rapid invasion of the drive allele 22 
ultimately creates the conditions that lead to the more rapid invasion of a partially suppressing 23 
modifier (that arises by mutation in a drive allele background), which reverses the sign of the 24 
epistatic effect such that selection favours the ‘coupling’ allelic combinations (i.e. haplotypes: 25 
𝐷𝑀, 𝑑𝑚) because of the fitness advantage of the modified drive haplotype (𝐷𝑀). Therefore, 26 
despite arising through slightly different means in different scenarios, linkage disequilibrium 27 
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does not suggest alternative outcomes for natural selection, but it does increase the speed of 1 
reaching a stable equilibrium for the drive and modifier loci.  2 
In summary, our simple analysis here has shown that linkage disequilibrium can play 3 
a role in gamete-killing gene drive. Under the desirable model parameters for the design of 4 
effective gene drives suggested in the main-text, the size of linkage disequilibrium is likely to 5 
be relatively small compared to plausible recombination rates, preventing a dynamically stable 6 
equilibrium with linkage disequilibrium. Further, linkage disequilibrium that does arise only 7 
increases the speed at which evolutionary changes in gene frequency occur under natural 8 
selection, rather than having the potential to change the outcome of natural selection. As a 9 
result, there is no need to consider a more complicated model of the five scenarios under 10 
linkage disequilibrium to justify the conclusions in the main-text. However, the simple 11 
analysis of linkage disequilibrium presented here suggests that, were gamete-killing to be 12 
taken forward as a mechanism of gene drive, linkage disequilibrium would likely play some 13 
role – and so should be considered.    14 
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